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Multinational Corporations and the
Emerging World Order
Lewis D. Solomon*
INTRODUCTION
T HE DEVELOPMENT of the multinational corporation' as a
global force ranks as one of the key features of the second half
of the twentieth century. Giant firms came to rely on the seem-
ingly limitless expansion of a world system characterized by a rel-
atively free flow of investment and goods among nations and the
abundant supply of cheap energy. Corporate managers viewed
the world as an open market for a consumer society resting on
the continuance of stable political arrangements which would per-
mit corporate expansion.
* Member of New York Bar; J.D. 1966, Yale Law School; B.A. 1963, Cornell
Univ.; Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School
of Law. Copyright @, 1976, Lewis D. Solomon.
i There is no generally agreed definition of a "multinational corporation,"
nor agreement on how many multinational corporations there are. A multina-
tional corporation has its base in one country and operates in other nations through
branch plants or subsidiaries which may be wholly or partially owned or by
means of joint venture or management arrangements. The parent firm has
ultimate control over its foreign affiliates, although the degree of only a dozen
"truly multinational" corporations to more than 3,000 U.S. companies with direct
investments abroad are treated as U.S. multinational for statistical purposes.
Professor Raymond Vernon of Harvard refers to 187 United States based
multinational enterprises, with manufacturing facilities in six or more countries
in RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS -PRACTICES - The Operations of Multinational U.S. Enterprises
in Developing Countries - Their Role in Trade and Development, UNCTAD, (study
by Raymond Vernon), E.72.11 D.16, at 2, 23(1972). A 1973 U.S. Tariff Com-
mission study, Implications of Multinational Firms for World Trade and Investment
and for U.S. Trade and Labor, agrees that precise definition is difficult and con-
cludes that, to reduce the definitional problem to manageable proportions, "The
study will focus on all U.S. firms engaging in foreign direct investment in
production facilities."
United States Tariff Commission, report to the Committee on Finance of
the United States Senate and its Subcommittee on International Trade on In-
vestigation No. 332-69, under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Committee
Print, February, 1973, at 83. For its basic data, the Tariff Commission study
relies on a benchmark survey taken by the Department of Commerce of all U.S.
direct investments abroad for the year 1966, which covers 3,400 U.S. enterprises
and 23,000 foreign affiliates. In that survey the U.S. Commerce Department
defined direct foreign investment " . . . to include all foreign business organiza-
tions in which a U.S. person, organization or affiliated group owns an interest of
10 percent or more. In addition, a foreign business organization in which 50
percent or more of voting stock is owned by U.S. residents is counted as a direct
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Apologists for multinational corporations point to the ability
of such firms to transmit and allocate resources as part of an
hierarchical global organization. The global firm mobilizes and
combines capital with effective management. The efficiency ad-
vantages of multinational firms, that is, the use of resources to
achieve economic growth, are stressed." Specific benefits de-
rived from the multinational form of business organization al-
legedly include optimizing resources on a worldwide level, trans-
ferring modern technology and managerial skills, supplying capital
to meet investment demands abroad, bringing new products to
consumers, and training work forces in different nations. In
short, it is maintained that global firms provide benefits for de-
veloping nations. By helping tie the world together multinational
corporations also contribute to a reduction in conflicts among na-
tions.'
foreign investment even though no single U.S. group owns as much as 10 per-
cent. U.S. Direct Investments Abroad 1966, Part 1: Balance of Payments Data,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Dec. 1970, at 2.
For other definitional variations see BROOKE & REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 5 (1970) ("A multinational company is any firm which
performs its main operations, either manufacture or the provision of service, in
at least two countries."); THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 16 (Dunning ed. 1971)
("The concept of the international or multinational producing enterprise (MPE)
... [is defined] simply as an enterprise which owns or controls producing
facilities (i.e., factories, mines, oil refineries, distribution outlets, offices, etc.) in
more than one country."); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT IN CANADA 51 (1972) ("The multinational enterprise will be defined as
the embodiment of foreign direct investment by a single business enterprise
which straddles several economies (a minimum of four or five) and divides its
global activities between different countries with a view to realizing over-all
corporate objectives.") Hymer and Rowthorn, Multinational Corporations and
International, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 58 (Kindelberger ed. 1970)
("Multinational corporations see the world as their oyster and judge their
performance on a world-wide basis. They look to their global market position.");
Rolfe, The International Corporation in Perspective, in THE MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 17 (Rolfe and Dami eds. 1970) ("An Inter-
national company may be defined as one, with foreign content of 25 percent or
more; 'foreign content' is defined as the proportion of sales, investment, produc-
tion or employment abroad."); U.N. DEPT. OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 5 (1975) (" . . . the term
'multinational corporation' is used here in the broad sense to cover all enterprises
which control assets - factories, mines, sales offices and the like - in two or more
countries."); VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 4 (1971) (large in size, operate in
a substantial number of countries, have access to a common pool of human and
financial resources, control their widespread activities). See also Aharoni,
On the Definition of a Multinational Corporation, 11 Q. REV. OF ECON. & Bus. 27
(1971).
i See, e.g., Jacoby, The Multinational Corporation, 3 CENTER MAGAZINE 37 (1970).
Fayerweather, The Internationalization of Business, 403 ANNALS 1, 4-5 (1972).
iii See, e.g., Maisonrouge, How a Multinational Corporation Appears to its
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Third World nations view the present world capitalist system
based on multinational corporations as unacceptable. The concept
of dependency flowing from deep feelings of having been ignored
and exploited in both the colonial and post-colonial periods under-
pins the quest of Third World nations for a worldwide redistribu-
tion of wealth, status, and power. The success of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) altered the global
balance of power by challenging the existing world capitalist sys-
tem. The nuclear stalemate and the efficacy of guerilla insurgency
campaigns neutralized American military power and rendered
political power less effective. Power on the international scene
has come to rest on the control of scarce resources and the ability
to construct regional economic blocs. The new system, however,
creates the specter of intensified transnational conflict. Rising
expectations may also render intolerable existing inequalities of
wealth, status, and power.
This article focuses on the impact of American multinational
corporations on the economic, cultural and political processes of
developing nations, the response of such countries to multinational
entities, and other means which have been proposed to control and
regulate global firms. In formulating policy recommendations
regarding the accountability of multinational corporations, this
article relies on an interdisciplinary social science approach.
The current conflict between multinational firms and develop-
ing countries forms part of a larger struggle between industrialized
nations and Third World countries. A preliminary assessment of
the possible future changes in the world system is underway.
This article also explores the means for facilitating a global transfer
of wealth, status and power and the possibilities for building a
system which will produce benefits for industrialized nations,
Third World countries and multinational corporations.
Implicit in the discussion of sharing the benefits and the costs
of the organization of production across national lines and de-
termining who should make such decisions, is the need to formulate
the goals of the emerging world order. The present period of crisis
and transition may provide an unparalleled opportunity for a funda-
mental reexamination of the economic, political and social institu-
Managers, in GLOBAL COMPANIES 19 (Ball ed. 1975). But compare, Alger, The Multi-
national Corporation and the Future International System, 403 ANNALS 104, 112 (1972).
Horowitz, Capitalism, Communism, and Multinationalism, in THE NEW SOVEREIGNS
133-137 (Said and Simmons eds. 1975) argues that multinational corporations
may have lifted the United States and the Soviet Union out of the cold war by
producing a common set of national interests based on economic realities.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tions - global corporations, nation-states, regional groupings, eco-
nomic blocs, and transnational arrangements - which currently
produce, control and distribute wealth, status and power. This
article raises the possibility for a new 'World order resting on the
creation of organizations and institutions that will further human
growth and development and enable individuals to realize their po-
tentialv through participation in decision making and an equitable
distribution of the world's bounty. Others hopefully will be led to
rethink the present arrangements and investigate other alterna-
tives, including the need for and the possibilities of achieving a
new set of more self-contained economic, political and social insti-
tutions.
I. THE CONCEPT OF DEPENDENCY
Developing countries perceive multinational corporations and
the worldwide capitalistic system as perpetuating the dependency'
of such countries on industrialized nations, even after the ending of
iv See Solomon, Towards a Federal Policy on Work Restructuring the Governance
of Corporations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263 (1975).
1 The literature on dependency is vast. Leading works include: Galtung, A
Structural Theory of Imperialism, 13 J. OF PEACE RESEARCH 81 (1971); FRANK,
CAPITALISM AND JNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1967); Frank, The De-
velopment of Underdevelopment, in LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR
REVOLUTION 3 (Frank ed. 1959); BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH,
Ch. 5-7 (1965); Amin, Development and Structural Changes: African Experience, in
THE WIDENING GAP: DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970's 312 (Ward, Runnals and D'Anjou
eds. 1971); Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 231 (1970);
Sunkel, Big Business and 'Dependencia,' 50 FOR. AFF. 517 (1972); Weisskopf,
Capitalism, Underdevelopment and the Future of the Poor Countries, in ECONOMICS
AND WORLD ORDER FROM THE 1970'S TO THE 199 0 's 43 (Bhagwati ed. 1972); Seers,
Big Companies in Small Countries, 16 KYKLOS 4 (1963); Bodenheimer, Dependency
and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment, in READINGS IN
U.S. IMPERIALISM 155 (Fann & Hodges eds. 1971); Muller, The Multinational
Corporation and the Underdevelopment of the Third World, in THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 124 (Wilber ed. 1973). See also U.N.,
DEPT. OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 47-48, 53-54
(1973), and West, Economic Dependence and Policy in Developing Countries, in
LEADING ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 160-163 (Bergsten and Tyler
eds. 1973). GRIFFIN, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SPANISH AMERICA 117 (1969) views
dependency not in terms of the expansion of a given socio-economic system but
of a rapid and fundamentally political socio-economic transformation. But see
UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 22, (1972) where Prof. Vernon
concludes, "My impression is that, when measured in narrow economic terms
the operations of U.S.-based subsidiaries in the less developed countries have
benefited those countries on balance, as compared with any of the likely avail-
able alternatives." For a critique of the dependency theory see also Ray, The
Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment, 15 J. oF INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES AND WORLD AFF. 4 (1973).
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formal colonial relationships in the post-World War II period.2
In the view of Third World nations multinational corporations
have redistributed wealth from the underdeveloped periphery to the
centers of industrial power and decision making by securing effec-
tive economic, political and cultural dominance for certain countries
such as the United States. 3
Analysts fear that participation in the international capitalist
system of trade, investment and organization of production creates
an international polarization between the sophisticated center
countries and the developing nations on the periphery. The needs
of industries in the center set the order of priorities. Strategic de-
cisions are made in centralized corporate hierarchies in a few global
cities with the rest of the world confined to lower levels of activity
and income. Income, status, authority and consumption patterns
radiate from the hierarchical system of multinational corporations
headquartered in world cities located in the center.
One step below the corporations in world cities lie plants
located in lesser cities. The corporations provide a centralized
framework for control, determine global strategy, innovate a never-
ending flow of new products and dispense a flow of information,
while the plants handle and manage day-to-day activities. These
lesser cities adjust to the commands emanating from the upper
echelons, and engage in coordination and supervision of production
and distribution. At the periphery, nations produce raw materials
needed by the center and carry out certain phases of industrial
production under foreign control. According to dependency theo-
rists, the development of the entire system, integrated in a vertical
hierarchical structure, is shaped to meet the global strategy and
2 Developing countries tend to associate foreign capital with colonial rule.
See Hirschman, Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America, in LATIN
AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS 3 (Hirschman ed. 1961).
3An example of dependence was pre-Allende Chile, which exported a single
product (copper comprised 80 percent of exports). Foreign firms penetrated
and dominated the economy and repatriated profits out of Chile. From 1945 to
the early 1970's, U.S. firms remitted $7.2 billion from Chile while providing
only $1 billion. Rosen, The Open Door Imperative and U.S. Foreign Policy, in
TESTING THEORIES OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 125 (Rosen and Kurth eds. 1974).
Chile also had ample coal and petroleum, yet imported fuels. It was a major ex-
porter of wheat and livestock, but relied on imported food from the United States.
FRANK, LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION 102 (1969). Weak
institutional structures also pervade developing countries and include antiquated
governmental legal structures, a lack of competent and independent administra-
tors, a weak labor movement, and a lack of competition from local business.
BARNETT AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS 137-139 (1974) [hereinafter cited as GLOBAL REACH].
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expansionist needs and plans of multinational firms. Multination-
al corporations control operations based on a global strategy de-
veloped outside of and without regard to the interests of host na-
tions. Foreign subsidiaries conduct truncated operations, not a full
line of functions.
Under the theory of dependency, growth in the developing na-
tions occurs as a reflex of the expansionistic drives of multinational
firms and the economic systems of the dominant countries. As
the world divides between the center and the periphery, three
types of concentration - partner, commodity, and trading - may
occur. The center has many trading partners. A country at the
periphery generally establishes trade relationships with one or two
partners. The center produces and trades in a diversified range of
products while the periphery concentrates only on a few primary
exports to pay for its imports. Finally capital intensive, high skill
activities with significant spinoff effects in other areas characterize
the center. The periphery, on the other hand, concentrates on
labor intensive, low skill activities with a limited spinoff thrust.4
It is charged that economic exploitation results from the in-
corporation of developing nations into the world capitalistic sys-
tem. This, in turn, produces underdevelopment, slow economic
growth, and technological backwardness, as the center controls the
economic potentials of the periphery. The center's power grows
through technological progress, while the periphery is relegated to
the function of a raw material supplier. The integration of de-
veloping countries into the world capitalistic system defines and
delimits the alternatives available for Third World nations.
But does dependency constitute a continuing situation in which
the possibilities for development are predetermined, and does the
world capitalistic system necessarily involve continued expansion
and exploitation? After examining the factual basis for the con-
cept of dependency through an analysis of the economic, cultural
and political impacts of global firms on developing nations, the
efforts of developing countries to extricate themselves from the
so-called iron law of dependency will be discussed.
A. Analysis of the Theory of Dependency
Economic problems constitute the mainstay of the dependency
theory. It is alleged that developing countries face declining terms
of trade and are plundered by firms engaged in extracting raw
4 Hymer, The Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational Enterprise, 60 AM.
ECON. REV. 441 (1970); Hymer, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Un-
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materials. In manufacturing operations multinational corporations
engage in transfer pricing and restrictive business practices, and
support technologies and social structures inimical to rounded de-
velopment. Reliance on foreign technology creates a fear of tech-
nological dependence, unfair competition and foreign control over
industry. Multinational firms may also acquire local firms and
gain control over financial and capital markets.
The net result of multinational activity in raw material extraction
and manufacturing is the generation of "excess" profits which
multinationals repatriate to their home country, adversely affect-
ing a host nation's balance of payments. The outflow of national
wealth weakens a country's capacity to develop a local capital
market and indigenous firms as well as its capacity to develop an
independent technological base. The cultural and political ques-
tions must not be overlooked. The elite in developing countries
follow consumption patterns of advanced countries. Multina-
tional firms create clientele groups whose interests, privileges
and status derive from their ties to foreign enterprises and who
desire to assure that these firms continue to play a preeminent
role in a local economy. In addition the firms may intervene
directly or indirectly in a nation's political process. The global
corporations may also produce a fear of a loss of national sov-
ereignty and identity on the part of nation-states and reduce the
choices available for a host country. Conflicts may arise between
the economic goals of a corporation and the broader policies of a
nation-state. A country may develop a branch plant outlook
which affects its broad range decision-making power.
B. Economic Factors
1. Raw Materials
The intertwining of developing nations into the world capitalist
system generates at least two problems in terms of raw materials
produced in such nations. First, developing countries allege that
their respective primary commodity exports, apart from ownership
of such materials by global firms, face declining "terms of trade."5
even Development, in ECONOMICS AND WORLD ORDER FROM THE 1970's TO THE
1990's, 124-126, 129 (Bhagwati ed. 1972).
5 Prebisch viewed the benefits from technological change and increased
productivity as spreading to the center of the world system based on an analysis
of the long-run downward trend in the terms of trade between the manufactured
products exported from Great Britain to Latin America and the primary products
imported into Great Britain from Latin America since the late 19th century.
See Prebisch, Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, 49 AM. EcON.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Terms of trade deteriorate when import prices rise faster than
export prices. A widely held belief exists that the prices of raw
material exports failed to keep pace with the upward spiral in the
price of manufactured goods imported from industrialized nations.
In support of the theory of declining terms of trade, a recent study
by the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) indicates that between 1953 and 1972
the terms of trade for the commodities covered, which include about
two-thirds of the total value of commodity exports excluding
petroleum, declined about 2.2 percent annually on the average. 6
The report concluded, "The analysis presented in . . . this note
would appear to establish fairly conclusively that the net barter
terms of trade of a large number of primary commodities, ac-
counting for the bulk of the commodity exports (excluding pe-
troleum) of developing countries, have deteriorated substantially
over the last 25 years." 7 However, another study prepared for the
Secretary General of UNCTAD by a group of experts found that
for a broad range of products, again excluding petroleum, prices
of raw materials during the past 25 years rose about as much as
prices of manufactured goods. The group found no clear evidence
of a long-term deterioration in the terms of trade of developing
countries, although the terms of trade were subject to substantial
short-term fluctuations. 8
Although further analysis must be undertaken, it appears likely
that since 1950 prices of raw material exports from developing
REV. 251 (1970). DiMarco, The Evolution of Prebisch's Economic Thought and
Dadone and DiMarco, The Impact of Prebisch's Ideas on Modern Economic Analysis,
in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT 20 (DiMarco ed. 1972); See also
LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, 19-22 (1975). For criticisms of
Prebisch's conclusions and methodology see Ellsworth, The Terms of Trade be-
tween Primary Producing and Industrial Countries, 9 INTER-AMERICAN ECON. AFF. 47
(1956) (decline in prices British paid for primary products 1876 to 1905 stemmed
from a substantial decline in inward freight rates); Haberler, Terms of Trade and
Economic Development, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA 275 (Ellis
ed. 1961) (annual index of U.K. commodity terms of trade too narrow); Flanders,
Prebisch on Protectionism: An Evaluation, 74 ECON. J. 305 (1964).
6UNCTAD SECRETARIAT, TERMS OF TRADE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6
(1975) (UNCTAD/CD/Misc. 60).
I d. at 14. See also Cairncross, How Best to Help Third World, Manchester
Guardian, Sept. 20, 1975, at 7, cols. 3, 4, 5 and Maidenberg, Poor Sugar - Ex-
porting Lands Hard Pressed by Price Slump, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1976, at 59, col.
2. 2 Dale, Idea of Growing Disparity in World Prices Disputed, N.Y. Times, May
25, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 2; See also LAW, supra note 4, at 22-23 (1975). For
further clarification see United Nations Press Section Office of Public Informa-
tion, Note 3916, May 27, 1975.
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countries have declined relative to prices of manufactured imports. 9
The declining terms of trade concept underpins the argument that
the world capitalist economy automatically and inexorably works
against developing nations. Both past and future studies must be
approached critically, however, because of the problems inherent
in constructing terms of trade indices. Difficulties include com-
paring the value of import packages which shift composition be-
cause of technological change, the appearance of new materials
such as synthetics, and the growing emphasis on recycling. The
rising share of services in the economics of developed countries
also adversely affects the demand for primary commodity prod-
ucts. A shift has also occurred in the pattern of the quality and
quantity of traded goods. Productivity changes must also be
taken into account. Use of index numbers involves such matters
as determining the weighting system, a suitable base period, in-
clusion of certain countries and whether the index should be based
on actual price quotations or unit values derived from trade sta-
tistics. 10
In addition to the likelihood that raw material exports from
developing countries encountered declining terms of trade since
1950, foreign ownership and exploitation of natural resources by
global firms have enraged developing nations. Multinational
corporations engaged in extractive industries were viewed as too
rapidly drawing nonrenewable resources from the soil, seeking only
high profits and lacking interest in local development." Con-
siderable skepticism pervaded Third World nations about the value
returned to such nations by direct foreign investment in mineral
extraction. The mere existence of raw material producing, foreign-
owned enclaves also constituted a source of resentment. 12  On
the other hand, other observers have emphasized the contribution
of foreign capital to local development through the generation of
9 Power, Of Raw Materials, Raw Statistics and Raw Deals, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1975, at 15, col. 2 concludes: "In the 1950's prices fell, although from a high and
untypical peak. In the 1960's, using the old techniques of measuring, terms of
trade fluctuated around a fairly flat mean. And now in the 1970's, after a short
boom, they are moving downward again. And once the double factorial method
is refined we may well get confirmation that a much grimmer situation has pre-
vailed."
10 See Stobaugh, Systemic Bias and the Terms of Trade, 49 REV. OF ECON. AND
STAT. 617 (1967).
11 See e.g., BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH 197 (1957); Evans,
National Autonomy and Economic Development: Critical Perspectives on Multinational
Corporations in Poor Countries, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 325 (Keohane and
Nye eds. 1971).
12 VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 50 (1971).
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foreign exchange and tax revenues. 13  Until recently it was
doubted whether developing nations possessed sufficient capital,
know-how and other skills, and access to an international sales
network to develop their raw material wealth. 14  This line of
reasoning has come under attack1s and increasingly more gov-
ernments are seizing ownership and control of raw materials from
global firms.
2. Manufacturing Enterprises
In the 1950's, developing countries turned to a new develop-
ment strategy; namely, encouragement of foreign direct investment
in manufacturing industries designed to reduce a nation's depen-
dence on the importation of such products.16 Together with the
relentless quest by multinational corporations for expansion, the
trend toward establishing manufacturing plants exacerbated the
economic plight faced by the developing world. As a result,
problems arose such as use of transfer pricing, restrictive business
practices, transfer of inappropriate technology, lack of local re-
search and development and the impact on industrial organization,
capital markets and balance of payments.
a. Transfer Pricing
Intrafirm transactions between a parent and its subsidiaries
enable multinational corporations to maximize global profits.
These intrafirm exchanges replace market transactions and enable
multinational firms to evade many of the checks on corporate
behavior provided by national laws. Intrafirm transactions may
take a number of forms including: 1) locating profits in a sub-
sidiary in a country with lower tax rates (conversely restricting
profits where taxes are higher) thereby reducing a corporation's
13 Mikesell, The Contribution of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to Economic
Development, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES
3 (Mikesell ed. 1971); Vernon, Foreign Enterprises and Developing Nations in The
Raw Materials Industries, 60 AM. EcON. REV. 122 (1970).
14 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 13 (1974); Zinser, Alternative Means of
Meeting Argentina's Petroleum Requirements, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETRO-
LEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES 189 (Mikesell ed. 1971); Cruft, Comment, in
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 97 (Wallace ed. 1974).
15 TANZER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL OIL AND THE UNDER-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, Ch. 22 (1969).
16 VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 99 (1971); GORDON AND GROMMERS, UNITED
STATES MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL (1962); Baranson, The Automo-
tive Industry in the LDCs, 3 COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus. 49 (1968).
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total tax burden on a worldwide system of operations; 2) with-
drawing funds from a given subsidiary (for example, in the face of
limits on repatriation or the expectation of foreign exchange losses
if a country devalues its currency) by increasing prices on the
goods sold to such subsidiary by other subsidiaries in a multina-
tional corporation; and, 3) financing a subsidiary by reducing prices
on goods sold to such subsidiary by other subsidiaries in the multi-
national corporation. 17
From the viewpoint of a developing country, transfer pricing
results in a subsidiary located in such a nation paying higher prices
on imports, especially so-called intermediate goods, than prevail
in so-called independent markets. These techniques may cause a
loss of taxes and foreign exchange for a developing country. Low
reported profit levels may deter local competition and perpetuate
dependence.
From the viewpoint of a multinational corporation, various
factors external to the firm influence it in its decision to engage in
transfer pricing. Such factors include the tariff barriers in force
in the importing country, the absolute and relative difference in
tax rates, actual and expected exchange rate differentials, and gov-
ernment policies on remittance transfers. The internal reasons
for corporations' use of transfer prices include varying degrees of
ownership of subsidiaries, a desire to place profits where owner-
ship is the highest, the goal of reducing profits for wage negotia-
tions purposes, and using pricing as a means of allocating markets
among subsidiaries.
Publicly available studies indicate that multinational corpora-
tions generally engage in transfer pricing in their operations in
developing countries - particularly in overpricing the goods im-
ported by developing countries and underpricing the export items
produced by such nations. A leading study by the Colombian gov-
ernment of a wide range of pharmaceutical imports showed an
overpricing by global firms, in comparison with world market
17 ROBBINS AND STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 91
(1973). For examples of different approaches to transfer pricing see TUGENDUAT,
THE MULTINATIONALS 147-49 (1971) (citing Dr. James S. Shulman, unpublished
thesis, Transfer Pricing in Multinational Business, (1966); Carley, Lands of Op-
portunity, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 16, 1972, at 1, col. 6; Rose, The Rewarding
Strategies of Multinationalism, FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1968, at 104. Other transfer
pricing techniques include allocation of overhead and joint costs, such as explor-
ation, research and development, and advertising and overpricing the plant
and equipment used to set up or expand a foreign facility. Other interaffiliate
transactions include altering the speed with which a bill to or from a subsidiary
in another country is paid (the so-called "leads and lags" technique).
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prices, of 155 percent in 1968 and 87 percent for the 1967 to 1970
period compared with 19 percent on products imported by locally
owned firms. Selected rubber imports were overpriced by 44
percent (in comparison with zero overpricing by local firms), some
chemical imports by subsidiaries of global firms were overpriced
by 25 percent, and electrical components by 54 percent. For 11 of
14 foreign firms surveyed in Colombia in 1966-1967, the profit
accruing from overpricing exceeded declared profits.18  Con-
versely, foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations in Co-
lombia underpriced a number of export products, including tim-
ber, processed fish and precious metals.19 Another study of Latin
i8 UNCTAD, POLICIES RELATING TO TECHNOLOGY IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE
ANDEAN PACT: THEIR FOUNDATIONS (Doe. No. TD/107 prepared by the Junta
del Acuerdo de Cartegena 1971) at Par. 128-129. In the Chilean pharmaceutical
industry, imports by foreign subsidiaries were overpriced by 30 to 500 percent;
in Peru the range was 20 to 300 percent. Id. A parent may drain profits from
a subsidiary that faces difficult labor negotiations or if another party owns a
major share of a subsidiary, or if profit remittances are blocked by government
regulation. It may also seek to evade currency-exchange restrictions and losses
from currency devaluations. In the Colombian pharmaceutical industry in 1968,
reported profits were 3.4 percent of the effective return, royalties 14 percent
and overpricing 82.6 percent. The drug companies in the sample overpriced
imports by $3 million and estimates of the cost of the whole drug industry of
the Colombia balance of payments in 1968 runs as high as $20 million. TURNER,
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD 59-60 (1973); Shulman, When
The Price Is Wrong by Design, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT 184 (Stonehill ed. 1970). A number of foreign subsidiaries may show
"losses" each year yet mysteriously continue in business. See also Brundenius,
The Anatomy of Imperialism: The Case of the Multinational Mining Corporation in
Peru, 9 J. OF PEACE RESEARCH 189 (1972); Muller, Multinational Corporation and
the Underdevelopment of the Third World, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOP-
MENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 143-144 (Wilber ed. 1973) (Table 4 Overpricing of
Imported Intermediate Parts by Foreign Ownership Structure: Colombia 1968);
BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 158 (1974); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SECTORAL
STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA: THE AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY 21, 24 (1974). (Transfer pricing interaffiliate charges, intra-corporate
debt in foreign subsidiaries in automobile industry in Latin America); Lall,
Transfer Pricing by Multinational Manufacturing Firms, 35 OXFORD BULL. OF ECON.
AND STAT. 173, 185-87 (1973); BARANSON, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (1969); UNCTAD, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INCOME EFFECTS OF
PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING: CASE STUDIES OF COLOMBIA
AND MALAYSIA (Doc. No. TD/B/C.3(vi)/Misc. 1 prepared by Lall and May-
hew 1973); H. S. Walker, Permenant Representative of Jamaica to the U.N.,
SUMMARY OF THE COMMENTS OF THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE GROUP OF EMINENT
PERSONS TO STUDY THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOP-
MENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 424, E.74.1I.A.9. (1974) [hereinafter cited
as GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS]. (Pricing of inputs and outputs is believed to be
contrived to avoid local taxation and frustrate exchange controls.)
11 UNCTAD, POLICIES RELATING TO TECHNOLOGY IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE
ANDEAN PACT: THEIR FOUNDATIONS (Doc. No. TD/107 prepared by the Junta del
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American exporters of manufactured goods in 10 Latin American
countries in the 1966-1969 period suggests that multinational enter-
prises underpriced exports by an average of 40 percent. 2°
In addition to the methodological infirmities of such studies21
and the facile denials by multinational corporations, 22 several
structural factors internal to multinational firms, may in the future
minimize the scope of transfer pricing. First, the latitude avail-
able to firms depends upon the percentage of the total output for
a given subsidiary (or for an industry or foreign subsidiaries as a
whole) represented by local expenses incurred by that sub-
sidiary. 23  If, as seems likely, an overwhelming percentage of
Acuerdo de Cartegena 1971) at Par. 128-129. See also Muller and Morgenstern,
Multinational Corporations and Balance of Payments Impacts on LDCs An Econometric
Analysis of Export Pricing Behavior, 27 KYKLOS 304, 306 (1974); Statement of Ronald
Muller, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, THE MULTI-
NATIONALS FUNCTION AND FUTURE 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 74 (1974).
20 Muller and Morgenstern, supra note 19, at 304.
21 VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 139 (1971). One critical problem involves
establishing world independent market prices as a basis for comparison.
22 See e.g., Emil Collado, Executive Vice-President Exxon Corporation, GROUP
or EMINENT PERSONS 34 (1974) (The manipulation of prices usually neither feas-
ible nor desirable in light of severe penalties for using improper transfer prices);
Maisonrouge, The Mythology of Multinationalism, 9 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 7, 11
(1974) (IBM prices according to a uniform standard involving the cost of pro-
duction of the item to be imported plus a fixed markup); Champion Spark
Plug Company Paper Submitted to Subcommittee on International Trade Com-
mittee on Finance, December 29, 1972, in Senate Compendium (1973) (Cham-
pion's prices to foreign subsidiaries are essentially the same in each country
with minor fluctuations due to volume). See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, REALITIES: MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES RESPOND ON BASIC ISSUES
54-60 (1974). (Caterpillar Tractor Co. and Pfizer Inc. divided profits accord-
ing to the subsidiaries, respective contributions to finished products). But com-
pare BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 278 (1974). ("... [I]t is clear that
the practice of charging transfer prices which deviate from market value is in-
creasingly widespread."). Braun, International Control From the Standpoint of the
European Economic Community, in INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 54 (Wal-
lace ed. 1974), notes: "It is practically beyond question that multinational corn-
panies manipulate internal price relations so as to locate their profits either in
the country of the mother company or in countries where taxes are lowest."
Empirical studies disputing the pervasive existence of transfer pricing include
GREENE AND DUERR, INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTIONS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM,
21-22 (1970). A survey of 130 U.S. firms indicated that many of such corpora-
tions treated foreign subsidiaries as "unrelated" parties and charge competitive
prices. TUGENDHAT, THE MULTINATIONALS 145-148 (1971) (Study of eight U.S.
firms with overseas interests. Only two regularly use transfer prices to maxi-
mize worldwide after-tax profits. Among the remaining six, arm's length pric-
ing is used to avoid conflict as to where to show the highest profit and to project
a good citizen image with a host country). A few multinational corporations
admit juggling transfer pricing. And the Wall Street Journal reported,
"An executive of one big international oil company says prices between sub-
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the value of a product is produced locally, little room exists for
multinational corporations to enjoy the benefits accruing from
overpricing imports. Second, the size and complexity of orga-
nizations force managers to dull their pencils somewhat and rely
on rules of thumb, not the most sophisticated tools. 24  Studies
have shown that medium size firms, but not large corporations,
tend to favor more flexible pricing procedures which take into
account varying circumstances and relationships between the
parent and its foreign subsidiaries.25 Use of transfer pricing may
pose intrafirm morale problems and conflicts among executives in
parent and subsidiary corporations. Finally, governments increas-
ingly attempt to contain the use of transfer pricing, subject to the
sidiaries are controlled by the company's headquarters, which "tilts" the prices
one way or another, depending on the situation.
The treasurer of another company says he sometimes resorts to manipula-
tion especially when a foreign government blocks a subsidiary's profit remit-
tances to the parent." Carley, Profit Probes, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1974,
at 1, col. 6. See also ARPAN, INTERNATIONAL INTRACORPORATE PRICING: NON-
AMERICAN SYSTEMS AND VIEWS (1972) which analyzes the pricing systems used
by 60 foreign firms.
23 Statistics exist as to the value of intrafirm transactions. The United
Nations group of Eminent Persons estimated that more than one-quarter of the
value of all international trade is in goods of an intragroup character. In addi-
tion the intracorporate transactions occur in services, research and development,
and administrative functions, making the scope for price manipulation quite ex-
tensive. U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 88 (1974). Barnet
and Muller estimate that 50 percent of all U.S. exports (excluding agricultural
transactions) are bypassing the market. BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH
266-67 (1974). Solomon, International Control of Investment in the Trade Sector, in
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 16-18 (Wallace ed. 1974) states that 10
percent of all U.S. exports involved possible non-arm's-length transactions with
a relatively higher percentage of these goods going to developing as opposed to
developed countries. He estimates that 5 percent of all world trade is on a non-
arm's-length basis. See also Lupo, Worldwide Sales by U.S. Multinational Com-
panies, 53 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. 33 (1973); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SECTORAL
STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA: THE AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY (1974) indicates that for multinationals in general and automotive
multinationals in particular, inter-affiliate transactions are probably in excess of
50 percent of total transactions between Latin America and the rest of the world.
21 Stobaugh, The Multinational Corporation: Measuring the Consequences, 6
COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus. 59 (1971).
's But compare Guisinger, The Rise of the Multinational Corporation and U.S.
Trade Policy, 54 Soc. Sci. Q. 552, 559 (1973); ROBBINS & STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 91-92 (1973); Stobaugh, supra note 24, at 59 notes
that multinational corporations which spend greater than average amounts on
research and development seem to be more reluctant than other corporations to
use financial techniques which might upset local authorities.
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ability to gain sufficient knowledge and administer such provisions
in a noncorrupt manner.15
Because of the difficulty in establishing an arm's length price
for goods, especially in oligopolistic markets for complex products
in a world of currency fluctuations and language barriers, the
advantage probably lies with the multinational corporation. The
ability to juggle royalty and management fees, other overhead costs
and the small number of expert nation-state personnel further
contributes to the power of multinational corporations. As one
observer concluded, "Though the host government can insist on
seeing the books of the local subsidiary, it cannot examine the
books of the parent, and even if it could, it would not have the
highly trained manpower to make informed reallocations of earn-
ings and costs."27
b. Restrictive Business Practices
In the post-World War II period, developing countries, as
previously noted, encouraged foreign direct investment in manu-
facturing plants that would produce import substitute items. These
industries required, however, additional imports in the form of
capital goods, plants, equipment and raw materials. Lack of a
Carley, Profit Probes, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 6;
ROBBINS AND STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAl ',5"-EP"RISE 92 (1973).
The governmental requirements and the organizational constraints of the firm
led Robbins and Stobaugh, id., at 92, to conclude that the use of transfer pricing
is substantially below its indicated potential. See also statement of Hans Schaf-
fner (member United Nations Group of Eminent Persons and Chairman of
Sandoz A.B. (Swiss Drug and Chemical Company)) who stated that in the great
majority of instances, transfer pricing poses no problem because of the existence
of arm's length prices and because transactions are under the scrutiny of many
authorities who would reach to evidence of a zigzag policy. U.N., THE IMPACT
OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974). The United States uses Section 482 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to achieve arm's length intra-corporate
pricing. For the experiences of 'American corporations with Section 482 see
DUERR, TAX ALLOCATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1972). (Ch. 3 sets forth
the reallocation formulas involving the pricing of goods). See also Hammer,
Morrione and Ryan, Concepts and Techniques in Determining the Reasonableness of
Intercompany Pricing Between United States Corporations and Their Overseas Sub-
sidiaries, N.Y.U. 30TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1407 (1972); Bischel, Tax. Allocations
Concerning Inter-Company Pricing Transactions in Foreign Operations: A Reappraisal,
13 VA. J. INT'L L. 490 (1973). Keegan, Multinational Pricing: How Far Is Arm's
Length?, 4 COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus. 57 (1969). American corporations particu-
larly object to the administration of Section 482, and allege that agents do not
follow Internal Revenue Service's regulations, that their determinations were
arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent with previous findings.
27 Speech by George W. Ball at The New School for Social Research Sym-
posium in New York City, April 5-6, 1974.
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sufficient home market impeded profitability. Developing coun-
tries then sought to penetrate markets in other countries by ex-
porting in the hope of earning vitally needed foreign exchange,
and by absorbing excess plant capacity. 28 The export restric-
tions imposed by a parent multinational corporation over its foreign
subsidiaries tended to thwart this strategy.
The imposition of export restrictions by multinational corpora-
tions on their foreign subsidiaries appears pervasive. A study by
an organ of the Andean Common Market of over 400 contracts
for the transfer of technology shows that approximately 81 percent
of such contracts prohibited the use of the transferrred technology
for producing exports, while 86 percent of the contracts contained
export restrictions (for example, to certain countries or areas).
Two-thirds of the technology contracts in Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru, which the Andean Group analyzed, also had
tie-in clauses requiring the purchase of intermediate and capital
goods from the same source providing the technology.29 Other
studies by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment have indicated the extent of restrictive practices.3
21 See generally BARANSON, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1969) for an analysis of the pressure by developing nations to manufacture
for export and the response of multinational corporations. By 1968, exports of
subsidiaries of American corporations represented 40 percent of all manufactur-
ing exports from Latin America. UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES
(study by Raymond Vernon), E.72.11. D.16, at 15, 16 (1972). One impact of
export restrictions is the relatively poor export performance of U.S. corporations
in Latin America. United States manufacturing subsidiaries in Latin America
export less than 10 percent of total sales; while in Europe, U.S. subsidiaries
average 25 percent. Belli, Sales of Foreign Affiliates to U.S. Firms, 50 SURVEY OF
CURRENT Bus. 20 (1970). Further research must be undertaken breaking down
export performance to other countries within a region (for instance, Latin Amer-
ica) and to the rest of the world by U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries in different
countries in relation to domestic firms.
29 UNCTAD, POLICIES RELATING TO TECHNOLOGY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
ANDEAN PACT: THEIR FOUNDATIONS (A study by the Board of the Cartagena
Agreement) TD/ 107 (1971), TD/107/Corr. I at para. 127-128 (1972). An analysis
of 451 contracts by country showed the following prohibitions on exports: Bolivia,
77 percent; Colombia, 77 percent; Chile, 73 percent; Ecuador, 75 percent; and
Peru, 89 percent. Overall, by different industries, the figures were as follows:
textiles, 88 percent; pharmaceuticals, 89 percent; chemicals, 78 percent; food and
beverage, 73 percent; and other, 91 percent. See also BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL
REACH 163 (1974).
30 UNCTAD, RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS IN FOREIGN COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS
IN INDIA (prepared by Indian Investment Center) TD/B/389 (1971) indicating 40
percent of technical collaboration agreements with foreign firms by public and
private firms in Indian contained export restrictions: UNCTAD, RESTRICTIONS
ON EXPORTS IN FOREIGN COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL-
IPPINES TD/B/388 (1972) (65 percent of the contracts studied contained export
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From the viewpoint of a multinational corporation, export
restrictions may appear rational. The parent fears the loss of
control over the management of a subsidiary and seeks the preser-
vation of its distribution channels.31 However, such practices
perpetuate the dependency position of developing countries. More
sophisticated defenders of multinational corporations rely on a
comparative advantage argument as theoretically countering the
extent of export restrictive practices. 32  The economic interest
argument runs as follows: It is unlikely that firms would restrict
exports from subsidiaries which possess the capacity of producing
and marketing their products competitively in terms of price and
quality, provided continuation and expansion of exports can rea-
sonably be assured. This line of reasoning does not appear to
counter the objection of a developing country desiring to increase
the exportation of its industrial products, but lacking a significant
price or quality advantage.33 With the trend to global supplying
restrictions). See also UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (Doc. No.
TD/122/Supp. 1 1972), at 38-49 and UNCTAD REPORT OF THE AD Hoc GROUP
OF EXPERTS, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES IN RELATION TO THE TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Doc. No. TD/B/C 2/119 1973); U.N.,
THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 65-66 (1974) (citing Pakistani
study); Frankena, Restrictions on Exports by Foreign Investors: The Case of India, 6
J. WORLD TRADE L. 575 (1972) (restrictions on exports found to comprise a sig-
nificant trade barrier). GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN CANADA 153-182 (1972) (surveys use of export restrictions by U.S. multi-
national corporations). INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 32 (1974), states that
territorial arrangements accompanying patent and know-how licensing are
customary.
31 UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (study by Raymond Vernon),
E.72.11. D.16, at 17 (1972).
32 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 32 (1974). See generally INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REALITIES: MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES RESPOND ON
BASIC ISSUES 40-46 (1974), for responses to an inquiry regarding export market
allocation by parent firms. More ardent defenders of multinational corpora-
tions point out that export restrictions may stem from cost-raising import sub-
stitution policies and maintenance of an over-valued currency. Johnson, The
Multinational Corporation as a Development Agent, 5 COLUM. J. OF WORLD BUS. 25,
29 (1970). Hans Schaffer, a member of the U.N. Group of Eminent Persons
maintained that the multinational corporations producing highly specialized
industrial commodities cannot completely avoid export restrictions and the eco-
nomic conditions of the country of importation may require such measures.
U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 157 (1974).
33 This is frankly acknowledged by Olivetti who states: "Local govern-
ment's expectation of establishing an uncontrolled export policy and practice has
been resisted with a certain success. A global export system has been adopted
with due regard however to the aspirations of individual countries in this re-
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of components by complex multinational firms, export restrictions
may become less important and pervasive. But the global firm,
not the developing country, still decides on the location of a plant
and the quantity of production. With the ability of multinational
corporations to shift production facilities to developing countries
and use such sites for export purposes, the firm's policy with
respect to the price of such exports assumes paramount impor-
tance.
c. Technology Questions
Whether a developing country seeks manufacturing plants for
import and export purposes, reliance on foreign subsidiaries of
multinational corporations creates problems in terms of the ap-
propriateness of the technology transferred. These problems can
include the form of managerial know-how or production tech-
niques, both labor and the type of products sold, questions re-
garding the lack of local research, products and processes, and
development and impediments posed by the patent system. Op-
ponents of multinational corporations perceive global enterprises
as transferring sophisticated technology irrelevant to the needs of
developing countries which further stunts a nation's capacity for
self-sustaining growth. 34 The technology employed in manu-
spect. It is not practical nor possible to meet these aspirations in full and in-
discriminately, and therefore there may remain objections and criticisms by
individual governments in this connection." INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COM-
MERcE, REALITIES: MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES RESPOND ON BASIC ISSUES 44-45
(1974).
34 See Vaitsos, Director, Technology Policy Group, Junta del Acuerdo de
Cartagena, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 397-404 (1974); Vaitsos, Foreign
Investment Policies and Economic Development in Latin America, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L.
619-639 (1973); BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 164-66 (1974); Pavitt, The
Multinational Enterprise and the Transfer of Technology, in THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 81 (Dunning ed. 1971); Brundenius, The Anatomy of Imperialism:
The Case of the Multinational Mining Corporations in Peru, 9 J. OF PEACE RESEARCH
189, 205 (1972); Myrdal, The Transfer of Technology to Underdeveloped Countries,
231 Sci. AM. 173 (1974); H. S. Walker, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to
the U.N. in Geneva, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 424 (1974); Muller, The Multi-
national Corporation and the Underdevelopment of the Third World, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 133, (Wilber ed. 1973) (study
of 257 manufacturing firms in Latin America indicates that multinational cor-
porations use almost one-half the number of employees per $10,000 of sales as do
local firms); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SECTORAL STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 14 (1974). Foreign firms in
Pakistan in contrast to domestic firms have higher labor productivity based on
a much higher capital to worker ratio. Pavitt, The Multinational Enterprise and
the Transfer of Technology, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (Dunning ed. 1971);
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facturing facilities reduces job opportunities in economies char-
acterized by unemployment rates in excess of 30 percent.5
Simply enough, jobs are not being created for rapidly growing
labor forces: These manufacturing subsidiaries utilizing capital-
intensive techniques create unskilled jobs with minimal training
opportunities, relatively low remuneration, and limited spinoff
benefits for the remainder of the economy.36 Linkages to the re-
mainder of the economy are especially important in determining
whether local entrepreneurs will flourish as distribution channels
and in other service capacities, 37 and whether the industrial sec-
tor will be segregated from the economy. Although the Depart-
UNCTAD, MAJOR ISSUES ARISING FROM THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES (Doc. No. TD/B/AC. 11/10 1972). BARANSON, INDUSTRIAL
TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (1969); Bonin, The Multinational Firm as
a Vehicle for the International Transmission of Technology, in THE MULTINATIONAL
FIRM AND THE NATION STATE 111 (Pacquet ed. 1972). See generally Mansfield,
Technology and Technological Change, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE 147 (Dunning ed. 1974); U.N. DEPT. OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY FROM MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1974). INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (1972),
indicating the benefits for developing countries.
3 In addition to unemployment, underemployment is pervasive. The re-
dundant urban labor force has been swelled by migrants from the countryside
to the town. With the rise of the service sector, a declining percentage of the
nonagricultural labor force is employed in industry. PREBISCH, CHANGE AND
DEVELOPMENT - LATIN AMERICA'S GREAT TASK 30-31, 233 (1971); Muller, The
Multinational Corporation and the Underdevelopment of the Third World, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 132-135 (Wilber ed.
1973); OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, THE INTERNATIONAL UTILIZATION OF
LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE PACIFIC BASIN 3, 7-8 (1972).
But the global employment impact of the multinational corporation is minimal
as approximately 13-14 million people are employed by subsidiaries of all
multinational corporations.
3 See, e.g., Behrman, Foreign Investment and the Transfer of Knowledge and
Skills, in U.S. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT ABROAD 114 (Mikesell ed.
1962); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
SOCIAL POLICY 58-59, 62 (1973). Valued managerial and accounting skills will
be acquired which may be more suitable for a subsidiary than for another enter-
prise and thus may not be readily transferable. U.N. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 52 (1973); Hyson & Weigel,
Investment in the LDCs: The Unresolved Debate, 5 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 33, 36-37
(1970). But compare INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 59, 62 (1973) (which states that managers are
trained who go into local firms or government service).
37 Multinational firms may resist the subcontracting of parts and com-
ponents to independent manufacturers in developing countries because of al-
leged difficulties regarding quantity control, organization and cost competitive-
ness. See Watanebe, International Subcontracting, Employment and Skill Promotion,
105 INT'L LABOUR REV. 425 (1972). But smaller firms in semi-conductor in-
dustries in developed nations will subcontract with independent suppliers in
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ment of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations con-
cluded, "On the whole, the employment impact on the host
countries is positive since extreme cases of destruction of local
industries and wholesale displacement of labour are rare,"38
concern exists regarding the creation of a labor "elite," and ac-
centuation of the distortion in wage structure between skill
groups, as well as between the urban wage-earning minority and
rural majority which characterize many developing nations. 39
Multinational corporations, moreover, have generally failed to
developing countries. Helleiner, Manufacturing for Export, Multinational Firms
and Economic Development, 1 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 13, 20 (1973).
38 U.N., DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 52 (1973). See also U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS 75 (1974) for the conclusion that export oriented production has a
positive employment impact. See also INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 45-46 (1973) (citing study by
BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL: NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS 1967). However, multinational corporations have adverse effects on local
firms and cause the replacement of artisan workers by mass production in-
dustries. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 36, at 20.
39 U.N., DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 52 (1973); see also U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS 76 (1974); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 36, at 55-58,
73. Multinational corporations give training to familiarize new workers with
industrial production and give job oriented training. Instruction is also provided
to improve general educational qualifications so as to meet future training re-
quirements. See UNCTAD, MEASURES FOR THE EXPANSION AND DIVERSIFICA-
TION OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES, EXPORT POLICIES IN THE DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES, MANUFACTURING OF COMPONENTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTING
AS A MEANS OF EXPANSION AND DIVERSIFICATION OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES
FROM THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Doc. No. TD/B/C.2/107 1971) at 9.
Wages in resource industries, oil and mineral production, are usually higher
than other branches of activity. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note
36, at 72; Church, Labor Relations in Mineral and Petroleum Resource Development, in
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES: ASC STUDIES OF
INVESTOR-HOST COUNTRY RELATIONS 82 (Mikesell ed. 1971) (Latin America and Mid-
dle East). Bauxite workers earned a higher wage than other workers in Jamaica.
The sugar industry in Jamaica complained that it lost some skilled workers to the
bauxite industry. And workers in a bauxite area feel that if they cannot obtain
bauxite wages, there might be no point in working at all. H. S. Walker, Permanent
Representative of Jamaica to the U.N. in Geneva, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS
427-428 (1974). On the payment of higher wages by foreign subsidiaries and
the impact thereof, see generally Shearer, Industrial Relations of American Cor-
porations Abroad, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR 114 (Barkin, Dymond, Kassalow,
Meyers, Myers eds. 1967). Krishnamurti, Some Effects of the Multinational Cor-
porations, INTERECONOMICS 362, 366 (1973). Muller, The Multinational Corporation
and the Underdevelopment of the Third World, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DE-
VELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 132-135 (Wilber ed. 1973); U.N. ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN LATIN AMERI-
CA, E/CN 12/368 (1970); Stephen Hymer, New School for Social Research,
GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 238-239 (1974).
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transfer social problem-solving technology capable of producing
cheap, basic products because of their self-interest. For example,
American firms were reluctant to concentrate on small, efficient
cars (or mass-transit vehicles) to meet the transportation require-
ments of developing countries. Even after the introduction of
sub-compact cars in Latin America, parent corporations required
their subsidiaries to concentrate the bulk of their advertising on
more profitable, larger vehicles. 40  Only recently have General
Motors and Ford addressed themselves to the problems of design-
ing a vehicle for low income consumer needs and smaller scale
production requirements. 41  Apparently, little thought has been
given to the production of mass-transit vehicles.
From an economic efficiency standpoint, multinational corpora-
tions favor capital-intensive plants for several reasons. A firm's
experience militates in favor of capital-intensive technology.
Lower capital costs (including sunken costs involving knowledge of
capital-intensive technologies) generally prevail if capital-intensive
technology is used. A subsidiary wishing to compete in the world
market needs sophisticated technology. It may be easier for a
capital-intensive plant in a vertically integrated multinational en-
terprise to respond more quickly to unexpected fluctuations in de-
mand and/or production. In short, a capital-intensive plant better
protects a manager from risk and uncertainty. The importance of
engineers (and executives with an engineering background) in the
selection of technology cannot be minimized. Engineers generally
prefer sophisticated equipment, with machine or automatic con-
trols, as opposed to a reliance on people to control quality which
is implicit in more labor-intensive techniques. The sophisticated,
40 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR Eco-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SECTORAL STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 16, 22 (1974). In view of the
small size of most markets in developing countries, firms are reluctant to modify
or adapt policies and practices.
41 Id. at 16-17. General Motors assembles in Ecuador, Philippines, Portugal,
Malaysia its low cost basic transport vehicle components also locally produced,
but the engines, transmission, suspension, rear axle and steering systems are
supplied by GM's Vauxhall plant in the United Kingdom. Thomas Murphy, Vice
Chairman of the Board of GM, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 87 (1974). Also, Ford
Ficra multi-purpose vehicle is assembled in the Philippines with its power train
supplied by high-volume Ford plants for sale in the Asia-Pacific region. How-
ever, second-hand capital equipment imported from a parent is sometimes valued
at the comparable price of new equipment, thereby enabling a subsidiary to take
higher depreciation changes and if the host country has excess profits tax based
on the rate of return of capital or a ceiling on permissible dividend remittances
based on the rate of return on capital, the subsidiary can evade the excess
profits tax or exceed the remittance ceiling. Supra note 40, at 25.
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capital-intensive equipment permits an engineer to function at a
level for which he was trained and at which he has been function-
ing in a more "advanced" economy. Managers also wish to avoid
problems associated with supervision of large work forces in de-
veloping countries, particularly with the difficulties involved in
dismissing workers in periods of slack demand, or those who fail
to attain a sufficiently high level of productivity.42 All of these
reasons may be rational from the vantage point of a multinational
enterprise, but such corporate strategy fails to meet the needs of
developing countries.
Further empirical research must be undertaken to compare the
type of technology used by import-substituting or export-oriented
foreign manufacturing subsidiaries and local firms. Several
pioneering studies indicate that national and foreign firms may
not behave differently with respect to the type of technology used.43
A comparison of pairs of matched foreign and local firms in the
Philippines and Mexico indicates that the American subsidiaries
use more capital per worker, which is more heavily invested in
buildings, but that they do not use significantly more equipment
per factory worker than their local counterparts.44 The subsidiaries
42 See Wells, Economic Man and Engineering Man: Choice of Technology in a
Low Wage Country, PUBLIC POLICY 7-9 (1973); U.N. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY FROM MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12-13 (1974); Emil Collado, Executive
Vice President, Exxon Corporation, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 40 (1974) (who
notes that in processing operations, using less modern technology almost al-
ways results in economic failure), INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT
INCOMES AND EQUALITY: A STRATEGY FOR INCREASING PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT IN
KENYA 390 (1972). Limits exist on capital intensive plants including the small
size of local markets and the difficulty of maintaining sophisticated equipment.
STRASSMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE MANU-
FACTURING EXPERIENCE OF MEXICO AND PUERTO RICO 203 (1968). If labor-intensive
technology is used, what will be the cost to consumers in a host country and
will the goods be competitive for export purposes? Infra note 43, at 21.
43 U.N., DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, THE ACQUISITION
OF TECHNOLOGY FROM MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12-14
(1974) concludes that if the influence of scale and the ability to avoid price
competition is removed, multinational techniques and behavior patterns of multi-
national subsidiaries and local firms are similar. Multinational corporations
are more likely than a domestic firm to use labor-intensive second-hand equip-
ment because of their ability to locate and evaluate such equipment.
44 Mason, The Transfer of Technology and the Factor Proportions Problem: The
Philippines and Mexico, UNITAR RESEARCH REPORT 10 (1971); Mason, Some Observa-
tions on the Choice of Technology by Multinational Firms in Developing Countries, 60
REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 349 (1973); Mason, The Multinational Firm and the Cost
of Technology to Developing Countires, 15 CALIF. MANAGEMENT REV. 5 (1973). See
generally, STRASSMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(1968).
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of American corporations surveyed, therefore, did not use more
capital-intensive methods than did local producers. Another re-
port concluded that many multinational corporations, as a result
of careful checking of the possibilities for modifying technology,
have made a limited number of adaptations in their materials
handling, construction and repetitive operations. The latter
changes have occurred most notably in food processing and phar-
maceutical packaging.4s Generally, firms transfer advanced tech-
nology to their manufacturing subsidiaries in developing countries,
but the particular industry and product affect the choice of tech-
nology and may limit a firm's flexibility to select labor-intensive
techniques. Competitive pressures may, however, compel a cor-
poration to utilize more labor and less capital per unit of output.46
The technology question involves other problems, including
the lack of local research and development and impediments posed
by the patent system. Developing countries rely on multinational
corporations to gain access to new technologies. Cognizant that
in a modem world, control of a society may, in large measure, rest
on technology, developing countries decry the inadequacy of the
level of local research and development. They denounce the brain
drain caused by the migration of scientists, professionals and busi-
nessmen to advanced countries in search of better paying jobs and
an environment thought, at least by Western standards, to be more
stimulating and desirable. 47  In addition to the arguments ad-
vanced in opposition to decentralizing research and development
facilities in developed countries, spokesmen for multinational
corporations assert that the lack of technical experts and support
services and the inadequacy of local educational facilities and
45Chudson, The International Transfer of Commercial Technology to Developing
Countries, UNITAR RESEARCH REPORT 13, at 25-26 (1971).
46Wells, Economic Man and Engineering Man: Choice of Technology in a Low
Wage Country, PUBLIC POLICY 6, 7 (1973), studies technologies in different plants,
local and foreign, in the same developing country. Firms that competed pri-
marily on a brand name basis were more likely to have a capital-intensive
technology than those that competed primarily on price. Once the basis of
competition is held constant, there is no significant difference between the be-
havior of a domestic firm and that of a foreign owned factory. See also Hel-
leiner, Manufactured Firms, 83 ECON. J. 21 (1973).
47See, e.g., FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA:
HISTORICAL STUDIES OF CHILE AND BRAZIL 211-214 (1969). NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, U.S. INTERNATIONAL FIRMS AND R.D. & E. IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1973). Research by U.S. firms is centralized in research headquarters in
America. See DUERR, R. & D. IN THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY (1970) (survey of
162 firms); U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS
FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR, VOL. III
580-585 (1973).
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governmental subsidies perpetuate reliance on foreign tech-
nology.48  If a nation mandates increased local research and
development, scarce scientific talent may be absorbed, thus
making it more difficult for local firms to compete. But global
firms have not lessened the developing countries' fears of tech-
nological dependence. Apparently, few multinational firms, if
any, have evidenced an interest in building up the educational and
technical skills of nationals in the periphery.
Even if the level of research and development activity in de-
veloping nations were increased, the patent system poses a funda-
mental barrier to technological independence. A concentration of
patent holders exists in developing countries. In Colombia, for
example, in the pharmaceutical, synthetic fiber and chemical
industries, 10 percent of all patent holders (all of whom are multi-
national corporations) own 60 percent of the patents in such areas. 49
Studies also indicate that the overwhelming percentage (on the
order of 90 to 95 percent) of the patents granted to foreigners by
various Latin American countries are never utilized or exploited.50
In 1966 for U.S. multinational corporations engaged in manufacturing, 6
percent of their research and development funds were spent abroad. Most of
the foreign research and development was concentrated in three countries:
Canada, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. The higher levels of foreign
"research" are clustered in the following areas: industrial and farm machinery,
soaps and cosmetics, and food products. This stems from the need to perform
necessary research and development and product and market testing on the spot
and because research and development only constitute an alteration of a basic
American product. Id. at 581.
See also EXXON CORPORATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, THE ROLE OF
TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPMENT 10 (1974) which states:
". .. [T]he overall level of R & D in developing countries is low and it is true
that MNCs conduct only limited amounts of research in developing countries.
It is unlikely that MNCs will sponsor significantly higher levels in the near
future."
48 See, e.g., EXXON CORPORATION, supra note 47. Factors favoring the cen-
tralization of research include cost, the need for a large market and for contacts
between laboratories, headquarters and universities. Research and develop-
ment activity is viewed as the function for the parent corporation. INTERNA-
TIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REALITIES: MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES RESPOND
ON BASIC ISSUES 72-80 (1974).
49 UNCTAD, POLICIES RELATING TO TECHNOLOGY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
ANDEAN PACT: THEIR FOUNDATIONS 132 (A Study by the Board of the Cartagena
Agreement) (Doc. No. TD/107 1971), (Doc. No. TD/107/Corr. 1 1972); Vaitsos,
Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries, 9 J. DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
71 (1972). For an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of a patent sys-
tem in developing countries see Penrose, International Patenting and the Less De-
veloped Countries, 83 EcON. J. 768 (1973). See also U.N., DEP'T OF ECON. AND
Soc. AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES (1964).
10 UNCTAD, POLICIES RELATING TO TECHNOLOGY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
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Multinational firms use the patent system existing in de-
veloping countries to preserve markets for overpriced imported
components or final products. Local firms fall behind in the com-
petitive race due to the lack of access to the technology monopo-
lized by multinational firms through the patent system, and the
know-how and human technical skills which global firms have
accumulated. Payments for technology also adversely affect the
balance of payments of developing countries.
d. Impact of Industrial Organization
The economic impact of multinational corporations in de-
veloping countries may be viewed from several other points:
Increasing economic concentration and loss of entrepreneurial op-
portunities, draining the local capital markets, and generating high
profits for the global firm adversely affecting a nation's balance
of payments. Developing countries' fears of foreign industrial
dominance and control of key industries have been realized. Sta-
tistics from several countries indicate the extent of foreign indus-
trial dominance. Among the 500 largest manufacturing firms in
Brazil, foreign subsidiaries controlled 37 percent of total output;
multinational enterprises owned 100 percent of that nation's auto
and tire production, 67 percent of machinery and 68 percent of
electrical appliance machinery output. In Mexico, 100 percent of
output in rubber products and transportation materials was foreign
controlled, with 75 percent under foreign control in industrial
chemicals and tobacco industries*51 American-style oligopolistic-
ally organized industries, resting on brand names and consumer
preferences, have come to pervade many developing nations.
ANDEAN PACT: THEIR FOUNDATIONS 132-133 (A study by the Board of the Carta-
gena Agreement 1972); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, EXECUTIVE SECRE-
TARIAT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SECTORAL STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA: THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 29 (1974) estimates
that in the manufacturing sectors of Latin American industries, over 80 percent
of the total multinational patents registered are never used. See also Vaitsos,
Director, Technology Policy Group, Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, GROUP
OF EMINENT PERSONS 399 (1974).
51 U.N., DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 20-21 (1973), (1970 figures); in pre-Allende Chile, in
each of seven key industries, one to three foreign firms controlled at least 51
percent of production. See Muller, The Multinational Corporation and the Under-
development of the Third World, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 130 (Wilber ed. 1973) for examples of the oligopoly power of
global firms in developing nations. Hymer, The Efficiency (contradictions) of
Multinational Corporations, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 441, 443 (1970) concludes that
"the world level of concentration is much higher than it would be if foreign
investment and domestic mergers were restricted."
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Foreign subsidiaries thwart competition in a variety of ways.
They grow by acquiring firms in the main sectors of a country's
private economy. 52  For example, more than one-third of the
direct private investment by American firms in Peru and Colombia
during the period 1958 to 1967 involved the acquisition of local
firms.s3  The absorption of local entrepreneurs retards self-
sustained national development. Multinational corporations may
also have a displacement effect on a local economy by producing
machine-made products which destroy native handicrafts. On the
other hand, global firms may create opportunities for suppliers of
component parts, retailers, repair shops and provide training for
employees, some of whom may take their skills into other lines of
endeavor.54
e. Impact on Balance of Payments and Capital Markets
The repatriation of profits generated by foreign subsidiaries ss
and charges for patents, trademarks, licenses, know-how, manage-
52 See TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD 49, 50
(1973); Diaz Alejandro, Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL CORPORATION 331 (Kindleberger ed. 1970); BARNET AND MULLER,
GLOBAL REACH 155 (1974) indicate that from 1958 to 1967, the 187 largest U.S.
multinational enterprises used capital for the takeover of nearly 50 percent of
all manufacturing subsidiaries rather than creating new production facilities.
But compare Hans Schaffner (member of U.N. Group of Eminent Persons) who
maintains that rarely do multinational enterprises merge with firms in develop-
ing countries. U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 158-159
(1974).
53 Vaitsos, Comment, in INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 129 (Wallace
ed. 1974).
54 Vagts, The Host Country Faces the Multinational Enterprise, 53 B.U. L. REV.
261, 268 (1973); Pavitt, The Multinational Enterprise and the Transfer of Technology,
in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 74-79 (Dunning ed. 1971); Streeter, Costs and
Benefits of Multinational Enterprises in Less Developed Countries, in THE MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISE 254 (Dunning ed. 1971). See generally WOOD AND KEYSER,
SEARS, ROEBUCK DE MEXICO, S.A. (1953).
55 BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 160 (1974) estimate that the minimum
rate of return on investment for U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries in Latin Amer-
ica during the 1960's was at least 40 percent. See also Muller, Multinational
Corporations and the Underdevelopment of the Third World, in THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 147-48 (Wilber ed. 1973), noting that
in 1968, 15 multinational drug subsidiaries in Colombia showed a rate of return
on investment in excess of 136 percent. These figures, moreover, do not take
account of export underpricing, and are based on the net worth of investment
as declared by subsidiaries which is probably overvalued. Brundenius, The
Anatomy of Imperialism: The Case of Multinational Mining Corporations in Peru, 9
J. OF PEACE RESEARCH 189, 199 (1972) (a study of the Mascona Mining Com-
pany which estimated its annual profits on capital invested in Peru from 1953
to 1966 to be from 29.7 percent to 132.6 percent, depending on the accounting
method used).
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ment and servicess6 adversely affect a nation's balance of pay-
ments. Observers estimate that between 1946 and 1967 for each
dollar entering Latin America approximately $2.70 left.5 7 The
interminable nature of the remittances and the lack of guarantees
of new capital inflow exacerbate the impact of the suction effect
of foreign direct investment in developing countries.
A comparison of investment outflow and inflow by multina-
tional firms may, however, be misleading on several grounds.
Foreign investments in new productive activities (as opposed to
the takeover of existing firms) generate their own capacity to
reduce imports and increase exports of a developing nation. Criti-
cal unresolved assumptions include the following: 1) Does the
possibility of local replacement of foreign direct investment exist?
For example, does a subsidiary's output add to or act as a substitute
Subsidiaries in extractive industries are usually much more profitable, but
manufacturing returns generally are understated because of the exclusion of fees
and royalties and the use of transfer pricing. For use of transfer pricing as an
important element in remittance of income, see Vaitsos, Foreign Investment Policies
and Economic Development in Latin America, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 619, 638 (1973)
(Studies in Colombia, Peru, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico of firms in electronics,
pharmaceuticals, rubber, chemicals, fish, timber and precious metals). Multi-
national firms assert that in view of the risks undertaken and the greater in-
stability of developing countries, profits are not excessive. Between 1960 and
1968, American multinational firms repatriated 79 percent of net profits from
Latin America. From 1965 to 1968, 52 percent of the profits of U.S. manufactur-
ing subsidiaries operating -in Latin America were repatriated to the parent
corporation. BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 153-154 (1974).
56 For developing countries, a one-sided flow of technology exists in favor
of the developed countries. A study of 13 developing countries (representing
65 percent of the population and 56 percent of the total GNP of developing na-
tions) showed a total cost, in the late 1960's for patents, licenses, know-how and
trademarks, management and service fees, to be $1.5 billion per year or more
than half of the flow of direct private investment to developing countries. The
costs were growing at the rate of 20 percent per year and absorbing an ever in-
creasing share of export earnings. UNCTAD, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (Doc.
No. TD/106 1971). Royalty figures may be deceptive, especially between
wholly owned subsidiaries and a parent corporation, as they represent one way
of taking money out of a subsidiary in response to corporate strategy and/or
governmental policy.
57 Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 231, 234
(1970). Earnings repatriations create a net outflow. Between 1965 and 1970 the
net investment inflow to 43 developing countries was 30 percent of the income
outflow. U.N., DE'T OF EcoN. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS 54 (1973). Further empirical studies must be undertaken to de-
termine the impact of multinational firms on a developing host nation's balance
of payments. From 1950 to 1970, U.S. subsidiaries repatriated $790 million in
profits from mining operations in Peru, and the parent corporations invested
$284 million in the form of loans. Brundenius, The Anatomy of Imperialism:
The Case of the Multinational Mining Corporations in Peru, 9 J. OF PEACE RESEARCH
189, 196 (1972).
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for what otherwise would have been produced? 2) What is the
impact of foreign direct investment on import substitution by a
developing country which may be divided into impact of new sub-
sidiaries as opposed to older units? 3) Were earnings of foreign
subsidiaries reinvested or remitted to the parent corporation?
Stated differently, for what other purposes would local resources
have gone in the absence of foreign direct investment? Foreign
subsidiaries may also stimulate the establishment of comple-
mentary domestic industries and generate exports from the local
production of foreign firms.58  However, the generation of in-
come by foreign subsidiaries probably raises income levels and
induces a higher level of consumption of imports thereby reducing
the supply of local goods available for export.
Global enterprises also tap local capital markets, especially for
short-term working capital, drying up the sources of financing
relied on by local firms. Subsidiaries of multinational banks
5 UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 19-20 (1972) (prepared by
Raymond Vernon); Nisbet, Transferring Wealth from Underdeveloped to De-
veloped Countries Via Direct Foreign Investment: A Marxist Claim Reconsidered, 37
S. ECON. J. 93 (1970); UNCTAD, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INCOME EFFECTS
OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING: CASE STUDIES OF INDIA AND
Iran, (Doe. No. TD/B/C.3(V)/Misc. 1 1971) (prepared by Sanjaya Lall);
UNCTAD, FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT IN ITS RELATIONSHIP To BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS EFFECTS ON PRIVATE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES OF
INDIA, IRAN, JAMAICA AND KENYA, St. 72-247 (1972) (Prepared by Sanjaya
Lall). U.N., DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
55 (1973) states: "The one [study] based on the assumption that no local re-
placement was possible indicated a positive impact on the balance of payments
of developing countries; the other, assuming local replacement, indicated negative
impact in the case of Latin America, and neutral in other developing countries."
Citing HUFBAUER AND ADLER, OVERSEAS MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT AND THE
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (1968) and STREETEN AND HALL, UNCTAD, MAIN
FINDINGS OF A STUDY OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SELECTED DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, (Doc. No. TD/B/C.3111 1973) (Study of 159 foreign firms in
Colombia, India, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya and Malaysia. In 55 percent of the
sample the impact on a nation's balance of payments was positive; however,
in the remaining 45 percent, it would be cheaper for a host country to sub-
stitute its own capital for existing foreign capital. For only 21 percent of the
firms was the impact clearly positive, 11 percent clearly negative and 60 percent
borderline. The positive impact of foreign direct investments on exports and
imports is illustrated by the fact that in 1966, U.S. subsidiaries in Latin America
exported $4.5 billion in goods and imported $1.3 billion in materials and sup-
plies. U.N., DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS 54 (1973). However, multinational firms may limit exports, overprice
imports, or require tie-in purchases. A nation's balance of payments position
is adversely affected by the shift to import substitute subsidiaries which im-
port capital goods. See FURTADO, DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT Ch.
5 (1967).
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may also control increasing amounts of scarce savings in a host
country. The propensity of U.S. multinational banks to lend to
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, stemming from the long-
range global interests of the banks, further depletes funds avail-
able for local enterprises.5 9
C. Cultural Factors
The economic penetration by multinational corporations shapes
and distorts cultural patterns in developing countries. 60  The
Westernization (particularly the Americanization) of culture pre-
sents a formidable threat to the cultural integrity of the non-West-
ern world. Multinational firms transmit the values and life styles
of global capitalism. Not only do the local employees of a foreign
subsidiary adopt a life style modeled on the image established by
the parent corporation, its executives and employees, but the ethic
of consumption spreads to an entire society. A developing coun-
try's elite, by imitating Western consumption patterns, creates a
demonstration effect which others attempt to imitate.
Multinational firms reproduce the products and ideas origi-
nated in developed countries. To remain competitive, local indus-
try must gear production to meet the requirements of a consumer
society. But the emerging taste and consumption patterns may
fail to meet the needs of the mass of citizens in developing coun-
tries. For example, the manufacture and sale of automobiles in
5, BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 140-141 (1974); Muller, Alitinational
Corporations and the Underdevelopment of the Third World, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 136-138 (Wilber ed. 1973). See also
Weigel, Muhinational Approaches to Multinational Corporations, 11 FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 27, 29 (1974); Vaitsos, t orein Investmnent Policies and lconostic
Development in Latin America, 7 J. WORLD TRADE 619, 634, 635 (1973). For an
analysis of sources of funds used to expand U.S. subsidiaries in Canada and the
nmobilization of Canadian savings by U.S. niultinational firns see LEVIrIrr, SILENT
SURRENDER 137-141) (1970).
Debt repayments to bilateral agencies such as the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national I)evelopment and multilateral agencies such as the World Sank also
drain savings from developing countries.
"I Evans, National Autonomy and Iconomic Developiet: Critical Perspecti [Ies 'i
Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries, in TRANSNATIONAL RiATIONS 332-335
(Keohane and Nye eds. 1971); Vaitsos, Director, Technology Policy Group.
Junta dcl Acuerdo dc Cartagena, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONs 396 (1974); Peter
Goldman, President of International Organization of Consuner's Unions, GROUP
OF EMINENT PERSONS 193-194 (1974).
See generally BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 172-184 (1974). See also
Woollacott, Things h'liat [Vent Better WI ith Coke. Manchester (;uardian, May 24,
1975, at 4; INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 29 (1974).
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a developing country absorbs resources which might be utilized
for mass transportation, creates pollution problems and requires
the importation of petroleum (unless available and refined locally)
thereby increasing a nation's balance of payments difficulties.
Critics charge that the overzealous promotion of infant formulas
in developing countries may indirectly contribute to malnutrition,
illness and higher infant mortality rates. The cost of using infant
formula may also drain a significant portion of a family's income. 61
With foreign direct investment comes a surfeit of products and
reliance by global enterprises on sophisticated marketing tech-
niques to sell their products and create and mold consumer wants
and needs. A loss of national control of the communications
media may result from the domination of consumption patterns by
multinational corporations. Television and radio carry the mes-
sages designed to stimulate consumption.62 Motion pictures and
television create the images of Western society and its values -
the thrill of violence and consumption. 63  Global advertising
firms, particularly American advertising agencies, increasingly
account for larger proportion of advertising placed in developing
nations. The impact of marketing manipulation64 and the sales
techniques which observers have deemed inappropriate may be
seen in a shift in eating habits, for example, from local beverages
(or local soft drinks) to the international soft drinks resulting from
an exploitation of brand names. The spread of 400 Kentucky Fried
Chicken outlets (Heublein, Inc.) in 30 countries and the interna-
tional activity of McDonald's and Burger King (Pillsbury Co.)
evidence the worldwide proliferation of American "culture."65
61 Crittenden, Baby Formula Sales in 3d World Are Criticized, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1975, at 55, cols. 1-5. The problem arises because the milk solid form
of infant formula sold overseas must be mixed with water which may be unclean.
Improper sterilization of bottles and nipples further contributes to health hazards.
In Nigeria the cost of feeding a three month infant with formula is estimated to
approximate 30 percent of the minimum urban wage.
62 SCHILLER, MASS COMMUNICATION AND AMERICAN EMPIRE (1969); WELLS,
PICTURE-TUBE IMPERIALISM: THE IMPACT OF U.S. TELEVISION ON LATIN AMERICA
(1972).
63 Id. See also CUBACK, THE INTERNATIONAL FILM INDUSTRY (1969).
64 Schiller, Madison Avenue Imperialism, TRANS-ACTION 52, 55 (1971); Field,
Transnationalism and the New Tribe, 25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 353 (1971); Osterberg
and Ajami, The Multinational Corporation: Expanding the Frontiers of World Politics,
15 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 457, 467-468 (1971). BARNET AND MULLER, GLOBAL
REACH 143 (1974) note that American firms can use techniques developed and
paid for in the domestic market.
65 Said and Simmons, The Politics of Transition, in THE NEW SOVEREIGNS 27
(Said & Simmons ed. 1975). An interesting impact of consumption is the
worldwide tourism industry which ships the world's richest citizens to the world's
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The cornucopia of products and advertising affects the values of
the citizens of developing countries. Instead of meeting the basic
food, health and housing needs, the consumer society fostered by
foreign direct investment stimulates wasteful appetites, misal-
locates resources and contributes to a worldwide homogenization
of life styles and values. 66
D. Political Factors
The rise of a Western-oriented consumer society, it is alleged,
co-opts the elite of developing countries who are closely tied to
multinational corporations and the international capitalist system.
Global firms create client groups whose interests, privileges and
status derive from ties to foreign business and who have a vested
interest in perpetuating the preeminent position of multinational
corporations in a local economy. In a political process charac-
terized by a lack of widespread participation, the detachment of an
elite from the masses by multinational firms enables multinational
firms to undermine national political autonomy and to diminish
national identification. In short, a symbiotic relationship exists
between foreign investors and members of local oligarchies which
forms the backbone of local reactionary political parties.
Other observers have rejected this deterministic view of the co-
optation of local groups and the submergence of the national polit-
ical process. A study of foreign copper companies and their alleged
conservative retinue in Chile from 1955 to 1970, indicates that
leaders of the traditional upper classes in Chile did not oppose
and in some instances led the movement to restrict the activities of
foreign copper producers.67 The nationalistic urges of local con-
poorest societies, thereby graphically demonstrating for the nationals of de-
veloping countries the gulf between rich and poor. Moreover, local elites
realize their relatively underprivileged status by global standards. See TURNER,
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD Ch. 8 (1973).
66 See, e.g., FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
281-318 (1967); Johnson, Dependence and the International System, in DEPENDENCE
AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 105, 109 (Cockcroft, Frank, Johnson eds. 1972); Frank,
Who is the Immediate Enemy?, Id. at 429; BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
GROWTH 153 (1957); BOORSTEIN, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF CUBA 12-14
(1968); Evans, National Autonomy and Economic Development: Critical Perspectives
in Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries, in TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 339-
340 (Keohane and Nye eds. 1971).
67 MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE
172-315 (1974); Moran, The Alliance for Progress and 'The Foreign Copper Com-
panies and their Conservative Allies' in Chile 1955-1970, 25 INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 3
(1972). See also Moran, The Theory of International Exploitation in Large Natural
Resource Investments, in TESTING THEORIES OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 168-169
(Rosen and Kurth eds. 1974).
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servative groups may, therefore, block their alleged symbiosis with
foreign investors. Local businessmen who compete with foreign
subsidiaries perceived their own independent economic interests
and generally sought to limit the activities of multinational cor-
porations.68  Local bureaucrats tended to make increasing de-
mands on foreign interests so as to increase governmental revenues
and perpetuate their claim to power. 69 These bits of evidence
may lead to the conclusion that foreign interests in developing
countries, especially in the natural resource field, have few per-
manent domestic allies. 70
But multinational firms desire to perpetuate conditions favor-
able to foreign direct investment, thereby curtailing or destroying
the sovereignty of nation-states. To achieve such an objective,
global enterprises may attempt to subvert a nation's political
process by more direct means than the promotion of a consumer
society. Internal cleavages which make the politics of developing
countries penetrable and fragile facilitate these efforts. Multi-
national corporations have actively intervened in the domestic
affairs of host developing countries. One instance involved Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph Company which financed a
coup in Chile against the late President Salvadore Allende Gos-
sens. There and in other instances multinationals sought to sub-
vert (or in that wonderful euphemism "destabilize") the local po-
litical process by supporting and collaborating with forces hostile
to legitimately constituted political authority.71 On other occasions
global enterprises sought to utilize their broad financial power to
develop close, and hopefully favorable, relationships with govern-
mental officials through a variety of means including bribery.
Corporate resources have also been used, either legally or illegally
under the laws of a host nation, to support particular political par-
ties. 72  The political process in such nations may constitute a
68 VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 199-200 (1971); Vaitsos, Foreign Investment
Policies and Economic Development, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 619, 629-630 (1973).
69 VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 197-198 (1971). Bureaucrats have also
gained more knowledge about the impact of foreign investments through the
collection and exchange of information and better training of local personnel.
70 MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE
247 (1974).
71 U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 46 (1974); SAMPSON,
THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF I.T.T. (1973); Harrington, U.S. Capitalism: Partner in
Chile's Junta, 8 Bus. & Soc. REV. OF INNOV. 73 (1973); The International Telephone
and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-1971, Report to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations (1973).
72 See, e.g., Riding, Balaguer and His Firm Ally, the U.S., Are Targets of Domini-
can Unrest, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1975, at 6, col. 3.
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shadow game with the real power held by global enterprises. In
addition, global firms have pressured their home countries, with
diminishing success, to intervene in the domestic affairs of a host
nation. The most conspicuous example of the latter pattern of
behavior was the economic strangulation of Allende's regime by the
United States government, which resulted in part from the urgings
of American business interests. 73
Despite the apparent power of multinational corporations,
developing countries sought to break out of the grasp of global
firms and to limit or end their economic, cultural, and political
dependency. These efforts undertaken by national or regional
groups, and through the formulation of cartels of raw material
producers, form one of the turning points of the 20th century world
development.
II. BREAKING FREE FROM THE GRASP OF DEPENDENCY
Third World nations at the periphery, seeking a greater degree
of self-determination, gradually abandoned their previously passive
role. 74  Local elites, in many countries, no longer act as pliable
allies of multinational firms. Changes occurred in the composi-
tion of local ruling groups and in the value structures of such groups.
Control over vital raw materials shifted the balance of economic
power to nations controlling such natural resources. Nations
have also become aware of the opportunities to bargain and to en-
73 U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 45-46 (1974); The
International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-1971, Report
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Subcommittee on Multina-
tional Corporations (1973); Birns, Allende's Fall, Washington's Push, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 15, 1974, at 21, col. 2. See also Bus. WEEK, Aug. 11, 1973, at 102-103 which
reports that while I.T.T. was engaged in a dispute with Ecuador over com-
pensation for appropriated properties, the corporation pressured the U.S.
Agency for International Development to withhold from Ecuador for 2 years
$15.8 million in authorized assistance funds. See also Nader and Green, The
Worldcorp Above the Law?, 12 WAR/PEACE REP. 3, 6 (1973); Sigmund, The
"Invisible Blockage" and the Overthrow of Allende, 52 FOR. AFF. 322 (1974) argues
that the U.S. government did not impose an invisible blockage on Chile.
74 As Venezuela's President Carlos Andres Perez put it, "Today, industrial-
ized nations must share decisionmaking with us, we believe in interdependence,
but interdependence among equals rather than an interdependence in which there
are subordinates." Interview with President Carlos Andres Perez, What the
Third World Wants, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13, 1975, at 56. For background on na-
tionalism see DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY (1953); HAYES, THE HISTORICAL EVOLU-
TION OF MODERN NATIONALISM (1931); KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A
STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND (1944); ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALI-
TARIANISM (2d ed. 1958).
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ter into coalitions. Before analyzing these trends in the area of
raw materials, recent attempts by governments to manipulate eco-
nomic arrangements involving manufacturing operations of foreign
subsidiaries will first be examined. Pursuit of national economic
and political objectives evolved through three phases: Greater use
of bargaining skills to renegotiate with foreign subsidiaries, na-
tional legislation, and regional programs. These strategies gener-
ally pursued the same objectives vis-a-vis manufacturing firms;
namely, to disassemble the organization, management, technology
and access to markets provided by global firms and capture ex-
cess oligopoly profits. Nations hoped that increased local own-
ership would promote development by encouraging entrepreneur-
ship and changing the selection of products, the technologies to
be used, and marketing methods.
A. Use of National Bargaining Position
During the post-World War II period, developing countries
operated from a weak bargaining position because of a lack of
knowledge regarding the impact of global firms and the absence
of the requisite technical and administrative skills. Nations
gradually became aware of the fact that the cost of the package
provided by multinational corporations was, as previously dis-
cussed, too great. Inappropriate modes of technology were trans-
ferred. Global firms adversely affected economic and cultural
patterns by discouraging local entrepreneurs, stimulating con-
sumption and interfering in the political process. With increased
knowledge about the operations and impact of multinational cor-
porations, nations reassessed their bargaining position. Govern-
ments of developing countries gained access to requisite expertise
to oversee corporate behavior by training nationals in negotiating,
taxation, accounting, and production; by hiring top rank inter-
national lawyers, accountants, economists and other academicians;
and by using foreign and local industrialists, state corporations
and advisors from international institutions in the developed
world.75 The competition by labor-intensive industries for new
75 U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 32 (1974); Moran,
The Theory of International Exploitation in Large Natural Resource Investments, in
TESTING THEORIES OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 168-169 (Rosen and Kurth eds.
1974); Streeten, Costs and Benefits of Multinational Enterprises in Less-Developed
Countries, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 248 (Dunning ed. 1971). A Har-
vard Development Advisory Group has been established to advise developing
countries. Salzman, How to Reduce and Manage the Political Risks of Investment
in Less Developed Countries, in GLOBAL COMPANIES 98 (Ball ed. 1975). See also
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sources of cheap labor assisted the developing countries. The
growing markets in developing countries also made these areas
of greater interest to global enterprises. Once a multinational
firm located a plant in a country, such an operation became a
hostage subject to being squeezed by the government.
Moving from the realization of their increased bargaining posi-
tion, nation-states required the payment of higher taxes or other
fees and imposed restrictions on the financial and operating
policies of existing foreign manufacturing units. The increasing
complexity of industrial processes and products (the supposed
genie of progress) lent an esoteric character to the manufacturing
activities. The regenerative nature of manufacturing operations,
as opposed to raw material extractive activities, rendered the form-
er less vulnerable to governmental renegotiating pressures. 76
Facing this dilemma regarding established operations, governments
emphasized control over the entry of foreign firms into local
markets as their primary strategy.
Access to a greater number of options formed another card in
the government's bargaining hand. Leaders realized that a number
of firms could supply the type of technologies required by a de-
veloping nation." The ability to negotiate with multinational
firms from different nations strengthened a developing nation's
bargaining advantage.78 Techniques used by nation-states in-
cluded competitive bidding and challenging established operations
by new competitors, often of a different nationality, or stimulating
local firms to prevent key industries from falling under foreign
domination. In addition to diversifying sources of technology and
foreign investment, nations sought new trading partners and mar-
Hanner, Business Investment Negotiations in Developing Countries, 18 Bus. HORIZONS
97 (1975) and Williams, Negotiating Investments in Emerging Countries, 43 HARV.
Bus. REV. 89 (1965). The dynamics of negotiation between large foreign com-
panies and the Indian government is analyzed in KAPOOR, INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS NEGOTIATIONS: A STUDY IN INDIA (1970).
76 VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 106 (1971).
77 Comments by Ryutaro Komiya, U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 125 (1974).
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPT., EXXON CORP., THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPMENT
(1974) stated:
The experience of Exxon, IBM and other companies generally shows
that there is competition in meeting the technical needs of developing
countries and that the negotiators of developing countries are well in-
formed and skillful.
78 However, as multinational corporations from the United States, Western
Europe and Japan become aware of the bargaining process used by a nation,
firms could form a new oligopoly which would prevent a nation from playing
off firms from different countries.
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kets. Economic and technical assistance provided by centrally
planned economies was tapped. But limitations on governmental
expertise, the pervasiveness of corruption, the size of a local mar-
ket, and the amount and profitability of existing foreign direct
investment restricted the ability of developing nations to break
their dependence on traditional knowledge. 79 The ability of global
firms to develop new products and manufacture more complex
products enabled them to retain continued bargaining strength.
Multinational firms headquartered in different nations could
conspire to upset the strategy of competitive bidding.
B. National Legislation
Cognizant of their increasing bargaining power, developing
countries are turning to legislation to extract a larger share of the
profits, jobs, markets, technology and managerial skills created or
controlled by global firms. Governments are pursuing three
basic strategies: 1) limiting the entry of foreign firms by pre-
serving certain areas for local firms and by nationalizing key
sectors of the economy, 2) requiring local participation in the own-
ership, management or control of new foreign subsidiaries, and
3) controlling the transfer of technology through the registration of
technology contracts and/or government evaluation and approval
of such contracts.
The major thrust of national control centers on screening foreign
direct investment and permitting entry on stringent conditions
agreed to at the outset. Countries have looked to Japanese foreign
investment laws as a model. To achieve self-sufficiency and eco-
nomic development thought to be sound, Japan, commencing in
1950, screened foreign direct investment and only permitted those
investments which could make a positive contribution to the Japa-
nese economy. The criteria for screening were generally vague,
giving government officials added latitude. Over the past quarter
century, with the dramatic resurgence of its economy, Japan
gradually relaxed its foreign investment restrictions. Throughout
this period, the Japanese government encouraged the licensing of
technology to protect domestic industry. By the early 1960's,
Japan permitted foreign investment which did not unduly oppress
small firms, seriously disturb the industrial order or impede local
79 Dunning, The Future of Multinational Enterprise, 113 LLOYD'S BANK REv.
15, 30-31 (1974); Horst Heininger, Head of Department, Institute for Interna-
tional Politics and Economy, German Democratic Republic, GROUP OF EMINENT
PERSONS 203-205 (1974).
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development of industrial techniques. Liberalization took the form
of permitting joint ventures equally owned by Japanese and foreign
interests in an expanding line of product groups. Only recently
has Japan permitted wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, but only
in product areas where local firms assert nearly undisputed com-
petitive superiority8D
The Japanese example inspired nationalists in developing coun-
tries to delineate, by legislation, general guidelines subject to assess-
ment on a case-by-case basis by an administrative agency, cover-
ing areas of investment, ownership, restrictions on profits, business
practices and transfer pricing. A general pattern has evolved.
Certain economic activities (such as transportation, communica-
tions, banking and insurance) are reserved solely to local public or
private enterprise. In other areas, nations welcome new foreign
investment but require mandatory local participation (either on a
public or private basis) of a specified percentage of ownership
depending on the type of activity. Legislation usually covers both
new investments and takeovers of existing local firms.8s For
10 See Yoshino, Japan as Host to the International Corporation, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL CORPORATION 345 (Kindelberger ed. 1970); OZAKI, THE CONTROL OF
IMPORTS AND FOREIGN CAPITAL IN JAPAN (1972); Kobayashi, Foreign Investment
in Japan, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT: EXPERIENCE OF HOST COUNTRIES 123 (Litvak &
Maule eds. 1970); THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE GROWTH AND SPREAD OF
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 35-37 (1969); Okita and Miki, Treatment of Foreign
Capital on a Case Study for'Japan, in CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT 139 (Adler ed. 1967); Pearl, Liberalization of Capital in Japan, 13 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 59 (1972). Japan has had a strong position because of a large market
with a sufficient internal demand and because of the presence of a large, innova-
tive industrial sector. See generally 6 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 173 passim (1974).
Since the 1960's France has screened proposed foreign investments. Torem
& Craig, Developments in The Control of Foreign Investments in France, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 285 (1971); JOHNSTONE, UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FRANCE:
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FRENCH CHARGES 79 (1965).
81 See generally New Era for the Multinationals, Bus. WEEK, Jul. 6, 1974, at
73; Multinationals Find the Going Rougher, Bus. WEEK, Jul. 14, 1975, at 64. India
favors technical collaboration agreements subject to governmental approval, with
no or a minority foreign capital participation. For example, in fields such as
computers, IBM obtained 100 percent ownership of its subsidiary in India be-
cause of the complex nature of the industry and the export guarantees given.
Foreign majority participation has been allowed where India has made little
progress, where the cost of imported equipment is high and where export pos-
sibilities exist which will reduce the strain on foreign exchange resources. See
Medhord, Foreign Investment in India, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF
HOST COUNTRIES 280 (Litvak and Maule eds. 1970). Dr. Bharat Ram, Chair-
man, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company, Ltd., GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS
355 (1973).
Since 1960 Thailand has used a merit ratio system which has a built in bias
favoring local participation for selecting projects that warrant promotional status
and various benefits. The Philippines has also used a rating system including
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example, the 1973 Mexican law to promote Mexican investment
and regulate foreign investment reserves certain activities for the
state or local private firms and limits future foreign investment
to a maximum of a 49 percent participation in all areas not covered
net valued-added and balance-of-payments effects. In Indonesia under the 1967
foreign investment law, foreign ownership must be extinguished within 30 years
of entry. If capital is entirely foreign, the enterprise must allow for national
capital participation after a specified period. Burma has banned Chinese and
Indian businesses and Indonesia has limited all but its nationals from distribution
and marketing activities. In the Philippines, only its citizens can engage in re-
tail trade. See Robinson, The Engagement of Host Government Interests Upon the
Entry of Foreign Business, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 40-41
(Fayerweather ed. 1973); Galloway and Kapoor, Asia: Problems and Prospects for
MNC, 6 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 33, 34-37 (1971). Malaysia is seeking to give
Malays, as distinct from local Chinese or Indians, a larger share of jobs and equity
in foreign subsidiaries. Malaysia A Get-Tough Policy on Foreign Control, Bus.
WEEK, Jul. 7, 1975, at 32; Christian Science Monitor, Jul. 24, 1975, at 13, col. 1;
Hartley, Undeveloping Nation? Malaysia Scares Away Foreign Capital with Rules for
Redistributing Wealth, Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 22, 1975, at 24, col. 1.
See also P. 0. Ahimie, Secretary of Finance, Federal Ministry of Finance,
Nigeria, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 158-163 (1974); Sir Ronald Walker, Special
Advisor to Government of Australia on Multinational Corporations, GROUP OF
EMINENT PERSONS 437-438 (1974). The Australian Industrial Development Cor-
poration has provided funding to secure greater participation by Australian resi-
dents in the ownership and control of corporations engaged in Australian
industry. Sir Ronald Walker, Paper Prepared for Group of Eminent Persons
on Behalf of Australia 12 (1973).
Under the Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973 (Foreign Investment Re-
view Act of 1973 21-22 E113-2, c. 46 (1973)) the Canadian government has
screened proposed foreign takeovers to secure for Canada the maximum benefit
from foreign capital. The test used in screening turns on whether the takeover of
a Canadian business firm's investment will be of significant benefit to Canada.
The screening agency in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce also
attempts to bargain with participants for improved future performance. Be-
ginning on October 15, 1975, foreign direct investment in new lines of business
in Canada, including expansion by companies already operating in Canada,
were screened to insure that the proposed investment generates significant
benefits for Canada. The government also issued a new 14 point code of
conduct for foreign companies in Canada. Provincial leaders in Canada are
disturbed because of possible curtailment of industrial growth in their areas. A
majority of Canadians must also serve on the boards of directors of foreign
controlled corporations. Over the past 15 years Canada has also excluded
foreigners from control of banks, book and magazine publishing, and radio and
television broadcasting. The Canadian Development Corporation seeks to
promote new Canadian controlled corporations by pooling management skills
and capital, thereby providing a Canadian alternative to foreign subsidiaries.
Fayerweather, Canadian Foreign Investment Policy, 17 CALIF. MANAGEMENT REV.
74 (1975); Hartt, Who is Affected by the New Law?, Arnett, What Activities Are
Screened: Takeovers and New Business, Hon. Lastair Gillespies, Objectives of the
New Legislation, Abell, The Foreign Investment Review Act: Reaction of the In-
vestment Communities in Canada and Abroad, in CANADIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT
REVIEW SEMINAR (Sponsored by Richard De Boo Limited & Tax Management
Inc.) (1974). Patton, An Overview of Canadian Policy Towards U.S. Investment in
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by previous legislation and decrees. s2  An administrative body,
the National Foreign Investment Commission, may increase or
decrease the maximum percentage of foreign capital for certain
geographical areas and economic activities. The 1973 law also
requires that foreign investors receive approval by the National
Foreign Investment Commission to acquire more than 25 percent
of a local company's capital or over 49 percent of its fixed assets.
Rather than imposing rigid rules, Mexico encourages bargaining
to take place between the government and multinational corpora-
tions.
The Mexican government recommends but does not require
that foreign subsidiaries offer part of their shares (preferably a
major part) for purchase by the Mexican public.8 3  Thus the
Mexican statute follows the general non-retroactive pattern of
foreign investment control legislation. Exceptions, of course, exist
which mandate divestment. For example, Jamaica requires that
its nationals obtain 51 percent of certain foreign controlled com-
mercial banks within a specified time period.84
Developing nations have also imposed other restrictions on
Canada, 1 J. CONTEMP. Bus. 11-15 (1972). Franck and Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign
Investment Control Experiment: The Law, the Context and the Practice, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 76 (1975); Note, The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act: Red, White
and Gray, 5 L. & POLICY INT'L Bus. 1018 (1973); McMillan, After the Gray Report: The
Tortious Evolution of Foreign Investment Policy, 20 McGILL L.J. 213 (1974). Cooney,
A Cold Shoulder - Clampdown by Canadians on Investing by Aliens Alarms Multi-
national Firms, Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1975, at 38, col. 1; Trudeau's New Rules
for Foreign Investors, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 24, 1975, at 58; Trumbull, Canada Tightens
Investing Screen, N.Y. Times, Jul. 19, 1975, at 33, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Jul.
21, 1975, at 6, col. 1; Zehr, Canadian Review of Foreign Investments to Be More Com-
prehensive in Phase 2, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 1975, at 19, col. 2. See gen-
erally Trudeau's Balancing Act: Economic Nationalism - With Continued U.S. Ties,
Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1974, at 60; and Couzin, The Canada Development Corpora-
tion: A Comparative Appraisal, 17 McGILL L.J. 405 (1971). Of recent concern has
been the control of the editorial content of the Canadian editions of Time and
Reader's Digest. See Borders, Canada Involved in Press Dispute, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1975, at 5, col. 1; Trumbull, Bill on Foreign Publications Introduced in
Canada, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1975, at 6, col. 1; Breasted, Canada Plans Action on
U.S. Publishers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1975, at 18, col. 1; Trumbull, Canadians
Begin a News Magazine, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1975, § 1, at 17, col. 1; Trumbull,
Canada Likes U.S. TV-Without Ads, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 3, at 3. Burns,
Canada to Curb TV Ads Made in U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 3;
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
12 Sainz, Under-Secretary for Industry and Commerce of Mexico, GROUP OF
EMINENT PERSONs 24-25 (1974); Werret, Mexico: Drawing in the Reins on Foreign
Investment, 9 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 68 (1974).
13 Sainz, supra note 82, at 25, 31.
84 Jamaica, H. S. Walker, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the U.N.
in Geneva, GRouP OF EMINENT PERSONS 424 (1974).
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multinational corporations including requirements that nationals
comprise a specified percentage of a subsidiary's personnel, man-
agement, and board of directors. Limits have been imposed on
profit repatriation and local borrowing.85 The transfer of tech-
nology and transfer pricing have come under national regulation
and scrutiny. Governments seek more information about the dif-
ferent components of the technology package multinational cor-
porations provide. Countries aspire to control technology based
on a realization that a failure to do so may doom a nation-state
to a low status role in the present world system.
Nations have generally concluded that the global firms have
levied exorbitant charges for technology they have transferred
either to subsidiaries or local firms. Countries have sought to
eliminate restrictive business practices including export restrictions.
The 1972 Mexican law on the Transfer of Technology and the Use
and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks illustrates the desire
to regulate the purchase of technology by means of disclosure,
registration, evaluation, negotiation and control so as to prevent
royalties deemed excessive and to eliminate contractual clauses
which might impede local development. Under the Mexican
statute, contracts and documents pertaining to the transfer of
technology must be registered with the National Record of the
Transfer of Technology. Agreements which, among other items,
impose excessive royalties, restrict export of goods or services
by the local technology user, limit the licensee's management
powers or prohibit the use of complementary techniques, are not
eligible for registry and have no legal effect.M Unlike the Mexi-
can foreign investment law, the technology statute is retroactive.
Companies were forced to rewrite contracts and present them to
an administrative commission which has reduced royalty levels
from a range of 5 to 15 percent of the licensee's annual sales to
8 See, e.g., Vernon, Future of the Multinational Enterprise, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CORPORATION 391-392 (Kindelberger ed. 1970); P. 0. Ahimie, Secretary
of Finance, Federal Ministry of Finance, Nigeria, GROUP OP EMINENT PERSONS
162 (1974).
s Sainz, supra note 82, at 25, 32; Werrent, supra note 82, at 88, 94; see gen-
erally Lacy, Technology and Industrial Property Licensing in Latin America: A Legis-
lative Revolution, 6 INT L LAW. 338 (1972); Licensing: A Revolt Against Exorbitant
Fees, Bus. WEEK, Jul. 14, 1975, at 68; Medhord, Foreign Investment in India, in
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF HOST COUNTRIES 280 (Litvak and Maule
eds. 1970). In India collaboration agreements are subject to government ap-
proval which, in turn, are contingent on a limited term, maximum ceiling on
royalty payments, and a limitation of export restrictions.
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under 3 percent. Licenses costing over 3 percent have been ap-
proved for products with high research and development costs.87
Governments are also moving into the thorny area of controlling
transfer pricing. Difficulties to be surmounted include checking
prices which must then be compared with world prices. Establish-
ment of an arms-length standard may be impossible if the items are
not freely traded on a world market. Nevertheless, host nations
spot check areas most vulnerable to manipulation and use current
infractions as grounds for reopening back tax returns. By en-
larging the share of local equity held in a foreign subsidiary, it
is hoped that nationals, assuming they possess the requisite busi-
ness capacity and the time, will observe and check intrafirm
pricing arrangements.
Unilateral efforts to regulate multinational corporations pose
several problems. In addition to the cost, the administrative staff
requirements, the training of negotiating personnel and the acquisi-
tion of more information on market opportunities may be beyond
the reach of small countries. The possibilities of corruption, politi-
cal influence, and nepotism exist. Nations also fear the loss of
existing and, more importantly, future foreign direct investment as
multinational firms seek out less restrictive nations.88 As a re-
sult, nation-states have formed regional economic alliances to
promote their interests.
C. Regional Efforts
Although impediments to regional cooperation abound (such as
differences in backgrounds, resources, and ability of nationals)
regional groupings strengthen the bargaining positions of developing
countries and assist in evolving techniques suitable for dealing
with the problems posed by global enterprises. A regional bloc
can impose rules and extract concessions that few nation-states
could have obtained alone. Regional arrangements also avoid
competition for investments among members of a bloc that would
weaken their hands in bargaining with global firms. Access to a
regional free trade zone may offer an inducement for foreign in-
87 Bus. WEEK, supra note 86.
88 KOLDE, THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY 199 (1974). A national effort to
control multinational corporations requires periodic review and appraisal and a
centralized agency to review the activities of such firms and develop criteria for
projects and formulas to be followed. U.N., DEPT. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 83 (1973).
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vestors, both present and future, to operate under the region's
regulations.8 9
A leading example of regional effort is Decision 24 of the Com-
mission of the Cartagena Agreement promulgated in the early 1970's
by the Andean Common Market, composed of Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and recently Venezuela. The Decision
by the Commission has spun an intricate web covering foreign
direct investment (both present and future), trademarks, patents,
licensing agreements and royalties. The divestiture sections of the
Decision are perhaps the most innovative approach, short of na-
tionalization, to the problem of foreign control and dependency.
Every existing foreign subsidiary must sell a majority of its stock
to local investors, and new investors from outside the region must
take minority positions, within 15 to 20 years, in order to
be eligible for Andean Common Market trade concessions. If a
multinational corporation wishes to survive in the Andean region
it must comply with the divestiture requirements. Noncomplying
firms will be at a disadvantage in competition with complying
firms. Several sectors, for example banking, mass media, and
domestic transportation, are closed to future foreign investment.
Current foreign investors in such sectors are given a specified
time period in which to divest themselves of at least a majority of
their ownership to Andean nationals. Technology transfers and
remittance of profits are also regulated and restrictive business
practices (tie-in provisions and exports restrictions) are prohibited.
Royalties are limited with the hope of encouraging price reduc-
tions and preventing foreign firms from using royalties to extract
excess profits.90 Despite the aims of regional arrangements to
s9 U.N., DEPT OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 88, at 85-86.
90 ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE, July 17, 1971, 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
126; ANDEAN CODE ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE REGULATIONS WITH
REGARD TO SUBREGIONAL CAPITAL, Dec. 9-18, 1971, 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
357. See generally COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, ANDEAN PACT DEFINITION, DESIGN,
AND ANALYSIS (1973); Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for
Foreign Investments, 5 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 313 (1972); Diaz, The Andean
Common Market: Challenge to Foreign Investors, 6 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 22 (1971);
Valdez, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. AND ECON. 1
(1972); Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for
Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972); Moore,
Imperialism and Dependency, in Latin America, 15 J. oF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES &
WORLD AFF. 21 (1973); Avery and Cochrane, Innovation in Latin American Regional-
ism: The Andean Common Market, 27 INT'L ORGAN. 181 (1973); Multinationals Find
the Going Rougher, Bus. WEEK, Jul. 14, 1975, at 64, 65. Comment, The Multinational
Enterprise, The Context of Latin American Economic Integration: The Andean Agreement
Model, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245 (1973). On the impact of the Andean Pact rul-
ing calling for a gradual conversion of foreign banks to enterprises dominated by
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increase ownership by nationals of existing and future foreign
subsidiaries, national implementation of broad policy goals may
generate local variations and produce competition among members
of the bloc. Respective nation-states may also offer inducements
not in accord with the regional scheme. Administrative staffs
must continually surmount the inadequacies of knowledge and a
lack of trained manpower. 91
III. THE RESPONSE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
As developing nations seek to obtain appropriate technology
and management skills separate from foreign capital and achieve
a larger share of ownership of foreign subsidiaries (including
mandating fade-out divestment of existing and/or future foreign
equity ownership positions), multinational firms have responded
with a variety of new business arrangements including joint ven-
tures, management contracts, and licensing agreements. The
focus by developing countries on shifting the ownership position
held by multinational firms may obscure the effort of such enter-
prises to perpetuate control over foreign ventures in which they
participate. Furthermore, a developing country must carefully
assess the costs and benefits of breaking up the package pro-
vided by multinational corporations and of the existing alterna-
tives; particularly whether, if in the absence of foreign direct in-
vestment, capital may be raised domestically or through foreign
borrowings.
A. Joint Ventures
A joint venture involves a partnership composed of public
agencies, the government or local private interests in a develop-
ing country and a global firm. 92 The contribution to the joint
Andean group ownership, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1975, at 19, col. 4. The Andean
Pact also provides for the creation of state-owned regional multinational enter-
prises. This may be the first of a series of regional enterprises in developing
countries which will invest overseas. EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, CONSIDERATION ON
GOVERNMENTAL POLICY TOWARD TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA:
A PRELIMINARY SURVEY 12 (1974).
91 U.N., supra note 88, at 85; Sunkel, Latin-American Faculty of Social
Sciences, Santiago, Chile, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 136 (1974); Martix,
Implementing Legislation and Judicial Trends of ANCOM Members, in COUNCIL OF
THE AMERICAS, ANDEAN PACT: DEFINITION, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS (1973).
92 See generally FRIEDMAN AND BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VEN-
TURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971); FRIEDMAN AND KALMANOFF, JOINT INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES (1961). TOMLINSON, THE JOINT VENTURE PROCESS IN
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venture by a multinational corporation may include equity or debt
funds, -patents, trademarks, or essential operational factors such as
a plant and equipment. In return, the global corporation seeks
to share in profits and participate in policy making, planning and
management functions. Multinationals may be limited in the
amount of capital they can place in the joint venture and may, in
some instances, participate in a contractual joint venture in which
they make no capital investment.
Developing countries favor joint-venture arrangements which
have been widely used in such nations.93 It is hoped that such
arrangements will facilitate the more rapid transmission of manage-
rial know-how and appropriate forms of technology and will pre-
vent abuses including excessive industrial concentration or im-
proper political influences. The opening of equity ownership to
local interests may, it is believed, promote more meaningful partici-
pation.
Joint ventures in Eastern European countries set an example
to be followed by developing nations. Yugoslavia took the lead in
amending its foreign investment law in 1967 to permit joint ven-
tures. Western interests can receive equity positions in such joint
ventures and own fixed assets in Yugoslavia, but a management
committee composed of Yugoslav and foreign representatives must
make all important management decisions by consensus. In the
early 1970's, Hungary and Rumania authorized joint ventures.
Western equity participation is limited to 49 percent ownership in
Hungarian and Rumanian joint ventures; while in certain cases,
in Yugoslavia, a foreign partner's equity share may exceed 50
percent. Hungary and Rumania have both restricted joint-venture
arrangements to certain sectors of their economies. Equity in-
vestments in Hungary and Rumania do not permit Western part-
ners to control fundamental management decisions. 94
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: INDIA AND PAKISTAN (1970); FRANKO, JOINT VENTURE
SURVIVAL IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1971); STOPFORD AND WELLS, MAN-
AGING THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE Ch. 9 (1972). See also Comment, Joint
Venture Corporations: Drafting the Corporate Papers, 77 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1964).
Gordon, Joint Business Ventures in the Central American Common Market, 21 VAND.
L. REV. 315 (1968).
93 See generally FRIEDMAN AND BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VEN-
TURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971). An interesting analysis of General Tire's
worldwide joint ventures is given in the statement of Thomas Fahey, Vice-
President, Sales, General Tire International Company, GROUP OF EMINENT PER-
SONS 183-186 (1974).
94 WOLF, EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATION 74-76 (1973). See also Holt, New Roles for Western Multinationals in
Eastern Europe, 8 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 131 (1973); Gabriel, Adaptation: The Name oJ
[Vol. 8: 329
EMERGING WORLD ORDER
Global firms resist joint-venture arrangements, especially
those entailing a minority ownership position. Multinational
enterprises seek both majority ownership and voting control be-
cause of a parent corporation's desire to coordinate and integrate
the worldwide production and marketing operations of a far-flung
network of subsidiaries. Businessmen are wary of a governmental
or public agency partner assuming a majority ownership position and
making decisions which are not based on profit oriented criteria. 5
More sophisticated businessmen, however, see the need to enter
into joint-venture arrangements to neutralize the political interests
of local elites, bureaucrats and businessmen. Tapping local capital
reduces the risk of foreign operations. Local businessmen may pro-
vide valuable information regarding local markets and products and
constitute a source of government and labor contacts. Against
these advantages must be placed the fact that the local partners
share in the profits previously enjoyed solely by the multinational
corporation. Local equity may be in scarce supply. The new lo-
cal shareholders, who possess a different time frame and who desire
a quicker dividend payout, pose new problems for the multina-
tional enterprise including cost allocations between operations
and reinvestment of joint-venture profits. The top heavy debt
structure of a joint venture may be vulnerable to start-up and other
short-term losses.
If the government of a developing country mandates that for-
eign investors may only establish minority ownership and voting
positions in a joint venture, the multinational corporation may enter
into special arrangements with the local majority partner or attempt
to control the enterprise through a variety of techniques including
technology and management contracts. %  In industries in which
technical change is critical, control may be exerted through a tech-
nology contract which provides that the multinational firm will
supply key supervisory personnel or that such personnel will be
the MNC's Game, 7 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 7 (1972); Glickman and Sukijasovic,
Yugoslav Worker Management and its Effect on Foreign Investment, 12 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 260 (1971); Sukijasovic, Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia, in FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT: EXPERIENCE OF HOST COUNTRIES (Litvak and Maule eds. 1970); KRETSCHMAR
AND FOOR, THE POTENTIAL FOR JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE (1972).
9 Robinson, Management Attitudes Toward Joint and Mixed Ventures Abroad,
6 WESTERN Bus. REV. 14 (1962); FRIEDMAN AND BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 383 (1971); STOPFORD AND WELLS,
MANAGING THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 152-153 (1972); Chandler, Private Foreign
Investment and Joint Ventures, in PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD (Ady ed. 1971).
% FRIEDMAN AND BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 385 (1971).
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satisfactory to the foreign investor.97 A global firm may wield
control through a management contract which provides for the
placement of key management personnel from the parent corpora-
tions in operating posts because of local skill shortages98  Use
of these and other techniques led two knowledgeable observers to
conclude: "Nevertheless, although a number of foreign investors
likewise feel that voting and technical control should always be
linked, a majority of them consider their technical superiority an
adequate means of exercising de facto control over the foreign joint
ventures where they are in a minority position." 99
The local majority shareholders who lack a common purpose,
have no interest in exercising control, or are on friendly terms with
foreign interests, also facilitate the control aspirations of multina-
tional corporations. A small local elite may repeatedly participate
in the number of joint ventures in a nation because of the difficulty,
if not the impossibility, of broadening the base of private local in-
vestor involvement. The elite group may be unresponsive to nation-
al priorities or governmental objectives thus providing ineffectual
representation for national interests. A dispersion of a majority
local ownership position may create a passive, non-unified
group enabling a minority foreign interest concentrated in one or two
foreign corporations to hold control. 1°°
More significantly from the viewpoint of developing countries,
joint ventures may fail to cure the problems raised by manufac-
turing activities of multinational corporations. A recent study con-
cluded that a joint-venture arrangement as contrasted with a wholly-
owned foreign subsidiary may not, on balance, produce a greater
contribution to national economic and social development.'t 1
97 Id. at 386.
98 Id. at 387, 125, 126, 272, 273, 280, 284. Nestle and Unilever seek manage-
ment control even if such firms occupy a minority ownership position. Thomas
Fahey, Vice-President, Sales, General Tire International Company candidly
noted, "In some of our companies where we have a minority participation, we
supply the management and run the business as though it were ours because we
have the best interest that it be successful." GRouP OF EMINENT PERSONS 189
(1974). See also BIVENS AND LOVELL, JOINT VENTURES WITH FOREIGN PARTNERS 43
(1966).
91 See FREIDMAN AND BEGUIN, supra note 96, at 386.
100 U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 60-61 (1974).
101 STOPFORD AND WELLS, MANAGING THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 152-153,
159-166 (1973); U.N., DEP'T. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE ACQUISITION OF
TECHNOLOGY FROM MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 29-30
(1974), UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 24-25 (1972). See also de la
Torre, Foreign Investment and Export Dependency, 23 EcON. DEVELOPMENT AND CUL-
TURAL CHANGE 133, 143-45, 149 (1974); Bonin, The Multinational Firm as a Vehicle
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Joint ventures pay more for technical and managerial services in
the form of royalties and other fees than do wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries. A majority-owned subsidiary will generally receive
greater access to the global distribution channels of its parent
corporation than a joint venture. A multinational firm may also
attempt to exercise more control over the export decisions and
distribution patterns of a minority-owned joint venture in order to
protect and enhance its global marketing strategy. Use of know-
how and trade names may be restricted by contract to certain
geographical areas. Joint ventures place a double burden on a
local capital market by using the financial resources of local part-
ners as well as tapping local credit sources. Although the amount
of capital available for other investments may be reduced, the
impact of using local capital to finance a joint venture depends
on an assessment of how such local funds would otherwise have
been deployed. Contrasted with these disadvantages, joint ven-
tures generally pay lower prices than do wholly-owned foreign
subsidiaries for intermediate goods purchased from multinational
firms. Higher charges for know-how, trade names, and manage-
ment and technical services and other overhead expenses may, how-
ever, counterbalance the diminished effectiveness of transfer pric-
ing.
A developing country may wish to pay the economic price, at
least in the short run, in an attempt to extricate itself from the
yoke of dependency. To reduce the drawbacks of joint ventures,
developing countries turned to careful scrutiny and appraisal of
control techniques used by foreign interests, even those occupying
minority positions. Several corporations may be invited to serve
as the foreign partners for a venture. The bargaining position of
developing countries in the regulation of joint ventures in the final
analysis depends on several factors including the type of technol-
ogy, the size of the local market and the number of multinational
firms possessing the requisite technological, managerial or mar-
keting skills. 102  If a nation wishes to extract the benefits of
multinational corporations, but avoid the encroachment of Western
for the International Transmission of Technology, in THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM AND
THE NATION STATE 119 (Pacquet ed. 1972) (limitations on exports may exist more
often in joint ventures and in licensing agreements than in parent-subsidiary
relationships); BRASH, AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY 95-98,
207, 233, 257 (1966).
102 Because of its technological and marketing superiorities, IBM insists
upon and has only wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, even in Japan and India.
FRIEDMAN AND BEGUIN, supra note 96, at 213-219.
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ideas and values, establishment of industrial enclaves may also
become necessary.
B. Other Arrangements Excluding Foreign Direct Investment
A country wishing to avoid foreign equity or debt investment
may gain technological and managerial know-how by requiring
multinational corporations to license technology or enter into man-
agement and marketing contracts. 03 The experience of Eastern
European nations again provides a useful guide for developing coun-
tries. 1°4  Major contractual techniques used by Eastern European
countries to achieve an inflow of intangible skills (managerial,
administrative and technical) include technology licenses, turnkey
contracts, production arrangements and management contracts.
The licensing of technology, know-how and other forms of informa-
tion involves the payment to firms, in cash or deliveries of prod-
ucts in kind, of fixed or variable fees (the latter linked to per-
formance of the venture) over a limited time period. Contractual
arrangements may be renegotiated at specified intervals. Turn-
key concepts include a Western firm providing design and tech-
nology for a plant and furnishing more sophisticated equipment,
while the local entity assumes responsibility for the construction
of a plant and supplies less sophisticated technology. Foreign in-
terests may construct an entire plant which local management then
operates. Under a production arrangement a Western corporation
supplies the necessary production technology and/or part of the
product line. The Eastern partner furnishes part of the produc-
tion line and perhaps some of the technology. The final product,
under a production arrangement, may be jointly marketed or mar-
keted by each partner in its own national market or in a regional
103 U.N., DEPT. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 39 (1973); U.N., DEPT. OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE
ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY FROM MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS BY DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 27 (1974); GABRIEL, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CORPORATE
SKILLS: MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1967); Gabriel,
MNCs in the Third World: Is Conflict Unavoidable?, 50 HARV. Bus. REV. 37 (1972);
Robinson, The Global Firm-to-Be: Who Needs Equity?, 3 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 23
(1968); Robinson, The Developing Countries, Development, and the Multinational Cor-
poration, 403 ANNALS 67, 77 (1972).
See also Galloway and Kapoor, Asia: Problems and Prospects for the MNC, 6
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 33-40 (1971); Behrman, Foreign Investment and the Traisfer of
Knowledge and Skills, in UNITED STATES PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT
ABROAD 114 (Mikesell ed. 1962). Nehemkis, Latin America: Testing Ground for
International Business, 13 CALIF. MANAGEMENT REV. 87, 92-94 (1971).
104 WOLF, EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATION 66-69 (1973).
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trading area. A management or marketing contract may be em-
ployed. Under such an agreement a foreign corporation receives
a fixed payment for future services rendered over a specified
time period with possible provision for incentives for successful
performance.105
Unless forced to enter a market by transferring skills, not capi-
tal, the approach of multinational corporations' contractual arrange-
ments varies depending on a number of factors. If a nation's
market is too small to warrant the investment or if a firm lacks
the capital to make an investment then contractual techniques
will be favored. However, many corporations desire to make di-
rect foreign investments. Firms possessing a technological lead or
those having incurred substantial research and development ex-
penditures generally evidence a lack of interest in licensing. In
such instances, the parent wishes to control its technological and
knowledge inputs. Such firms do not want to give away valuable
know-how as part of the contractual arrangement. Although suf-
ficient control may be achieved by contractual arrangements
such corporations wish to supply an entire package, including capital.
If a contractual arrangement would generate a return deemed in-
adequate, a firm may transfer less sophisticated technology or
skills. Other multinational companies seeking to control market
developments, including prices, profit remittances and allocation
of resources to protect product standards and foreclose any threat
to established market positions, avoid contractual arrangements.
A developing country which forces a multinational corporation
to unbundle the package and transfer skills but not capital,
faces at least two dangers. A certain percentage of firms will
not enter into such agreements. Depending on the clout of such
firms, they may seek to renegotiate the terms of entry. Other
firms will utilize contractual arrangements involving formal or in-
formal restrictions which, in fact, increase the cost of the arrange-
ment. Such restrictions also permit the global firm, even in the
absence of a capital investment, to control the local venture and
utilize such operations as part of its worldwide system. The per-
petuation of control occurs because the expertise and knowledge
of multinational corporations creates a decision-making capacity
beyond the monitoring ability of a local firm or a developing coun-
try.106  Each contractual supplier may also raise the price of the
105 For example, Fiat contracted to build an auto factory in the Soviet Union.
Multinationals: A Fiat is a Lada is a Zastana, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 12, 1972, at 32.
106 Baranson, Technology Transfer Through the International Firm, 60 AM. ECON.
REV. 435 (1970). IBM desires wholly-owned subsidiaries so as not to dilute
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ingredient furnished by realizing that the available return depends
on the use of other factors not under its control.
To counteract the efforts of multinational firms to achieve con-
trol, governments have sought expert advice and have trained na-
tionals to monitor operations and manage businesses. These steps
have enabled nations to take the appropriate action against multi-
national entities engaging in restrictive business practices. Local
employees, officers and directors must, of course, exercise effec-
tive surveillance. A lack of local capabilities and a continued
need to import knowledge and technology may perpetuate the de-
pendency syndrome.
C. Divestment
To secure both capital and intangible resources (management,
marketing and technology) offered by multinational enterprises,
experts have advocated that developing countries use a fade-out
divestment scheme for future ventures and perhaps existing foreign
subsidiaries. t07 The divestment arrangement contemplates the con-
version of existing or future wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries into
joint ventures in which local interests participate as equity owners
or into a totally locally-owned business within a specified time
period. The foreign investors' stake (including profit interests
and ownership of intangible and tangible assets) will be sold or
given to local investors. The divestment concept turns on obtain-
corporate decisions regarding prices, profit remittances, and international al-
location of resources. Id. at 439. See also Behrman, Foreign vs. Local Ownership,
17 WORLDVIEW 39 (1974); Penrose, School of Oriental and African Studies, Uni-
versity of London, GRouP OF EMINENT PERSONS 336 (1974).
A multinational corporation may also bring pressure on its parent government
to intervene in a variety of ways - military, trade and/or financial sanctions -
or attempt to persuade international organizations to block loans. U.N., DEP'T
OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY FROM MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 35, 41-42 (1974).
107 See Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America, and Why, ESSAYS IN INTER-
NATIONAL FINANCE No. 76, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMICS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (1969); but compare Behrman, International Di-
vestment: Panacea or Pitfall?, 18 LOOKING AHEAD 1 (1970) and Prebisch, Comment,
in INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 171 (Wallace ed. 1974). See also
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT, Article II(3)(c) (1972).
Boddeyn and Torneden, U.S. Foreign Divestment: A Preliminary Study, 8 COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus. 25 (1973), state that from 1967 to 1971, there were 424 divestments
by American corporations of active, foreign operations, including an increase
from 29 in 1967 to 144 in 1971. Divestments have grown substantially in Mexico,
Central America and South America. In 1967, 18.8 new establishments were
created for each divestment; in 1971 the ratio dropped to 3.5 to 1.
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ing the maximum advantage during the limited period when global
firms will make (or have made) their key contribution. An as-
sessment must therefore be made as to the point in time when
the benefits provided by a foreign firm will diminish (or has
diminished) so that a foreign-owned operation may revert, in
whole or in part, to local ownership.
Although one study108 revealed that 70 percent of the Ameri-
can companies surveyed might be candidates for fade-out arrange-
ments in Latin America depending on the terms and conditions
(which include a desire of foreign investors to retain a minority
interest and to avoid divestment for a sufficiently long time period
so as to obtain a return deemed adequate), businessmen gener-
ally view fade-out arrangements with considerable skepticism.109
But the increasing debt loads and the capital shortages many
multinational corporations are experiencing may force a reappraisal
of divestment as a means of raising funds. Beyond a fear of an
increase in state control and the spector of nationalization without
adequate timely compensation, several significant problems are
raised by mandating divestments. Global firms may fail to pro-
vide, on a continuing basis, the latest technology or the best
management. A firm which tightly integrates a subsidiary into a
global production and marketing system finds divestment unattrac-
tive. The inability to tie the activities of a subsidiary to the world-
wide network may also impede foreign investment and also lessen
the desirability, from a viewpoint of local interests, of operating
a business after divestment. Faced with a limited amount of time
in which to generate profits, global enterprises may seek "ex-
cessive" profits and repatriate earnings quickly putting pressure
on a host country's balance of payments. If the divestment ar-
rangement includes compensation for foreign investors, raising cap-
ital locally or borrowing funds may prove difficult whether under-
taken publicly or privately. Decisions must be made on whether
capital should be allocated to replace existing or future foreign
investments rather than finance new domestically owned enter-
prises. Finally, local partners may play secondary roles (includ-
ing activities such as sales, publicity, or labor relations) if foreign
firms, owning a minority interest after divestment, control key
108 Meeker, Fade-Out Joint Ventures: Can It Work for Latin America?, 24
INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 25, 9-32 (1971). The firms surveyed, ho~vever, rejected the
concept of a complete fade-out.
109 See J. Irwin Miller in U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
135 (1974).
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activities such as operations and financing.11° The apparent slow-
ness with which the members of the Andean Common Market
have pursued the divestment concept exemplifies the difficulties
in implementing such a scheme, particularly in assessing and pro-
jecting the price to be paid and the point in time when the costs
exceed the benefits provided by a foreign subsidiary. The need
to absorb new technology and the ability to tap multinational
corporations' access to foreign markets limits the desirability of a
divestment scheme.
In seeking to reduce dependency and capture excess profits, de-
veloping countries must carefully assess the costs and benefits
entailed in regulating the entry by and the manufacturing opera-
tions of multinational corporations. This requires accurate infor-
mation. Nations will derive different cost-benefit ratios depending
on the economic sector and the total situation within each country. 1 '
It has been estimated that if no foreign capital of any sort were
used in Canada (and assuming a continuation of the existing pro-
duction process, the existing capital-to-labor ratio applied to gov-
ernment and business, and maintenance of current Canadian of-
ficial overseas loans and holdings of foreign exchange assets),
Canadian gross domestic product would decline by over 16 per-
cent and that gross national income would be reduced by 2.9 per-
cent.1 12  A nation must be willing to accept this outcome. Coun-
tries wishing to tap the skills and resources offered by global firms
must establish a minimum level of return that will attract corpora-
tions. Those who attempt to disassemble the package provided by
multinational corporations and separately price and obtain skills
encounter a significant concern - will a nation generate sufficient
110 Behrman, International Divestment: Panacea or Pitfall?, 18 LOOKING AHEAD
1 (1970); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (1974); Salera, Liquidate U.S. Direct
Investments?, 24 INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 31 (1970); UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES 25 (1972) (prepared by Raymond Vernon): Ryutaro Komiya, U.N.,
THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 121 (1974). See also STOPFORD
AND WELLS, MANAGING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 152-153, 178 (1972); Hans
Schaffner, U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 148-149 (1974);
Peterson, Ancom: An Andean Paradox, 6 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 29 (1971).
I See generally U.N., DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE ACQUISITIOb
OF TECHNOLOGY FROM MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2(
(1974); Nye, Multinational Corporations in World Politics, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 155, 17,
(1974).
112 Hellervell and Broadbent, How Much Does Foreign Capital Matter, B(
STUDIES (NO. 13) 38, 39 (1972).
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capital for its developmental projects if it does not permit the
entry of Western capital?113
In the absence of private foreign direct investment, a govern-
ment could pursue several strategies to raise necessary capital.
Long-term debt issues on the Eurodollar or other capital markets
could be floated. Credits could be sought from international fi-
nancial institutions.114  Reliance could be placed on centrally
planned economies to provide capital. These strategies raise the
siector of a new dependency. State owned corporations may be
organized along regional lines. But a program to exclude private
foreign investment rests on the assumption that a cessation of the
economic drain caused by multinational corporations would create
a new wellspring of local capital and that through rigorous eco-
nomic planning the available capital could be allocated to certain
sectors, particularly labor-intensive, export-oriented industries.
Beyond economic planning, a nation must establish its eco-
nomic, social and human priorities and build a developmental
plan around such goals. A nation may conclude that nationali-
zation of foreign investments and economic isolation offers the best
hope for achieving a desired social system. The lack of trained
manpower may impose impediments. Foreign participation may
be needed to maintain distribution channels and marketing outlets.
In the absence of a vision excluding expansive developmental and
infrastructure programs, a program of autarky may prove difficult
but not impossible. The Egyptian example, however, does not
provide a hopeful pattern for developing nations." 5  From 1960
to 1974, Egypt operated a state controlled economy without any
major foreign direct investment. Facing an acute scarcity of capi-
tal in 1974, Egypt revised its foreign investment legislation to allow
multinational corporations to invest to produce items which Egyp-
tian firms did not make or items for export in industrial enclaves.
113 See, e.g. Cooney, A Cold Shoulder Clampdown by Canadians on Investing By
Aliens Alarms Multinational Firms, Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1975, at 38, col. 1.
114 But compare INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES AND THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15 (1974) which opposes
international financial institutions granting credits to developing countries to
nationalize foreign subsidiaries.
115 See Sklarewitz, Industrial Pyramid? Socialist Egypt is Courting Foreign In-
vestment, BARRON'S, Oct. 6, 1975, at 11; Ulman, Mideast Meets West to Bolster Its
Economy, Egypt Courts Private Enterprise, Foreign Investors, Wall Street Journal,
June 5, 1974, at 30, col. 1; Crittenden, Sadat's Effort to Attract U.S. Investors Is
Mixed in Red Tape, Egyptian Style, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1975, at 55, col. 1. See
also Hartley, Changes in Canberra Australia's Labor Government, Plagued by Economic
Ills, Is Veering to the Right, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 13, 1975, at 1, col. 2 and
Global Report, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 24, 1975, at 6, col. 2.
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In addition to receiving tax incentives, foreign firms were autho-
rized to repatriate profits and capital and were given protection
from nationalization and waivers from import duties on machinery
and raw materials. Export-oriented, labor-intensive industries will
apparently receive other special favors.
Economic activities in many developing# countries center not
on manufacturing, but on raw materials. The next section analyzes
efforts to establish national control over raw materials and the
formation of producers' cartels to redress the abuses of dependency,
particularly declining trade terms.
IV. RAW MATERIALS
A. National Strategy
With the growing awareness by developing countries of the
value of their natural resources and the availability of information
regarding the activities of the multinational corporations engaged
in raw material extraction, governments pursued two nationally
oriented strategies: Obsolescence bargaining 16 and nationalization.
Multinational corporations initially possessed greater bargaining
power when they sought to tap the raw materials found in devel-
oping countries. Access to capital, technical skills and the world
market enabled global firms to attain attractive concession terms.
After a firm invested capital and made discoveries, its bargaining
power declined.
Nations viewed the returns generated by multinational corpora-
tions as no longer appropriate to the risks. Government leaders
perceived an economy heavily reliant on the exportation of one or
two raw materials as vulnerable to changes in prices for such re-
sources and to shifts in operations by global enterprises. Accom-
panying this sense of exploitation and dependency came a resent-
ment of the isolation of foreign extractive enclaves.
Before significant steps could be taken to gain a larger share
of the profits, a nation had to strengthen its bargaining power.
Local individuals and public or private corporations acquired tech-
nical skill and marketing knowledge; the ability to generate capi-
tal grew. Host nations realized they could hire independent ad-
visors.
Governments sought to renegotiate existing concession agree-
116 VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY, Ch. 2 (1971); Mikesell, U.S. Private Invest-
ment in the Extractive Industries of the Developing Countries: Changing Patterns and
Attitudes, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF HOST COUNTRIES 355
(Litvak & Maule eds. 1970).
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ments. Demands for contractual revisions came to be viewed as
part of the game. Increased bargaining strength also affected
new agreements. Companies in extractive industries began risk-
ing new investments on terms established by host governments
that would previously have been regarded as unacceptable.
Beyond obsolescence bargaining, the concept of foreign conces-
sions came under attack. Regimes seeking to demonstrate their
power over multinational enterprises nationalized foreign holdings
of raw material deposits.117
The national aspirations of developing countries, especially as
manifested in the expropriation of foreign assets in extractive in-
dustries, faced two major challenges presented by multinational
corporations. First, vertically integrated firms controlled process-
ing facilities (for example, expensive aluminum smelters) and mar-
keting networks outside a particular nation. A nation could miti-
gate foreign control of these facilities by using its bargaining
position to force a firm to engage in more local processing prior
to nationalization, allocating capital for the development of local
processing after the nationalization of extractive operations, in-
vesting in local industries (for example, petrochemicals and fer-
tilizer) which consume large quantities of indigenous raw ma-
terials, and developing its own marketing network and locating
new trading partners, including countries with centrally planned
economies and maverick Western nations. 118 Recognizing a con-
tinued dependence on global petroleum firms, countries such as
Venezuela, even after nationalization, have executed participation
17 Recent examples of nationalization include petroleum in Venezuela,
(N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1975, at 27, col. 1); bauxite in Jamaica (Howe, Jamaica
Trying to Create Her Own Brand of Socialism, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 2, col. 3);
and iron ore in Peru, (Wall Street Journal, July 28, 1975, at 7, col. 1). In under-
taking the iron ore nationalization, Peru's Minister of Mines and Energy, Jorge
Fernandez Maldonado, charged Marcoa Mining Corp. with violating contracts
with the government, wasting ore lodes and causing "serious damage to our
country by actions typical of the immoral conduct that the greater multinational
consortiums traditionally exercise." Wall Street Journal, July 28, 1975, at 7, co l .
1; see also GIRVAN, FOREIGN CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN
JAMAICA (1971); and U.N., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, PERMANENT SOV-
EREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES, U.N. Doc. E/C/7/53 (1975).
118 Moran, New Deal or Raw Deal in Raw Materials, in A REORDERED WORLD;
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 168 (Cooper ed. 1973); Vernon,
Foreign Enterprises and Developing National in Raw Materials Industries, 60 AM. ECON.
REV. 122 (1970), but compare, TANZER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OP INTERNATIONAL
OIL AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, Chs. 10, 11, 21, 22, 26 (1969). In
considering whether to nationalize banana operations, the government anticipated
continued reliance on multinational firms to market bananas. Riding, Honduras
Eyes Banana Take-Over, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1975, at 38, col. 1.
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agreements to secure the continued involvement of multinational
corporations in the exploration for crude oil, for technical and
managerial expertise, and the marketing of refined products.119
In certain industries (for example, copper), global firms, real-
izing the difficulties involved in recapturing oligopoly profits down-
stream after the nationalization of the extractive activities, turned
to international alliances to bolster their position and ward off the
threat of nationalization or to increase the compensation to be paid
for nationalized assets. Kennecott pioneered such strategies by
raising funds for new joint-venture projects from a consortium
composed of host governments, customers in Europe and Asia
and international financial institutions with repayment provided
from the output of the project. This technique sought to place
pressure on a nationalistic Chilean government not to void Kenne-
cott's management contract or repudiate the government's guaran-
tee for debt obligations of the joint venture. If a subsequent
government failed to assume the guarantee obligations, then credi-
tors could threaten and did in fact prosecute legal actions against
commercial transactions involving the host nation. Thus, even if
support by a home government was not forthcoming, other inter-
ests (customers and financial institutions) in different nations, in
addition to Kennecott, had a direct stake in making certain a
nationalistic government would not repudiate its obligations. The
second part of Kennecott's plan involved lining up governmental
supporters in its home country so that the threat of nationalization
119 With additional new petroleum capacity expected during the next 5
years, competition among sellers may intensify and accentuate the marketing
problems for nations that have severed their connections with major oil com-
panies. The Oil Producers Cool Off on Nationalization, Bus. WEEK, June 9, 1975, at
22; Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1975, at 6, col. 1. Under 1975 oil nationalization
legislation, the Venezuelan government is permitted to make contracts or form
joint ventures with private foreign firms. President Carlos Andres Perez of
Venezuela maintained that the nationalized oil industry needed access to modern
technology and foreign marketing networks. Joint-venture arrangements will
probably emerge in 3 or 4 years when new exploration must be undertaken
to bolster Venezuela's oil reserves. See Goodsell, Venezuela Details New Oil
Policy, Christian Science Monitor, June 2, 1975, at 23, col. 1; Riding, Foreign Oil
Role in Venezuela Weighed, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1975, at 43, col. 5; N.Y. Times,
August 19, 1975, at 45, Col. 2; Scherer, Venezuela Maps Oil Nationalization, Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Nov. 12, 1975, at 8; Wall Street Journal, Oct. 14, 1975, at 21,
col. 3; Maidenberg, Venezuela, Its Oil Within Grasp, Needs Foreign Concerns Re-
fining Technology, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1975, at 57, Col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1975, at 27, col. 1; Forbes, How Venezuela Spends Its Oil Riches, FORBES, July 15,
1974, at 45; See also Smith, Kuwait Buys Out Gulf and B.P., N.Y. Times, Dec. 2,
1975, at 57, col. 5; Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1975, at 8, Col. 2; Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 2, 1975, at 4, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1975, at 47, col. 5;
Brazil Invites Oil Hunters, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 27, 197S, at 34.
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would produce a face-to-face confrontation between the United
States and Chile. Despite this involved web, Chile nationalized
Kennecott's assets, but paid more in compensation than if such
strategies had not been used. t20
B. Producers' Cartels
Oil producing nations formed the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to raise the price of crude oil and to
assist in securing national control over the production of petrole-
um. The success of OPEC in controlling, prices and using such
control as a political weapon led the nations producing other
commodities to form cartels with the aim of unifying economic
power to redistribute the world's wealth, to achieve local control
and more domestic processing, to conserve diminishing resources,
and to force changes in the foreign policies of consuming coun-
tries.
Based on the consumption of a seemingly inexhaustible supply
of cheap Middle East oil - the artery of prosperity - the econo-
mies of the United States, Western Europe and Japan blossomed
after World War II. Between 1950 and 1973, U.S. oil consumption
rose from 2.37 to 6.3 billion barrels a year. In Japan, demand for
imported oil rose from 100,000 barrels a day to almost six million
barrels a day. Western European imports of oil rose to over 15
million barrels a day in 1973, up from 1.5 million barrels a day in
1950.121 Supported by the governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom, seven multinational oil corporations (Exxon,
Mobil, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Gulf, Shell, and
British Petroleum) controlled the production of oil and allocated
markets for the sale of petroleum.t 22
120 Moran, Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defense by Multinational
Corporations: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost for Nationalization in Natural
Resources, 27 INT'L ORGAN. 273 (1973); See also Hoskins, How to Counter Expropria-
tion, 48 HARV. Bus. REV. 102 (1970).
121 Barraclough, The Great World Crisis, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 23,
1975, at 20, 22; and SZULC, THE ENERGY CRISIS, Part One (1974).
122 The cartel activities by oil corporations span much of this century.
The 1928 Achnacarry Agreement enabled major oil firms to achieve a stable
cartel. After World War II, the major oil corporations reestablished marketing
and pricing agreements which were gradually eroded in the 1950's by independent
American and European producers obtaining contracts for Middle East oil. To
expand their markets, these independents turned to price cutting and lessened
the effectiveness of the international oil corporations. See generally ADELMAN,
THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET (1972), and SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS (1975).
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After the formation of OPEC in 1960,123 its member nations
bided their time because of the abundance of oil and an inability to
agree on production controls. OPEC members realized, however,
that the economic survival and expansion of industrialized econ-
omies rested on a continuing supply of petroleum.
Events turned in OPEC's favor in 1973. An economic up-
swing was underway in industrial nations generally characterized
by weak governments. In addition to a temporary tightness of the
world oil supply, geographical concentration and political cohesion
existed on the part of major exporters. The Shah of Iran and King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia agreed to act in concert; King Faisal sought
to exert his influence and to free Jerusalem from Israeli control,
while the Shah desired to tap the wealth of his declining oil re-
serves. A relative abundance of wealth extended the time horizon
of OPEC members, who generally produced oil for export and
lacked significant internal interests pressuring for petroleum price
reductions. In the short run, the lack of alternative sources of sup-
ply and the lack of a close substitute commodity facilitated the
cartel's action. Under these conditions, the cartel of oil producing
nations became a political and economic reality.
In the fall of 1973, OPEC unilaterally quadrupled the prices of
crude oil exports, and posted additional price increases in 1974 and
1975.12 The celebrated seven sister multinational oil corporations
were reduced to the status of tax collectors for OPEC revenues.
During the winter of 1973-1974, Arab members of OPEC embar-
goed petroleum shipments destined for the United States and the
Netherlands and cut back shipments elsewhere to bring pressure on
the Arab-Israeli situation.
The oil price increases contributed to the worldwide inflationary
spiral, produced a fear that Arab interests would acquire massive
amounts of Western industrial and real estate properties, and drove
oil importing developing nations into a precarious financial posi-
tion. Yet the fears of calamity flowing from OPEC actions must
123 See ROUHANI, A HISTORY OF O.P.E.C. (1971), and SAMPSON, supra note 122;
Krasner, Trade in Raw Materials: The Benefits of Capitalist Alliance in TESTING
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 184-187 (Rosen and Kurth eds. 1974);
OPEC, The Economics of the Oil Cartel, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 13, 1975, at 77, 78; Kraar,
OPEC Is Starting to Feet the Pressure, FORTUNE, May, 1975, at 186, 187, For an
attack on the role of the oil companies in creating the "oil crisis" see RAND,
MAKING DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR OIL (1975).
124 For the 1975 round of price hikes, see Wall Street Journal, Sept. 29, 1973,
at 3, col. 1; Farnsworth, Countries of OPEC Agree to 10% Price in the Price of Oil,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1975, at 31, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1975, at 57, col, 5;
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
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be viewed critically. Recent estimates indicate that OPEC price
hikes were responsible for 25 percent of the 1974 rise in the U.S.
consumer price index. Because of the greater dependence of Japan
and Western European countries on imported oil, such nations
were harder hit. The OPEC price spiral caused about one-third
to one-half of the inflation in such countries in 1974.125 The small-
er OPEC price rises in 1975 will have a correspondingly lesser
impact on inflationary pressures.
The specter of worldwide disruption of financial markets and
of a large concentration of funds and resources in the small
number of OPEC hands seems misplaced. Although estimates
differ, it is projected that by 1980 surplus revenues enjoyed by OPEC
members will turn into annual deficits because of the growing
number of imports by Middle East nations, especially for goods
developed nations produce in order to develop infrastructures and
raise living standards and because of the static demand for oil,
the result of worldwide recessionary conditions and conservation
measures. 12 By 1980, OPEC wealth will likely amount to 2.4
percent of the world's capital stock and a smaller percentage of the
I's INT'L. ECON. POL. Ass'N. AND THE IEPA ADVISORY COMM. ON NATURAL
RESOURCES, PETROLEUM AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 3-4, (1975), (citing Annual
Report of U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, February 1975); See also Lewis,
Getting Even, N.Y. Times Magazine, Dec. 15, 1974, at 78 (The fourfold oil price
increase added I to 2 percent to the U.S. cost of living in 1974, or about one-fifth
of the overall price increases); and SAMPSON, supra note 122, at Ch. 13; SZULE,
THE ENERGY CRISIS Ch. 16 (1974). For an estimate that OPEC price hikes
boosted 1974 consumer price index. in the United States by one-third see, How
OPEC Has Worsened U.S. Economic Woes, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13, 1975, at 34.
12 The early estimates in size of OPEC surplus were exaggerated. OPEC
surpluses probably will disappear by 1980. See, Why OPEC's Rocket Will Lose
Its Thrust, FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, MONTHLY ECONOMIC LETTER, June 1975,
at 11; N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1975, at 51, col. 6; Farnsworth, Even OPEC Feels the
Pinch, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 4, at 5, Col. 1. (Estimates place the cumulative
OPEC surpluses by 1980 at under $200 billion); N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1975, at
39, col. 4; Lewis, OPEC Riches, Even Revised, Bespeak Powers, N.Y. Times, Apr.
20, 1975, § 4, at 1; Chenery, Restructuring the World Economy, 53 FOR. AFF. 242
(1975); But see N.Y. Times, June 17, 1975, at 43, col. 6, estimating cumulative
OPEC surplus of $449 billion by end of 1970's. The imponderables implicit in
such predictions include future OPEC imports and the demand for oil. See
generally INT'L. ECON. POL. ASS'N AND IEPA ADVISORY COMM. ON NATURAL RE-
SOURCES, PETROLEUM AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 7-10 (1975). The develop-
ment plans of populous nations such as Iran and Algeria will only permit such
countries to generate a small surplus, if any, while cash will probably continue
to pile up to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Some OPEC members are
turning to borrowing to meet the needs of their economic development plans.
The Oil Nations Go on a Borrowing Spree, Bus. WEEK, July 28, 1975, at 26; Wall
Street Journal, Aug. 4, 1975, at 4, col. 1; Barron's, Dec. 1, 1975, at 4, col. 3.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
world's total financial and real assets. 27  These figures appear
manageable. Furthermore, OPEC members probably will not
acquire Western firms on a massive scale but will, more likely,
use their oil revenues to develop their own industrial capacity and
engage in the processing of crude oil for exportation, particularly
in the form of petrochemicals.
One fear appears valid, namely, the plight faced by developing
nations which import oil.128 Inflationary pressures on goods im-
ported from the West have also contributed to the predicament of
poorer developing nations. OPEC members have diverted a por-
tion of their revenues to so-called "fourth world" oil poor develop-
ing nations. 29'  The extent of such loans and other financial
127 Cooper, The Invasion of the Petrodollar, SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan. 25, 1975,
at 10; Chenery, Restructuring the World Economy, 53 FOR. AFF. 242, 257 (1975).
128 OPEC price hikes have increased the balance of payments deficits
incurred by other developing nations which are heavily dependent on imported
oil as an energy source. Abiaka, The Energy Crisis and the LDS's, 9 COL. J.
WORLD Bus. 54 (1974). The Fourth World faces balance of payments deficit of
$35 billion in 1976, a substantial portion of which is attributable to the high cost
of oil. Estimates of the trade deficit in 1976 run to $57 billion. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1975, at 51, col. 7; Barron's, Oct. 27, 1975, at 4, col. 4. If developing
countries import less petroleum, their developmental plans must be scaled down.
Increases in the prices of food and fertilizers strained the resources of developing
countries. Chenery, Restructuring the World Economy, 53 FOR. ArF. 242, 246
(1975). See generally BROWN, By BREAD ALONE (1974).
129 In 1974, eight OPEC nations contributed $2.5 billion for development as-
sistance through OPEC-controlled agencies and placed $3.5 billion in inter-
national financing institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund
Special Oil Facility to finance the payment imbalances of IMF members. INT'L.
ECON. POL. Ass'N. AND IEPA ADV. COMM. ON NAT. REs., PETROLEUM AND FOREIGN
POLICY 8 (1975); Friedman, The New World of the Rich-Poor and the Poor-Rich,
FORTUNE, May, 1975, at 244, 247; Clark, The Waiting Game, Wall Street Journal,
Mar. 4, 1975, at 40, col. 1; Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 1975, at 7, col. 1;
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19, 1975, at 10, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1974, at
49, col. 2. OPEC members aided Fourth World through the Arab fund for
Economic and Social Development, Islamic Development Bank, Special Arab
Fund for Africa and the African Development Bank; Cooley, Abu Dhabi Be-
coming Major "Third World" Donor, Christian Science Monitor, Jul. 23, 1975, at
7, col. 3; Aziz, Islamic Bank - Will It Siphon Petrodollars from West?, Christian
Science Monitor, August 7, 1975, at 3, col. 3. Arab members of OPEC set up
a fund to compensate poorer Arab nations and created an Arab petroleum ser-
vices company. De Onis, Arab Oil Nations Will Aid Others, N.Y. Times, May 5,
1975, at 49, col. 4. Venezuela has eased the burden of oil bills by selling oil for
one-half cash and the balance in the form of low-interest long term loans.
Venezuela has also made substantial contributions to the Inter-American Develop-
ment and Carribean Development Banks. Maidenberg, Venezuela Asserts Her Oil
Power, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1975, § 3, at 2, col. 3; Maidenberg, Venezuela is
Aiding Poor Nations on Oil, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1975, at 27, col. 7.
World Bank estimates place actual cash disbursements under new and old
aid commitments at $10 billion in 1975; Dale, Jr., Rise in Aid from Oil Nations
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support raises considerable doubt as to the financial viability of
such developing nations.
The long-term viability of OPEC faces several questions. 13°
First, if worldwide demand for petroleum declines or remains
static in coming years, new oil supplies (such as the North Sea and
North Slope) under the control of industrialized nations will come
into production and may drive down the price of petroleum from its
present levels.131 However, these new supplies are high cost
sources propelling these nations (United Kingdom, Norway,
United States) to seek a floor price and not drive the price of oil
back to 1973 levels132 Second, the cartel faces unused capacity
which is a major source of friction among member nations.
But Western economies appear to be rebounding and the United
States is becoming more dependent on OPEC to meet its energy
requirements.
To date, the petroleum cartel has not collapsed but has served
as a model of developing nations exporting other raw materials. t33
Reported, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § 1, at 16, col. 3. See also N.Y. Times,
Aug. 8, 1975, at 33, col. 7.
The Shah of Iran has proposed a special aid fund to aid developing nations by
means of an assessment on each barrel of oil produced for next 5 years to go
into a low-interest loan fund for specific projects in developing countries. Oakes,
Shah is Offering New Plan To Aid Developing Nations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1975, at
1, col. 1; Teltsch, Iran Replies Skeptically to U.S. Economic Offers, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 3, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
130 See e.g., Varon & Takeuchi, Developing Countries and Non-Fuel Minerals,
53 FOR. AFF. 497 (1975); REPORT OF THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINA-
TIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1975); Fixler and Ferrar,
OPEC - Will It Work?, 9 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 47 (1974).
131 The possibility of military action to avoid strangulation of industrialized
Western countries and Japan was raised by Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger, Kissinger on Oil, Food and Trade, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 13, 1975, at 66, 69.
A plan for an aggressive military takeover of certain OPEC production and
reserve areas in the Persian Gulf was advocated by Tucker, Oil: The Issue of
American Intervention, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1975, at 21 (1975); and Tucker, Further
Reflections on Oil and Force, COMMENTARY, June 1975, at 45 (1975). But see Stone,
War for Oil?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 6, 1975, at 7.
132 See Kraar, OPEC Is Starting to Feel the Pressure, FORTUNE, May 1975,
at 186, 187, 279, 280; Lewis, Is It Time to Sob for the Seven Sisters? Not Yet, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1975, at 4, col. 3. See also, SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS, Ch. 14
(1975). OPEC nations will probably let the companies continue to sell for
OPEC members to prevent under-the-table attempts to increase sales by re-
spective member nations of OPEC.
133 During the 1920's, a number of producing firms (or sometimes producing
governments) entered into commodity agreements to drive up prices by means
of export controls and quotas. Lacking sufficient market power, the agreements
failed to prevent dramatic declines in commodity prices during the Great Depres-
sion. The intergovernmental commodity agreements of the 1930's in tin, rubber,
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In quick succession, nations have formed cartels or associations
for a variety of raw materials, including bauxite (International
Bauxite Association), tin (International Tin Agreements), coffee
(International Coffee Council), and copper (intergovernmental
Council of Copper Exporting Countries). 134 The cartels seek to
and wheat aimed to benefit producers through export restrictions and taxes.
World War II brought an end to these agreements. The decline in prices after
the Korean War produced a series of intergovernmental agreements in wheat,
sugar, tin and coffee designed to halt plummeting prices and reduce price
instability. These agreements included interests of producing and consuming
nations. For example, the 1962 International Coffee Agreement, signed by over
50 consuming and producing countries, established export quotas. Arrangements
governed the world coffee market until 1972 when the economic provisions of the
agreement lapsed. See generally WALLACE AND EDMINSTER, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF RAW MATERIALS (1930); ROWE, PRIMARY COMMODITIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE (1965); LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, Chs. 2 & 3
(1974); Krumme, International Commodity Agreements: Purpose, Policy and Procedure,
33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 784 (1963); Knorr, The Quest for Stabilization
Policy in Primary Producing Countries, 11 KYKLOS 224 (1958); Law, International
Commodity Agreements: Policies and Problems, 4 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 87 (1970); Law,
Stabilization of Prices of Primary Products: A Review Article, 24 INTER-AM. ECON.
AFF. 27 (1970); Swerling, Problems of International Commodity Stabilization, 63
AM. EcON. REV. 65 (1963). For specific commodities see Fox, TIN: THE WORK-
ING OF A COMMODITY AGREEMENT (1974); Barkerman, The International Tin Agree-
ments, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 495 (1975); Wasserman, Fourth International Tin
Agreement, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 355 (1971); FISHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE
AGREEMENT: A STUDY IN COFFEE DIPLOMACY (1972); Krasner, Business-Govern-
ment Relations: The Case of the International Coffee Agreement, 27 INT'L ORGAN.
495 (1973); Law, Coffee: Structure, Control and Development, 27 J. INTER-AM. ECON.
AFF. 69 (1973); Cordell, The Brazilian Soluble Coffee Problem: A Review, 9 Q. REV.
OF ECON. & Bus. 29 (1969); Kravis, International Commodity Agreements to Promote
Aid and Efficiency: The Case of Coffee, 1 CANADIAN J. OF ECON. 295 (1968);
Wasserman, International Wheat Agreement, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 360 (1971);
Farnsworth, International Wheat Agreement and Problem, 1949-1956, 70 Q. J. OF
ECON. 217 (1956); and Farnsworth, Commodity Power, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1975,
at 61, col. 1.
' 1 On bauxite, see Wall Street Journal, Apr. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 6; N.Y.
Times, Nov. 11, 1975, at 49, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jun. 4, 1975, at 53, col. 1. On
tin, see N.Y. Times, Jun. 21, 1975, at 33, col. 2; The U.S. May Join the Commodities
Club, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 15, 1975, at 23; on coffee, see N.Y. Times, Jul. 14, 1975,
at 37, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jun. 25, 1975, at 58, col. 2; Wall Street Journal, Nov.
13, 1975, at 26, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1975, at 63, col. 5; Prinsky, Brewing
Agreement, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Lemoux, The World
Politics of Coffee, NATION, Aug. 2, 1975, at 75; On iron, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
1975, at 53, col. 4. The Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries which includes
members from developed and developing countries, is not committed to at-
tempting to set prices or influence world markets. It is difficult to increase iron
ore prices because the United States, Sweden, Canada, and Australia mine one-
half of the non-Communist world's iron ore. On copper, see N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 1975, at 61, col. 2; Wall Street Journal, Oct. 20, 1975, at 16, col. 4; N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1975, at 49, col. 6.
See also, Stewart, Asians Studying OPEC, Consider Plans for Cartels, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1975, 5 3, Part 2, at 47, col. 1; Goodsell, Sugar, Other Cartels Seek
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achieve a common pricing strategy and to prevent multinational
corporations from playing one country against another.
Although the bauxite producers cartel probably has the great-
est possibility for success, raw material cartels face a multitude
of problems. In a non-growth recessionary period, cartels find it
difficult to increase prices. The financial staying power of many
raw material producing countries differs from, and is inferior to,
that of oil exporting nations. Many developing nations must
produce, export and sell their raw materials or commodities or face
financial ruin, especially in times of mounting oil prices. For
commodities requiring more labor than petroleum for their produc-
tion, cutbacks in output spell increased unemployment. Some
commodities, such as bananas, cannot be stored. Inability of a
cartel to control a sufficiently large share of world output or re-
serves, geographical and political diversity, and the lack of shared
experiences among producers create impediments. The problem
of internal dissention, particularly the allocation of production
quotas, is always present. Fear that price increases will generate
a decline in demand (the degree of price elasticity) or a shift to
the consumption of near substitute materials hampers a cartel, as
does the possibility of the development of natural or synthetic
substitutes and greater efforts at recycling. A cartel may also
encourage new producers to enter the industry and force importing
nations to stockpile raw materials to be released if a cartel increases
prices.'-" Only in the case of petroleum does the cost of the raw
material constitute a large percentage of the selling price.
to Keep Prices High, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1975, at 2, col. 2; Lewis,
Raw Materials: New Effort at Stable Prices, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, § 3, at 6,
col. 3.
15 Krasner, Oil is the Exception, 14 FoR. POLICY 68 (1974); Mikesell, More
Third World Cartels Ahead?, 17 CHALLENGE 24 (1974); Tilton, Cartels in Metal
Industries, 44 EARTH AND MINERAL SCIENCEs 41 (1975); U.S. COUNCIL ON INT'L.
ECON. POL., CRITICAL IMPORTED MATERIALS 25 (1974); Varon and Takeuchi,
Developing Countries and Non-Fuel Minerals, 52 FOR. AFF. 492 (1974); World Round-
up, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 24, 1975, at 40; Strauss, Why Commodity Cartels Won't Work,
Bus. WEEK, Jun. 30, 1975, at 20. But see Bergsten, The Threat is Real, 14 FOR.
POLICY 84 (1974); Bergsten, New Era in World Commodity Markets, 17 CHALLENGE
34 (1974). The success of other cartels may also turn on whether OPEC mem-
bers will contribute financial support. Venezuela offered to finance stockpiling
or destruction of surplus coffee stocks. Maidenberg, Venezuela Asserts Her Oil
Power, N.Y. Times, April 27, 1975, § 3, at 2, col. 3. But several Arab nations
withdrew their promised financing of CIPEC (Intergovernmental Council of
Copper Exporting Countries), N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1975, at 41, col. 1; World
Roundup, Bus. WEEK, July 21, 1975, at 32. In some metals, for example copper,
developed countries, such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa are sub-
stantial producers. However, Australia has joined the bauxite cartel.
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Despite these problems, in addition to petroleum, bauxite ap-
pears to be the raw material most suitable for cartelization. Forty
percent of the world's production of bauxite is concentrated in four
Caribbean countries - Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana and the Domini-
can Republic. The four Caribbean nations together with Australia
and the Soviet Union aggregate over 75 percent of the world's
output. 13 Six multinational firms, Alcoa, Kaiser, Reynolds, Al-
can, Pechney and Alusuisse account for over 80 percent of the
smelting capacity in the non-communist world. As with petroleum,
the existence of a few large, vertically integrated firms facilitates
the operation of a cartel. 137 Such corporations can pass on added
costs, including the cost of raw materials, to consumers. De-
veloped nations are heavily dependent on the importation of
bauxite. In addition to an increasing demand for bauxite, price
hikes seemingly do not produce a decline in demand. Bauxite
also lacks a readily available low priced substitute. The cartel,
however, faces one critical problem, namely the difficulty in
fixing the price for bauxite because of differences in quality among
bauxite deposits and the lack of an accepted benchmark stan-
dard. Because of the dependence of some nations, such as Ja-
maica, on the foreign exchange generated by bauxite exports, it
appears unlikely that nations will hold significant amounts of
bauxite off the world market. 138
V. TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES: TOWARDS A NEW WORLD ORDER
A. Raw Materials
Riding the wave of OPEC's success, yet cognizant of the long-
run ability of developed countries to generate new sources of sup-
ply, locate substitutes, engage in conservation and recycling, and
build stockpiles, developing nations in 1974 and 1975 sought to
develop a new international economic order based on their ap-
parent position of power. From this effort emerged a far reach-
ing attempt to redistribute income, decision-making, and power in
the world, to minimize severe jolts to economies which accompany
1-1 The ten members of the International Bauxite Association 145-146 (1975)
(Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana, Dominican Republic, Haita, Ghana, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia and Australia) control approximately 75 percent of the
world's production of bauxite. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
137 See generally, ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET (1972).
138 See Ward and Wagner, Commodity Cartels, Economic Rent, and the United
States, 1 J. oF EcON. 142, 144 (1975); but compare Bergsten, The New Era in World
Commodity Markets, 17 CHALLENGE 34 (1974); UNCTAD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES (study by R. Vernon) U.N. Doc. E. 72. 11. D. 16 at 9 (1972).
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violent swings in world commodity prices and to achieve wider
opportunities for industrialization in developing countries.
The quest for the new international economic order, after the
success of OPEC, began in 1974 with the adoption by the United
Nations General Assembly of the Declaration on the Establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order in May and the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in December.
After asserting that each nation-state possesses full permanent
sovereignty, not subject to any form of external coercion, over its
natural resources and all economic activities, Third World nations
called on developed nations to share resources with poor countries
and alter a system in which developing countries, which constitute
70 percent of the world's population, obtain only 30 percent of the
world's income. 139 One hundred and ten nations met in Dakar,
Senegal in February 1975, and reached a consensus on concrete
proposals for creating a new international economic order. 140 The
Lima Declaration of the Second General Conference of the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization, held in March 1975,
incorporated many of the Dakar proposals. t4t
As part of the new international economic order, attention
was focused on a program to regulate raw material and com-
modity markets through a series of agreements. Devices pro-
posed by developing countries to raise or support prices and
allocate production include the use of buffer stocks (that is, agree-
ments by producing and consuming nations to engage in purchases
and sales to keep prices within fixed ranges), 142 fixed floor and
139 U.N., Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order, May 9, 1974; U.N. Doc. A/Res/3202; Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, Dec. 12, 1974, 12 U.N. Monthly Chronicle 108 (Jan. 1975).
140 The Dakar Declaration, Conference of Developing Countries on Raw
Materials (Dakar, Senegal, February, 1975) U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/L45.
141 Report of the Second General Conference of the United National In-
dustrial Development Organizations, (Lima, Peru, March, 1975) U.N. Doc. Dr./D/
Conf. 3/31.
142 The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development has advocated an
integrated commodities plan based on a central fund to finance international buf-
fer stocks of selected commodities, except food grains. Report by the Secretary-
General of UNCTAD, AN INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR COMMODITIES, Dec. 9,
1974, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/166; Report by the Secretary-General of
UNCTAD, AN INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR COMMODITIES: THE ROLE OF INTER-
NATIONAL COMMODITY STOCKS, Dec. 12, 1974, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/166/Supp.
1 and Dec. 13, 1974, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/166/Supp. 1/Add.i; Report by
the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, AN INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR COM-
MODITIES: A COMMON FUND FOR THE FINANCING OF COMMODITY STOCKS, Dec. 12,
1974, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/166/Sup.2; Report by the Secretary-General of
UNCTAD, AN INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR COMMODITIES: THE ROLE OF MULTI-
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ceiling prices, various compensatory and supplementary financ-
ing systems, 143 and the indexing of commodities which would
gear prices of commodities and raw materials exported by develop-
ing nations to the cost of manufactured goods that Third World
countries purchase from developed nations. Agreements among
governments of developing countries and developed nations would
fix the supply and price of raw materials. The agreements would
also set a framework within which multinational corporations
would operate, thus reducing the role of global firms particularly
in extractive industries.
Faced with a need to structure programs to meet the demands
of members of OPEC and to preserve and bolster Western pre-
eminence in the world capitalist system, United States Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger turned from a strategy of confronta-
tion' 44 to one seeking cooperation with developing nations to force
LATERAL COMMITMENTS IN COMMODITY TRADE, Dec. 13, 1974, U.N. Doc.No.
TD/B/C.1/166/Supp.3; Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, AN
INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR COMMODITIES: COMPENSATORY FINANCING OF Ex-
PORT FLUCTUATIONS IN COMMODITY TRADE, Dec. 13, 1974 U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/
166/Supp.4. See also Wasserman, Commodities: An Integrated Approach, 9
J. WORLD L. 584 (1975); Wesserman, Multi-Commodity Approach to International
Agreements, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 463 (1975); Sulzberger, Inflation and a Cartel
War, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1975, at 15, col. 1. For background on UNCTAD,
see generally Gosovtc, UNCTAD: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE (1972).
143 See, e.g., Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, AN INTEGRATED
PROGRAMME FOR COMMODITIES: COMPENSATORY FINANCING OF EXPORT FLUCTUA-
TIONS IN COMMODITY TRADE, Dec. 13, 1974, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.1/166/
Supp.4. Pursuant to the 1975 Rome Convention, the European Economic
Community and certain countries in Africa, the Carribean and the Pacific agreed
to a guarantee program, which would be given according to the level of develop-
ment, for specified non-mineral products except iron ore. In the event export
revenues obtained from specific products sent to the Common Market decline
below a certain level, the Common Market will compensate affected country(s)
for part of the resulting loss. Anable, Europe and "Third World" in Trade Accord,
Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 12, 1975, § B, at 3, col. 1.
144 The United States House of Representatives rejected proposals for a Fed-
eral agency to act as sole purchasing agent for U.S. oil imports under which
oil purchased through secret competitive bidding could be resold to private
firms. Proponents hoped that secret competitive bidding for licenses to import
oil into the United States would force cartel members to cut prices to get a larger
share of U.S. markets. Such a strategy failed to consider the possibility of an
OPEC boycott or the submission of similar bids by OPEC members. A Federal
agency to take over the function of importing oil would also present the following
problems: capital costs, lack of experience and the possibility of constituting a
larger focus for a political attack. Wall Street Journal, Jun. 11, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
See also Lichtblau, Uncle Sam Would Be A Weak Oil Bargainer, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1975, § 3, at 14, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1975, at 27, col. 1. Secretary
Kissinger also wanted the United States and other oil consuming nations to set a
common floor price on oil imports to ensure energy development in the United
States and full conservation even if OPEC tried to undercut such efforts by
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down oil prices. 145 A preparatory meeting between consuming
and producing nations in Paris in April 1975 fell apart because the
United States wanted to focus only on energy, while developing
nations wanted to broaden the agenda to include all raw materials
and development. The April 1975 conference witnessed a coales-
cence of the views of OPEC members and non-oil producing de-
veloping countries that the agenda should include protection of the
purchasing power of developing countries' export earnings and
the indexing of raw material exports.146  Secretary Kissinger's
willingness in May 1975 to broaden the discussion between pro-
ducing and consuming countries to include all issues of concern
to developing nations and to consider international arrangements
for greater price stability of each commodity on a case-by-case
basis,147 paved the way for Secretary Kissinger's more detailed
slashing oil prices. It was hoped that such a plan would serve as an inducement
to oil producers to agree on long-term, lower-cost arrangements with oil con-
sumers. Gwertzman, Kissinger Unveils U. S. Plan to Spur New Fuel Sources, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 4; Keatley, Kissinger Discloses Strategy on Energy
Aimed to Break OPEC's Economic Power, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1975, at 5,
col. 3; Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 1975, at 3, col. 2; Smith, Kissinger Oil Price
Plan Finds Industry Skeptical, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1975, at 4, col. 2; but compare
Parisi, The Case Against A Price Floor for Oil, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 14, 1975, at 51.
American efforts to build an adequate petroleum stockpile also present cost
problems. Other nations might begin to stockpile unless the United States made
its stockpile available. Proposals abound for reduction of the demand for
petroleum products, increasing domestic production and developing substitute
energy sources. A Federal corporation might also be created to drill for pe-
troleum on the most promising oil acreage held by the Federal Government.
The U.S. Treasury Department favored a free market approach and opposed a
generalized system of commodity agreements aimed at fixing prices. Wall
Street Journal, Jul. 10, 1975, at 2, col. 3; Statement of Gerald 0. Parsky, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury before Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and
Monetary Policy of House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, Jul. 9, 1975.
14s The plight of the Fourth World (oil-importing, developing countries) evokes
American interest because of the potential of such nations as markets to absorb
exports of manufactured goods and for new foreign direct investment.
146 Ulman, Algeria Suggests the Oil Conference Hold "Parallel" Talks on Other
Raw Materials, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 9, 1975, at 7, col. 2; Farnsworth,
Energy Talks at Impasse: U.S. and Algeria at Odds, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1975, at
47, col. 7; Wall Street Journal, Apr. 18, 1975, at 9, col. 2.
The Third World supported and continues to support OPEC for at least
three reasons: Developing nations hope to be oil exporters, they want OPEC's
support for their own cartels and because nearly all developing nations bear
the scars of independence and humiliation. The Third World Leans Toward OPEC,
Bus. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1975, at 28.
147 N.Y. Times, May 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Wall Street Journal, May 14,
1975, at 8, col. 2; Farnsworth, U.S. Affirms Shift on World Prices, N.Y. Times,
May 22, 1975, at 1, col. 5; Wall Street Journal, May 28, 1975, at 3, col. 2; Ulman,
U.S. Is Set to Discuss New Arrangements on Individual Commodities Case-by-Case,
Wall Street Journal, May 29, 1975, at 4, col. 1; Farnsworth, Kissinger Offers New
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proposals to the September 1975 Special Session of the United
Nations General Assembly and for the December 1975 Conference
on International Economic Cooperation.
With reference to commodity trade and production and the
stability of the export earnings of developing countries, in Sep-
tember 1975, Secretary Kissinger recommended the establishment
of a consumer-producer forum for each key commodity to promote
the efficiency, growth and stability of the respective market. 148
He supported liberalization of the International Monetary Fund's
terms for financing of buffer stocks and the creation within the
International Monetary Fund of a developmental security facility
to stabilize overall export earnings by giving loans to sustain de-
velopment programs in the face of export fluctuations. Funds
available for loans would total $2.5 billion per year with an aggre-
gate maximum of $10 billion. 149 Representatives of developed
and developing nations convened the December 1975 meeting of
the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. Four
commissions - energy, raw materials, development and finance
- will explore these issues in an arena less marked by political
confrontation and will formulate practical recommendations reach-
ing beyond issues involving petroleum prices and suppliesis 0
U.S. Aid Plan, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1975, at 1, col. 4; Godsell, U.S. Yields on
Raw Materials Linkup, Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1975, at 3, col. 1;
Speech by Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger before the Kansas City In-
ternational Relations Council, May 13, 1975; Speech by Secretary of State,
Henry A. Kissinger before the Meeting at the Ministerial Level of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency, May 27, 1975; Speech by Secretary of State, Henry A.
Kissinger before the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, May 28, 1975; N.Y. Times, May 29, 1975, at 19,
col. 1; Hofmann, Kissinger Offers Poor Lands Links to Richer Lands, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
148 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20. The U.N. Resolution adopted at the
close of the September 1975, United Nations General Assembly Special Ses-
sion called for a six-point program to improve market structures in the field of
raw materials and commodities exported by developing countries; including, (1)
international stocking and other market arrangements for securing stable, re-
munerative and equitable prices for these commodities, and (2) widening and
enlarging existing facilities for compensatory financing of export revenue fluc-
tuations. The resolution also called for continued study by the UNCTAD
Secretariat of indexing schemes. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1975, at 10, col. 4.
Secretary Kissinger refused to agree to indexing and desired to avoid in-
ternational price-support mechanisms for basic commodities. He also proposed
an international system for nationally held grain reserves to meet food shortages
and famines. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1975, at 51, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 2,
1975, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
149 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 3.
Is0 Farnsworth, France Invites 27 Lands to Meet on Economic Ills, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Farnsworth, Paris Meeting of Rich and Poor Submit
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With the heightened prospects for ongoing discussions be-
tween producing and consuming nations, several problems must
be faced with regard to increasing or stabilizing raw material
prices. Developing countries seek to end exploitation and to obtain
a fair price for their raw material exports. 51  How such prices
will be set, for which raw materials, and by what institutions re-
main to be established.
Such agreements among developing and developed nations, if
successful, would provide a floor under world prices thereby con-
tributing to worldwide inflationary pressures.15 2  Indexing, in
particular, freezes prices at arbitrary levels. Arrangements to hold
up prices in periods of falling demand may reduce demand for such
commodities still further. Composition of the index basket must
be agreed upon. Utilization of buffer stock mechanisms involves
the difficulties of projecting the future size of the necessary buffer
stock in light of long-term supply and demand patterns and
elasticities, as well as the allocation of quotas among producing
and consuming nations, at different production levels. How
should the burden of contributing buffer stocks by consuming
nations be divided - for example, according to their respective
shares of consumption?
Despite these difficulties, commodity stabilization arrange-
ments offer benefits to both producing and consuming nations.
Producing nations seek stable (and hopefully increasing) prices
to maximize governmental revenues and avoid strains on their abil-
ity to meet social demands. Consuming countries want assured
access to supplies at prices which will prevent the upsetting of
business plans necessitating readjustments in price levels, quan-
tities available for sale and sales patterns. The mutuality of
benefits flowing from a commodity stabilization system will prob-
ably lead to an agreement among nations. Price levels and pro-
duction quotas and/or buffer stocks arrangements can be arrived
at through negotiations which, of course, will include political and
Two Lists for Paris World Economy Talks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1975, at 15, Col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1975, at 15, col. 1.
151 As a useful working definition, exploitation may be defined as forming
part of an exchange of goods and services when (1) the goods and services ex-
changed are quite obviously not of equal value, and (2) one party to the exchange
uses a substantial degree of coercion. MOORE, REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES
OF HUMAN MISERY AND UPON CERTAIN PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THEM
(1972).
152 Segments of labor and industry within each nation-state capable of
achieving parity with rapidly mounting commodity prices will further exacer-
bate the inflationary spiral.
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economic factors.i53 Negotiations of a series of pacts in unison
would enable nations to balance concessions. An integrated ap-
proach may reduce the total cost because it is unlikely that all
covered commodities would require price support at the same
time. Such agreements require international arrangements, open
to all nations, which will meet, through compromise, the needs of
both developing and developed countries, and which will take into
consideration the value of raw materials and commodities to the
consumer and the alternate costs of substitute sources. Con-
sideration may also be given to the indexing against the impact
of inflation. The most critical question is not the mechanics for
supplanting the market mechanism, but the distribution of the
fruits generated by the efforts of producing nations to counter-
vail the power of multinational corporations and consuming coun-
tries. The new arrangements will adversely affect nations and
other unorganized consumers which are heavily dependent on the
importation of a wide range of raw materials, including agricul-
tural products. Increases in prices of raw materials will yield
benefits for major raw material exporters such as the Soviet
Union, South Africa, Canada and Australia, which do not fit
the stereotype of developing nations. In short, commodity price
supports may not facilitate the transfer of income from rich to
poor countries. World food shortages further increase the power
of the United States, which dominates the food producer's oligop-
oly.
B. Manufacturing Operations
Confrontation between consuming and producing countries
over the price and the availability of raw materials has temporarily
obscured the efforts of developing nations to control the manu-
facturing operations of multinational corporations. The United
Nations has been active with regard to investigation of global
enterprises, and the creation of new bodies and commissions to
engage in research and to consider and recommend a variety of
means to regulate global firms.
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in
1972 requested the Secretary General to appoint a Group of Emi-
153 See Keynes, The International Control of Raw Materials, 4 J. INT'L ECON. 301
(1974). The Keynes-United Kingdom proposal in 1942 contemplated the estab-
ment of a separate international organization which all members of the United
Nations would be invited to join. In addition to councils for each commodity, a
Council of Commodity Control would supervise price and output policies and the
size and management of commodity output.
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nent Persons to study the role of multinational corporations and
their impact on the developmental process and their implications
for international relations and to submit recommendations for in-
ternational action. 154 The Group of Eminent Persons in its report
recommended that the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations discuss issues related to multinational corporations at
least once a year and that a commission on multinational corpora-
tions be created under the Economic and Social Council.155 The
Group further advocated the establishment of an information and
research center to perform two functions: Make available infor-
mation to assist developing countries in dealing with global firms
and provide substantive and administrative services; including the
collection, analysis and dissemination of information for the
proposed commission on multinational corporations. 156
In August 1974, the United Nations set up an Information and
Research Center to obtain needed information and analyze and
disseminate such information to nation-states. This was followed
by the establishment of a permanent United Nations Commission
on Transnational Corporations in December 1974 which would act
as a forum within the United Nations for the comprehensive con-
sideration of multinational enterprises; including promoting an
exchange of views, conducting inquiries, making studies, pre-
paring reports, assisting the Economic and Social Council in
developing a set of recommendations to form the basis of a code
of conduct, and preparing proposals relating to the regulation and
supervision of multinational corporations. i57
The United Nations has taken the lead in attempting to gather
information on and formulating a code of conduct for multina-
tional enterprises. Implicit in such steps are a variety of policy
alternatives and various mechanisms for implementation. At
least three possible routes could have been chosen: Disclosure,
international incorporation, and transnational standards for corpora-
tions, home countries and/or host nations. The United Nations
has chosen to pursue the first and the third paths. The founda-
tion of transnational policy for the regulation of multinational
firms rests on their disclosure of information and on the collection,
154 U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3 (1974).
155 Id. at 52.
156 Id. at 53-54.
157 COMMITTEE ON TRANSNAT'L CORPORATIONS, REPORT OF FIRST SESSION,
Supplement No. 12, U.N. Doc. E/5655 E/C.10/6, at 1 (1975).
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assessment, and dissemination of such data. ts8 With the present
lack of knowledge regarding the economic, political and social
impact of global firms, particularly in view of the lax disclosure
requirements imposed by nations other than the United States,
information gathering as a first step is laudable. Two caveats
must be noted. First, although a need for more information exists,
corporations may have valid reasons (for example, business se-
crecy) for confidentiality. A line must, therefore, be drawn which
will respect legitimate corporate needs, but not allow firms to hide
behind a screen of business secrecy. Secondly, in gathering the
data, certain preliminary judgments must be made to pinpoint the
most critical information; including implicitly, the developmental
paths of nation-states, the costs and benefits of multinational
firms, the allocation of such costs and benefits and the objectives
for and means' of implementing transnational regulation. Pro-
miscuous gathering of data probably will be self-defeating. But
greater disclosure and data gathering (for example, on restrictive
business practices and interaffiliate transactions) form a first
step in a pattern of international control and indirectly provide a
means of substantive regulation.
Beyond disclosure, multinational corporations could be for-
mally internationalized. Instead of national incorporation and reg-
ulation, an international corporate law could be developed pro-
15s Id. at 3-5, 10-12. The Commission has requested as a high priority task
that the Information and Research Center determine what information is avail-
able on multinational corporations and where such information is located. Id.
at 3. For the disclosure recommendations of the U.N. Group of Eminent Per-
sons regarding agreements and corporate performance, see U.N., DEP'T OF ECON.
AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOP-
MENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95-97 (1974).
See also U.N., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 87
(1973), which contemplates the gathering, analysis and dissemination of data
on: (1) The inter-affiliate flows of goods and services and their pricing; (2) the
international distribution of specific activities, technology and skills, generation,
managerial and equity control; (3) the actual financial flow of international di-
rect investment (apart from capitalized know-how/transfer of secondhand equip-
ment); and, (4) the impact of foreign subsidiaries on governmental policies (tariff,
restrictive business practices, credit availability, access to alternative sources of
supply of goods and services). Ralph Nader has suggested that the United Na-
tions send out a questionnaire to 200 top multinationals and host governments
to obtain data on: (1) Who owns what land, mineral and other resources in each
country; (2) the amount, origin and nature of new investment; (3) the firm's
total income; (4) payments received on royalties, patents, licenses and manage-
ment contracts from foreign subsidiaries; (5) interlocks with governments, to-
gether with the credit and debt relationship; and, (6) taxes paid. Ralph Nader,
GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 93 (1974). See generally Behrman, Conflicting Con-
straints, 4 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 43-46, 50-55 (1974).
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viding for international incorporation of certain global firms.
One proposal envisages the establishment of an international com-
panies law, administered by a supranational body composed of
representatives from signatory nations, which would exercise
supervisory authority over internationally chartered corpora-
tions. 159  Proposed restrictions on internationalized corpora-
tions are of particular concern. A company chartered under the
proposed international companies law would agree to be bound by
its provisions. Each signatory state would agree neither to im-
pose additional restrictions on chartered corporations nor ex-
propriate the subsidiaries of such corporations without prompt
payment of adequate compensation. In short, by placing the en-
tire scope of corporate activities under international surveillance
and regulation, the proposed law would protect the firm from
interference by host nations. The share ownership, board mem-
bership and top management of such corporations would also be
internationalized. By dispersing ownership of the parent cor-
poration, such an entity might no longer be regarded as the sole
instrumentality of a particular nation.
The suggestions for global chartering suffer from several im-
pediments. Although the proposed law would contain restrictions
on corporate activities, as would a code of conduct, developing
countries would not support lax, imprecise standards and inade-
quate enforcement machinery. The inability of nation-states to
impose additional restrictions on global firms constitutes an
impediment, as does lack of precision in the process of selecting
representatives to the supranational body. 16°  In short, such a
proposal would protect the existing position of multinational
firms.
The heart of the present United Nations' efforts center on
drafting a code of conduct for transational enterprises. A code
159 See Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 2 COL. J. WORLD
Bus. 25 (1967); Ball, Making World Corporations into World Citizens, WAR/PEACE
REPORT 8 (1968); Ball, Proposal for an International Charter, in GLOBAL COMPANIES
170-71 (Ball ed. 1975). The United Nations has proposed a variant; namely,
that multinational enterprises satisfying certain criteria and agreeing to observe
certain criteria and certain requirements would be registered with an agency of
the United Nations. In the event a dispute arises between a host country and
such multinational firms, a United Nations body would conduct an independent
study and render a report. U.N., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT 94 (1973). See also, Clausen, The Internationalized Corporation: An Execu-
tive's View, 403 ANNALS 12, 21 (1972) and A. Toynbee, On the Way: Companies
More Powerful Than Nations, 7 NEWS & WORLD REP. 38, 41 (1971).
160 Rubin, Corporations and Society: The Remedy of Federal and International In-
corporation, 23 AMER. L. REV. 263 (1973).
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of conduct envisages the establishment and acceptance of basic
principles which would serve as guidelines for the activities of
corporations. A proposed General Agreement on Multinational
Corporations forms a starting point for the consideration of a
code of conduct.161 Patterned after the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, the proposed agreement would lay down a
limited set of principles to be administered by an international
agency possessing the power to investigate questions submitted by
corporations or nation-states and make non-binding recommenda-
151 Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GATT for Investment: A Proposal for
Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 L. & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 295, 318 (1970).
But see Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's
Analysis, 3 L. & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 1 (1971); Statement, Onitiri, Director, Institute
of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibandan, Nigeria, GRouP OF
EMINENT PERSONS 108 (1974), who notes that a GATT type of agreement regulat-
ing the relations between multinational firms and host countries will follow ma-
jor changes in the structure of the economic relationships between developed
and developing countries.
Robinson, The Developing Countries, Development and the Multinational Corpora-
tion, 403 ANNALS 67, 78-79 (1972), proposed a General Agreement on Capital
and Technology Transfer that would, among other items, encompass: (1) Politi-
cal neutrality of foreign-owned firms in host countries (failure to maintain such
neutrality would void parent-government risk guarantees; a firm could only in-
fluence politics by public statements, and covert activity of a political nature
would constitute a per se violation); (2) adherence by multinational firms to
all local laws; (3) host governments would recognize foreign ownership of the
tangible assets and intangible rights of management control for 20 years, unless a
shorter time period was agreed to (the investor/contractor would adhere to en-
try conditions unless adherence was made impossible by a host government or a
change in circumstances beyond the control of the foreign investor); (4) full
force would be given to tax incentives and holidays introduced by other members
to foreign business interests; (5) the parent government would tax earnings at
capital gains rates or not more than 50 percent, whichever is less; and, (6) disputes
regarding rules would be referred for interpretation to an international forum
created under the Agreement.
Jacques Maisonrouge, President, IBM World Trade Corp., supported a code
containing five points: (1) Total or predominant employment of host nationals
in subsidiaries; (2) multinational representation at headquarters and on boards;
(3) multinational stock ownership; (4) adequate guidelines on transfer pricing;
and, (5) judgment of a company's performance, particularly in a developing coun-
try, based to a degree on its performance in area of social responsibility. Jacques
Maisonrouge, President, IBM World Trade Corporation, GRoUP OF EMINENT PER-
SONS 68-69 (1974).
Sir Val Duncan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. outlined to EMINENT PERSONS a code of good corporate behavior com-
prising: (1) A progressive degree of local autonomy in decision making, subject
to very minimum co-ordination at the center; (2) employing as high a propor-
tion of nationals of any host country as possible, including senior management;
(3) having nationals of host country serve as a majority of the board of directors
of each oversea corporation; (4) being sensitive to reasonable aspirations of the
host nation - being good corporate citizens; and, (5) giving the population of a
host country the opportunity to participate in major enterprises of that country
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tions which would, hopefully, be accepted by the affected parties
on a voluntary basis. Signatory states and perhaps multina-
tional corporations could consult and bargain regarding policy
departures from the agreement and also discuss problems and
procedures to facilitate the settlement of disputes. From a few
generally accepted principles, it is hoped that an international
treaty of substantial coverage would emerge. The precedents de-
veloped by the agency would also form a basis on which to build
a supranational system.
after the major risk stage has been surmounted. Sir Val Duncan, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., GRouP OF EMINENT PER-
SONS 174, 175 (1974).
The Under-Secretary for Industry and Commerce of Mexico, favored a code
of conduct which did not impair sovereignty of recipient countries. Possible
provisions in such a code of conduct would require that foreign investment com-
plement national investment. Multinational corporations could not replace local
corporations or deal in fields adequately covered by them, but would have to have
a positive effect on balance of payments (especially through the increase of ex-
ports), promote increased employment and adequate remuneration, hire and train
technicians and administrative staff from host country, utilize national products
as much as possible in preparing final products, finance operations from outside
sources, contribute to the development of less developed economic zones of a
host country, supply the best and most appropriate technology and contribute
to local research and development, have a favorable effect on the quality and
price level of production, respect the social and cultural values of the host, identify
with interests of the host nation, and not distort consumption patterns or monopo-
lize national markets. Sainz, Under-Secretary for Industry and Commerce of
Mexico, GRouP OF EMINENT PERSONS 27-28 (1974). See also P. Liotard-Vogt, Man-
aging Director, Nestle Alimentana S.A., GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 283 (1974);
Lombardi, President, International Chamber of Commerce, GROUP OF EMINENT
PERSONS, 297-300 (1974), who concluded that broad principles will influence the
attitude of multinational corporations and produce changes in their behavior.
Efforts by the OECD to harmonize policies and coordinate activities, gener-
ate information and a means for testing the validity of a code of conduct. The
OECD has attempted to informally coordinate 'the antitrust policies of member
countries through a committee of experts on restrictive business practices, which
periodically issues descriptive reports and recommendations to member governments
to take measures against practices deemed harmful, intergovernmental coordi-
nation of policies on extraterritoriality also has been successful. Rubin, The
Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 L. & POL. IN
INT'L Bus. 1, 14 (1971). The International Chamber of Commerce has developed
the GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (1972), which makes suggestions
for the behavior of governments and corporations (for example, encouraging local
equity ownership, local participation in management, and promotion of local
individuals to positions of responsibility). Self imposed guidelines which are ex-
pressions of general concepts are subject to varying interpretations and are of
limited efficacy. U.N., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 78
(1973). For a prior effort by the United Nations to formulate a treaty regulating
multinational corporations, see HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION, U.S. Dep't of State Pub. No. 3117 (Commercial Pol. Series 113,
1948). For an itemization of codes covering governmental and corporate behavior
see BENRMAN, CONFLICTING CONSTRAINTS ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 43-50 (1974).
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The advantages of a code and then a treaty include over-
coming the slow, costly efforts to meet the problems raised by
global firms through case-by-case bargaining between a nation-
state or a regional organization and a multinational corporation. 162
Multinational firms would, furthermore, know what is expected
of them, at least on the issues which comprise the code. Signa-
tory nation-states would legally be committed to arrangements
covering foreign direct investment, unaffected by pressures from
special local interests or the temptation to rely on discrimina-
tory or retroactive ad hoc measures in regulating multinational
corporations.
Agreement on basic principles remains difficult in view of the
current lack of common interests between developed and de-
veloping countries and differing perceptions of the economic,
political, and social impact of multinational enterprises. The first
meeting of the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions in March 1975 produced a split between developed nations
and developing countries on the scope and content of a code of
conduct and on whether such a code would apply to host gov-
ernments as well as to private and/or public enterprises engaged
in foreign direct investments. 163
In view of the position of multinational corporations in sup-
port of a code of conduct establishing general guidelines, de-
veloping and developed nations can probably agree on a narrow
range of issues' 64 including barring activities of global firms
which adversely affect competition (for example, the takeover of
or the merger with an existing local firm),65 requiring an end
162 Rostow, The Need for a Treaty, in GLOBAL COMPANIES 160-61 (Ball ed.
1975). Initially only a few developing countries would sign the treaty, but
Rostow believes others would sign if the original signatories find the results
"favorable." See also U.N. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOP-
MENT 93 (1973).
163 COMMISSION ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, REPORT ON THE FIRST
SESSION, U.N. Doc. E/5655 E/C.10/6, at 9-10 and 18-22 (1975). (Annex 1, List
of Areas of Concern Regarding the Operations and Activities of Transnational Cor-
porations, Note Submitted by the Group of 77; Annex 11, Areas of Concern which
Relation to Relations Between Transnational Corporations and Governments, Note Sub-
mitted by the Delegations of France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United
Kingdom, United States).
164 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Speech to United Nations on
Sept. 1, 1975, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 1.
165 Solomon, International Control of Investment in the Trade Sector, in INTER-
NATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT (Wallace ed. 1974); U.N., THE IMPACT OP
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 86-87 (1974); see also, Farnsworth, O.E.C.D. Asks
Data on Big Companies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1975, at 41, col. 8.
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to discrimination in employment based on sex, age, religion, race,
and ethnic origin, requiring that qualified local personnel be
employed or be trained for employment, 66 and imposing an
obligation on multinational enterprises to obey local laws and
refrain from illegal intervention in the domestic affairs of host
countries. 167  Although the code should permit multinational
corporations to continue to represent their views to government
officials in host countries (at least on those issues which directly
affect their interests), it is recommended that the code prohibit
multinational corporations from: (1) bribing government officials,
directly or indirectly, through the use of agents in host nations;
(2) engaging in local political controversies or identifying them-
selves with any political entity in host nations including a ban on
contributions to government officials, political parties or candi-
dates; and (3) engaging in intervention, directly or indirectly, in
the domestic affairs of a host government. International agree-
ment could also be secured on the prohibition of certain restric-
tive business practices by multinational firms in connection with
licensing of technology.168 Representing the interests of global
166 Farnsworth, O.E.C.D. Asks Data on Big Companies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1975, at 41, col. 8.
167 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Speech to United Nations, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 1. Farnsworth, O.E.C.D. Asks Data on Big Com-
panies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1975, at 41, col. 8. On the general topic of political
intervention see U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOP-
MENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 45-47 (1974). See also Solomon & Lin-
ville, Transnational Activities of American Multinational Corporations and United
States Government Regulation: A Policeman for the World's Moral Standards, forth-
coming, 17 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. -- (1976).
168 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Speech to the United Nations,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 1. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OP COMMERCE,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 22-24
(1974). The United Nations Group of Eminent Persons recommended a prohi-
bition on unjustified export market allocations and the creation of a framework
to revise existing arrangements. U.N. THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS 56 (1974). Technology transfer guidelines should consider what is being
transferred (such as basic research, engineering designs, technical service) and
formulate what objectives should be encouraged; for example, self-sufficiency of
products and processes and/or research and development in host nations. The
cost of such restrictions on multinational enterprises and host countries should
also be considered. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 203 (1974). Secretary
Kissinger also supported the creation of an International Industrialization Institute
to sponsor and conduct research, and an International Center for the Exchange
of Technological Information to act as a clearing-house for sharing research and
findings relevant to development. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Speech
to United Nations, Sept. 1, 1975, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 1.
A critical issue for a code of conduct would turn on whether to require a
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firms, developed countries may seek to distinguish restrictive
practices in fixing prices from those involving the allocation of
exports. Industrialized nations may also resist subjecting existing
technology contracts to current and future periodic review and
posing a limitation on amount of royalties or fees. In view of
national and regional endeavors in the area of restrictive business
practices, the value of an agreement on such principles is doubt-
ful.
Beyond this limited range of items, agreement on a code of
conduct may be more difficult because of either technical ques-
tions involved or differing viewpoints on the allocation of costs
and benefits of multinational firms. For example, the mere
statement that multinational corporations shall not engage in
transfer pricing establishes little. Even after more data is
gathered on the extent and effects of transfer pricing, standards
and regulations covering a wide range of situations in different
industries must be established. The multitude of means for
transferring income must be considered. Guidelines of uni-
versal applicability appear nearly impossible. A just price for
tens of thousands of terms cannot be found. An arm's length
standard of pricing is not helpful in instances of prices set by a
few firms. Determination of the costs, particularly the allocation
of research, administrative, and overhead expenses is difficult.
Agreement on the allocation of a stream of revenue among na-
tions may also prove difficult. A code of conduct dealing with
transfer pricing should leave implementation to national or re-
gional bodies, with provisions for an international agency to fa-
cilitate the collection, analysis, and distribution of data on transfer
pricing. 169
Although taxation has traditionally fallen within the area of
local concern, agreement may be reached on a single, universal
parent corporation to deploy technologies and production processes capable of
most efficiently employing local factors of production. Competition from other
multinational firms may constitute a more effective way to force foreign in-
vestors to experiment with more suitable technologies.
169See U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 56, 89 (1974).
But compare INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12, 35-36 (1974) which advocates the
creation of an arbitration process to which governments and multinational
corporations would have access rather than arbitrary accounting rules and stan-
dards for, what are by definition, special situations. See also, Vaitsos, Com-
ment, in INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 127-128 (Wallace ed. 1974). For
an analysis of the various facets of international agreements by functional areas
see BEHRMAN, CONFLICTING CONSTRAINTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 55-67
(1974).
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income tax on the global profits of a multinational corporation,
with tax liability assessed by each jurisdiction in which a firm
operates in proportion to the profit of the entire enterprise, ir-
respective of where the profit nominally appears. 17 Such a tax
system would remove the incentive to engage in transfer pricing
and other manipulations of income. At least two obstacles exist.
First, a formula on which taxation will be based (for example,
sales, profits, assets, and a percentage of dollar payrolls) must be
devised in each country. Secondly, many developing host coun-
tries currently use tax incentives and subsidies (as well as fa-
vored access to credit and restrictions on unions and strikes) as a
means to attract foreign direct investment. In the future, this
may lead to home nations imposing countervailing restrictions on
host tax inducements. Host countries may in turn attempt to
avoid these home country retaliatory efforts. 171 Whether develop-
ing countries will presently agree on a restriction on tax induce-
ments appears problematic. Perhaps home country retaliatory
policies may force a more conciliatory approach. National and
regional efforts reducing flexibility in transfer pricing may also
force multinational firms to perceive the advantages of interna-
tional tax collaboration.
Revision of the patent system, such as the creation of an inter-
national patent bank to which public institutions would donate
patents which would be licensed to developing countries without
payment of royalties, appears difficult. Developed nations and
multinational corporations will probably press hard in opposing
changes in the patent system and argue that the patent as a monop-
oly forms an incentive for innovation. As access to the highest,
most modern forms of technology probably does not meet the de-
velopment needs of many Third World countries, revisions of the
patent system may fade into the background. The ability to tap
intermediate forms of technology, particularly the labor-intensive
110 U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 91-95 (1974). See also PENROSE, THE LARGE INTER-
NATIONAL FIRM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 273 (1968); PENROSE, International Eco-
nomic Relations and Large Firms, in THE GROWTH OF FIRMS, MIDDLE EAST OIL AND
OTHER ESSAYS 273 (Penrose ed. 1971); VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 276
(1971). But compare INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISES AND THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 37-38 (1974). See gener-
ally, U.N., DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF MULTI-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
TECHNICAL PAPERS: TAXATION, ST/ESA/II (1974), especially Shoup, Taxation
of Multinational Corporations at 33-35.
171 Bergsten, Coming Investment Wars?, 53 FOR. AFF. 135, 141-142 (1974).
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variety and unpatented know-how, may be much more vital for
developing countries. If high technology is deemed critical, na-
tions or regional groupings should consider national or regional
legislation that provides greater discrimination in the granting of
patents, particularly regarding the standard of usefulness. They
should also provide for the compulsory licensing of patents in the
event of non-utilization by foreign firms.172
The difficulties inherent in devising principles for assessing
the costs and benefits of multinational enterprises and in agree-
ing on the allocation of costs and benefits among nation-states and
corporations, 173 as well as the drafting of technical solutions to
general guidelines, present formidible barriers to the early adop-
tion of a meaningful code of conduct or a more formal international
agreement on transnational enterprises. Corporate behavior deemed
desirable may vary with the circumstances and may therefore be
difficult to codify. Nations differ in development priorities, na-
tional interests, economic, social and political objectives, attitudes
and ideology to foreign direct investment, levels of governmental
sophistication, and resource endowments. Industries differ in
structures and patterns of behavior. The interest of labor in de-
veloped nations and developing countries must, of course, be con-
sidered. Developing nations, because of the importance of raw
materials in a world facing resource scarcities, believe their bar-
gaining position is improving. They probably do not want to enter
into compromise arrangements involving current institutional norms
or dispute-resolving mechanisms as a point of reference or to ac-
ceed to a surrender of their sovereignty. Developed countries
probably will resist demands of developing countries for exclusive
domestic jurisdiction over multinational corporations, including
litigated matters, compensation for nationalization, and for a
prohibition of a home country from interceding in a dispute be-
tween a multinational firm and the host government. 174
172 U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 56 (1974); U.N.,
DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY
FROM MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45 (1974).
173 Other difficult areas include ownership and fadeout policies, procedures
and methods for nationalization, the amount and the timing of the payment of
compensation, and environmental questions (including the assessment of social
costs and allocation of such social costs).
174 Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report in the First Session,
U.N. Doc. E/5655 E/C 10/6 (1975), Annex I (List of Areas of Concern Re-
garding the Operations and Activities of Transnational Corporations, Note Sub-
mitted by the Group of 77) at 18-19. Latin American governments wish to deny
local rights and remedies to any foreign-owned subsidiary if such entity or its
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The resolution of issues may evolve in the following stages:
Taking the easy areas first, building up capabilities and trust, then
handling the difficult questions. The United Nations probably
still constitutes the best arena for dealing simultaneously with the
wide variety of issues and for using the results of investigations
undertaken by that body.
Even if guidelines and specific approaches could be agreed
upon, the problems of devising a satisfactory supervising agency
and enforcement mechanism must be resolved. A centralized
regulatory agency may be unresponsive to future needs. Regula-
tion by a branch of the United Nations or a newly created inter-
national agency might prove too weak. A United Nations-based
agency might be regarded as likely to be too inefficient and slow,
but developing countries would probably feel more comfortable
with an agency within the United Nations system. For this rea-
son, multinational corporations and developed countries may desire
a regulatory body not connected with the United Nations. Exist-
ing international organizations, such as the United Nations, might
resent the intrusion of a new regulatory body. The vested inter-
parent called on the home government of the parent (or any foreign government)
in a dispute with the host nation.
The possibility of a multinational corporation pressuring a home country led
to the creation of the Calvo doctrine pursuant to which a subsidiary would refrain
from appealing to its home government for protection or support. U.N.,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 81, n.15 (1973), summarizes
the development of the Calvo doctrine as follows:
To prevent appeals by aliens to their home governments for diplo-
matic intervention on behalf of their contract rights, a number of Latin
American states, during the latter part of the 19th century, adopted a
policy of writing into their contracts with aliens a clause, known as the
"Calvo Clause," the general tenor of which was that the alien agreed
that any disputes that might arise out of the contract were to be decided
by the national courts in accordance with national laws and were not to
give rise to any international reclamation.
International arbitration tribunals and mixed claims commissions have differed
on their interpretations of the clause - some have upheld it as a bar to the inter-
position of the alien's home government, others maintain that the act of an alien
cannot restrict rights of his government under international law.
For background on the Calvo Clause see HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
635-54 (1943); Summers, The Calvo Clause, 19 VA. L. REV. 459 (1933); Note, The
Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a Contractual Renunciation of Diplomatic Protec-
tion, 6 TEX. INT'L L.F. 289 (1971).
To promote acceptance of the Calvo doctrine by home countries, host nations
could guarantee: (1) Economic rights to foreign subsidiaries, (2) non-discrimina-
tory treatment as compared with national enterprises, and (3) procedures for
compensation following nationalization formulas to determine the level of com-
pensation. U.N., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 81-82
(1973).
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ests of established international organizations will lead to pressures
for an agency under the United Nations umbrella. Developing
nations could fird that the international regulatory agency,
whether or not under the auspices of the United Nations, may
develop a sympathy for the entities regulated, with business inter-
ests superceding the public interest charge of the regulators.
Multinational corporations will oppose any meaningful restrictions
as an impediment of their flexibility. Transnational regulation,
like regional grouping, limits ability to play one nation against
another. The press of contradictory national regulations may,
however, lead multinational firms to search for transnational uni-
formity.
Agreement must also be reached on the functions of an inter-
national regulatory agency. Such an agency could perform several
possible functions; including, consultation, gathering of information
with the possible power to compel the production of documents,
promulgation of detailed regulations with the power to enforce
such standards, investigation and the making of nonbinding reports,
arbitration of disputes and reaching decisions which nation-states
and multinational corporations are obligated to effectuate.15 As
evidenced by the refusal of many developing nations, particularly
those in Latin America, to sign the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States formulated by the Executive Directors of the World Bank,
Third World nations remain unwilling to surrender autonomy to a
dispute-resolving mechanism which they view as being dominated
by developed nations. 176  Conversely, if the cards are perceived
175 See Vagts, Formal and Structural Problems of International Organization for
Control of Investment, in INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 235 (Wallace ed.
1974).
176 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States created the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes. The Convention was designed to facilitate the
flow of funds to developing countries by providing arbitration and conciliation
facilities to deal with investment disputes between governments of signatory
states and nationals (private investors) of other signatory states. CONVENTION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF
OTHER STATES, Submitted to Governments by the Executive Directors of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Submitted March 18,
1965; Entered into Force October 14, 1966). For the reaction of Latin American
countries, see, e.g., Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America,
1 VA. INT'L L.J. 256 (1971); Diaz Alejandro, Direct Foreign Investment in Latin
America, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 338 (Kindleberger ed. 1970).
Major capital importers wish to retain sole domestic jurisdiction over foreign
direct investment.
Although the United States and Jamaica are signatories to the Convention,
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to be stacked in favor of developing countries, developed countries
will probably manifest intransigence.
Other problem areas involved in setting up an international
regulatory agency include the financing of the agency, the compo-
sition of the membership of the agency (for example, Should mul-
tinational corporations be eligible for membership?), the selection
of a voting system (on an equal or weighted basis), and the col-
lorary question of who will have the controlling voice in the choice
of top administrators. In the end, Third World nations may per-
ceive that an international agreement may only legitimize the
activities of multinational corporations, 177 giving such entities
added respectability without producing any significant benefits
beyond national or regional controls.
C. Other Efforts to Control Multinational Firms
and to Improve the Position of Developing Countries
In view of the problems inherent in securing meaningful inter-
national regulation in the near future, control over the manufac-
turing activities of multinational corporations depends, in addition
to national and regional regulations of host countries, upon the ef-
ficacy of generating more information and publicity, creative use
of the United Nations system apart from international control and
regulation, sensitizing home nations to problems presented by mul-
tinational corporations, strengthening the transnational position of
labor unions, and increasing the financial assistance for develop-
ing nations through aid and tariff concessions by developed coun-
tries. The information on the impact of multinational corpora-
tions developed by the United Nations Information and Research
Center will strengthen the negotiating position of developing coun-
tries. Model contracts, with standardized provisions, could be
created to regulate relations between a foreign corporation and a
host country. The United Nations Center could also furnish ad-
visory services to developing countries including the evaluation of
the fairness of new private foreign direct investment projects and
Jamaica has refused to participate in a current arbitration proceeding before the
Centre involving taxes on bauxite. Jamaica has taken the position that a legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment relating to minerals or other natural
resources is not subject to the convention. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1975, at 61,
col. 1. It is politically unrealistic to think that developed countries will refrain
from assisting multinational corporatons headquartered in their country, by
diplomatic support and investment guarantees.
177 Vaitsos, Comment, in INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT 127-28, 130
(Wallace ed. 1974).
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technical advice on how to handle existing investments. In addi-
tion to reviewing a proposed contract and comparing it with other
agreements used by such a multinational firm (or another corpo-
ration in the same industry) in other countries, the Center or an-
other United Nations agency might act as a broker to assess
the benefits offered by each party and present alternatives it
views as fair in the allocation of costs and benefits. Such a body
could also identify for developing countries the most desirable
strategies in dealing with multinational corporations and prepare
model contracts. Such mechanisms may assist in dispelling mis-
trust and so permit bargaining on the basis of a clearer concept of
self-interest and evolve fair terms for investments and operations
by multinational enterprises.178
Home nations, such as Sweden, have taken the initiative in
regulating foreign direct investments abroad by corporations
domiciled in such nations with a view to the possible impact on
host nations. For example, a Swedish firm must obtain authori-
zation from the Bank of Sweden whenever it wishes to make di-
rect investments abroad 179 or to borrow money in foreign coun-
tries to finance investments outside Sweden. Sensitizing the
governments of developed nations to problems raised by multina-
tional corporations in developing countries may bring additional
178 U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 74 (1973). A U.N.
agency might offer mediation and conciliation services in the event of disputes
between a nation-state and a multinational corporation. Senator Jacob Javits
(R-N.Y.), a member of the U.N. Group of Eminent Persons, stated that he
opposes the U.N. acting as a party to adversary negotiations between a host
country and a multinational firm. He regarded it as an inappropriate, unrealistic
role considering the wide spectrum of required expertise. U.N., THE IMPACT OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 107 (1974). Business groups also oppose a U.N.
role in negotiations between developing governments and multinational cor-
porations. USA-BIAC COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE, A REVIEW OF THE REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS
TO STUDY THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 18-19, 25-26 (1974). Negotiations should also consider
the impact on income distribution in developing countries. Technical assistance
would strengthen the position of a host nation, lessen dependency and redress
the inequality of power. U.N., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT 87-88 (1973).
179 See SWEDISH INSTITUTE, CURRENT SWEDEN-MULTINATIONAL FIRMS -
SWEDISH VIEWPOINTS 2 (1975); see also Ersman & Gardlund, In Sweden, Invest-
ment Abroad is a Moral Issue, 5 COL. J. WORLD BUS. 26 (1970). Social conditions
(including behavioral standards, non-discrimination in employment, promotion or
division of work, and attitudes toward trade union activities) and benefit condi-
tions (training, social security and social welfare) are included as part of the
Swedish system of investment guarantees which are made available only to invest-
ments which, it is felt, will improve the economic development of the host coun-
try.
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regulation. Such domestic control over American multinational
corporations may only have a limited impact because of the inter-
linking arrangements between big business and government of-
ficials.
Labor unions comprise another possible source of countervail-
ing power. Multinational corporations threaten unions in a variety
of ways. A national union's task of influencing management is
made more difficult because of the problem of identifying and
affecting a decision-making seat outside a nation. A union may
also be unfamiliar with the personnel and organizational traits of
the management of global firms. A union faces difficulties in
obtaining financial data on the profitability of and the wages
paid by the total enterprise and each subsidiary. Multinational
corporations allegedly possess the ability to shift, temporarily or
permanently, production facilities and/or arrange for the use of
multiple production facilities thereby weakening a national union's
power. In particular, switching production to developing coun-
tries may undermine a union's power. The financial staying
power of a multinational corporation with many profit centers
enables such an entity to withstand a local strike better than a
union with one profit center.18D Unions assert that foreign direct
investment results in a reduction of employment and a skewing
of income in the United States.
The assertions of union leaders, however, are overstated.
Some managements have decentralized responsibility for labor ne-
gotiations. Even if decision making over labor matters is central-
ized, top management may carefully consider the views of the
executives of its subsidiaries. The loss of its fixed investment
(such as plant and machinery) and imposition of financial penal-
ties (such as severance pay) under the laws of a host nation retard
the assumed flexibility of multinational corporations to shift oper-
ations. A transfer of production or other operations to a plant
which lacks geographical proximity or sufficient excess capacity
may not prove feasible. The ability of a union to stop production
180 Blake, Trade Unions and the Challenge of the Multinational Corporation, 403
ANNALS 34, 36-37 (1972); U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
77-79 (1974); Lea, Multinational Companies and Trade Union Interests, in THE MUL-
TINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 156-57 (Dunning ed. 1971); Masetti, Secretary, World
Federation of Trade Unions, GROUP OP EMINENT PERSONS 318 (1974); Roberts,
Multinational Collective Bargaining: A European Prospect, 11 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELA-
TIONS 1 (1973); Comment, National Labor Unions v. Multinational Companies: The
Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power, 11 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 124-26 (1972);
Seham, Transnational Labor Relations: The First Steps Are Being Taken, 6 L. & POL.
IN INT'L Bus. 337, 340-44 (1974).
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in one critical part of the vertically integrated operations of a global
firm may give a union considerable bargaining power. 181
Labor unions have undertaken a threefold response to multi-
national firms. First, they have advocated national legislation in
developed home countries (for example, reducing tax incentives
for foreign direct investment) aimed at weakening the position of
multinational corporations. Second, international trade union
secretariats have been created to engage in research, information,
and advisory activities (for example, to gather collective bargain-
ing agreements in an industry throughout the world). This infor-
mation provides guidance to a union in bargaining with the subsidiary
of a multinational corporation. Secretariats also sponsor confer-
ences and seminars, co-ordinate union activity, and establish per-
manent world councils composed of representatives of workers
which have engaged in consultations with employers.182 Third,
181 INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
SOCIAL POLICY 90, 146 (1973); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THEIR ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 26-27 (1974);
U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 137 (1974); see KUJAWA,
INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MANAGEMENT IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
(1971).
182 Unions., representing workers in same or related industries in different
countries collaborate through international trade union secretariats. Unions
which represent workers in different industries are affiliated through international
confederalism. For further information on international trade union secretariats,
see U.N., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 79 (1973). See
also INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL
POLICY 96-99 (1973); Blake, Trade Unions and the Challenge of the Multinational
Corporations, 403 ANNALS 34, 39-41, 43-44 (1972); Lea, Multinational Companies and
Trade Union Interests, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 156-57 (Dunning ed.
1971); Weinberg, The Multinational Corporation and Labor, in THE NEW SOVEREIGNS
96-99 (Said & Simmons eds. 1975); Cox, Labor and Transnational Relations, 25
INT'L ORGAN. 554 (1971).
The variety of strategies employed by international trade secretariats include:
(1) Helping in the organization and strengthening of unions, including the
encouragement of mergers of national unions; (2) bridging religious/ideological
differences; (3) training in union procedures and techniques; (4) exchanging
information; (5) providing assistance in negotiations; (6) assisting in strikes,
including direct financial assistance, pressure on world corporate headquarters
by a home country union, boycotts and demonstrations; (7) taking action against
the strategic plants of multinational firms; (8) synchronizing contract expiration
dates; (9) establishing worldwide corporation councils to coordinate activities of
unions representing workers in all countries where a multinational firm operates;
(10) standardizing demands (for example, hours of work and working condi-
tions); (11) holding joint meetings with a multinational firm; and (12) engaging
in joint bargaining with a global firm or firms. Weinberg, The Multinational
Corporation and Labor, in THE NEW SOVEREIGNS 96-99 (Said & Simmons eds. 1975).
The International Federation of Chemical and General Workers (ICF) formed
a standing committee to coordinate union negotiations in France, Italy, the
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labor has pursued a variety of international bargaining approach-
es. A union in a firm's home country may support employees in
foreign subsidiaries by bringing pressure on the parent corpora-
tion, giving financial assistance for organizing activities, engaging
in strikes and boycotts, and refusing to work overtime. 8 3 The po-
United States and Western Germany including an agreement that a contract
would not be signed until the national unions had been informed and that the
corporation would not be allowed to shift production to avoid the impact of a
strike. No attempt was made to pursue common objectives. TUGENDAHT,
THE MULTINATIONALS 185-88 (1972). For a different view of the ICF, see Northrup
& Rowan, Multinational Collective Bargaining Activity: The Factual Record in Chemi-
cals, Glass and Rubber Tires, 9 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 49 (1974). On the involvement
of the ICF in the 1972 attempt by Akzo Group, a Dutch chemical company, to
close a number of plants in its Enka Glanzstoff Division, see Multinationals: A
Step Toward Global Bargaining, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 28, 1972, at 52; See also Seham,
Transnational Labor Relations: The First Steps Are Being Taken, 6 L. & POL. IN INT'L
Bus. 337, 359, 360 (1974). On the involvement of ICF with Michelin, see Farns-
worth, Big Business Spurs Labor Toward a World Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1972,
at 53, col. 1; Ulman, Multinational Firms Face a Growing Power, Wall Street Journal,
April 23, 1973, at 1, Col. 6. But compare Northrup & Rowan, Multinational Col-
lective Bargaining Activity: The Factual Record in Chemicals, Glass and Rubber Tires,
9 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 112 (1974).
On the importance of the exchange of information, see Seham, Transnational
Labor Relations: The First Steps are Being Taken, 6 L. & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 337, 354-
55 (1974). See also Jones, Labor Unions' Role At Multinationals Found Still Limited,
N.Y. Times, April 21, 1975, at 45, col. 4; Warner & Turner, Trade Unions and the
Multinational Firm, J. INDUS. RELATIONS June 1972, at 143; Windmuller, Inter-
national Trade Union Organizations: Structure, Functions, Limitations, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR 81 (Burkin, Dymond, Kassalow, Meyers & Myers eds. 1967).
A company council enables workers' representatives from a firm's plants
throughout the world to meet, exchange information, and coordinate negotia-
tions. TUGENDHAT, THE MULTINATIONALS 185 (1971). A concession given in one
country forms the basis of bargaining everywhere. Examples of workers
councils include councils for leading auto makers set up by International Metal-
workers Federation, and company councils in the chemical, rubber, paper, tex-
tile fiber, glass, ceramic and atomic energy industries, created by the Interna-
tional Federation of Chemical and General Workers' Union. Seham,
Transnational Labor Relations: The First Steps Are Being Taken, 6 L. & POL. IN INT'L
Bus. 337, 352-53 (1974).
1s3See generally INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE AND SOCIAL POLICY 100-02 (1973). A joint confrontation of labor unions in
two countries with St. Gobain (French glass maker) was engineered in 1969 by
the ICF in support of wage negotiations in which subsidiaries of St. Gobain
were engaged.
Unions claimed a subsidiary, Enka Glanzstoff of Akzo Group, wanted to close
its European synthetic fiber production in 1975 and move such operations to
lower-wage countries. The ICF has set up an Akzo World Council to monitor
the company's actions. The ICF hopes to force formal tralsnational union
negotiations with Akzo, while the corporation wants to hold separate talks with
unions in the Netherlands, West Germany, and Belgium to implement the firm's
unilateral decision to curtail operations. Keniezis, A Multinational vs. United
Nations, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Multinationals Bargaining on an
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sition of each national union has been reinforced through coordi-
nated bargaining which involves putting forth similar demands
and seeking, among other things, common contract termination
dates for contracts at all the facilities of a corporation. 184  The
ultimate aim is centralized multinational collective bargaining which
will encompass similar wage rates and working conditions. Unions
seek an international code of conduct creating a universal set of
fair labor standards to mitigate substandard labor conditions
in developing countries, including wages, and to impose similar
standards of health and safety in home and host countries. 185
Serious impediments exist which curtail extensive coordination
activities and collective bargaining by transnational unions. These
obstacles include differences in national bargaining procedures, that
is, between industry-wide bargaining and enterprise level bargain-
ing, other national legal provisions governing unions, social, politi-
cal and historical factors (including the political orientation and
ideology of many non-American unions), diverse national systems
of social benefits and the regulation of business, differences in
the functions and structures of unions, and the manner in which
a union represents its members. International union arrangements
must also overcome the traditional orientation of union leaders
who think in national terms. National union leaders may also
dislike delegating policy formulation to an international union and
may oppose making sacrifices for workers in other countries who
may be regarded as competitors for jobs. The attitude of rank
International Scale, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 27, 1975, at 38; Multinationals, Bus. WEEK,
Nov. 3, 1975, at 46. See also Litvak & Maule, The Union Response to International
Corporations, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 62, 66-68 (1972); Janssen, Global Clout -
How One Man Helps Unions Match Wits with Multinationals, Wall Street Journal,
June 17, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Townsend, Unions Hope for World Front in Disputes with
Multinationals, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
184 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL
POLICY 67-68 (1973). The management of multinational corporations maintain that
no transnational collective bargaining has occurred. TUGENDHAT, THE MULTI-
NATIONALS 186 (1971). However, some corporations have met with multinational
union representatives. TUGENDHAT, THE MULTINATIONALS 186 (1971); Comment,
National Labor Unions v. Multinational Companies: The Dilemma of Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 11 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 124, 149-51 (1972).
185 For a summary of trade union views, as expressed by international organiza-
tions in policy pronouncements, see INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 83-87 (1973). Unions also look to the ILO for
help in securing a code of conduct requiring multinational firms to recognize
union rights throughout the world. The requirements also could be imposed on a
home nation to ensure that multinational corporations under its jurisdiction ad-
here to basic labor standards throughout the world. U.N., THE IMPACT OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 79-80 (1974).
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and file workers to colleagues in other countries remains a dis-
couraging factor.' 6
The quest for universal fair labor standards (wage parity and
harmonious working conditions) may create an elite, local labor
force of unionized workers employed by multinational corpora-
tions in developing countries. Instead of raising wages for this
select group, a future international agreement might require
multinational firms to turn over to the governments of develop-
ing countries the difference between the going wage rates for
similar types of work in such industry in the developing nation
and the country in which the enterprise is headquartered. Such
a sum could then be invested in infrastructure improvements which
would benefit a wider group of people.187
Facing an acute capital shortage, oil-importing developing
countries seek to meet their needs through three means. First,
the lowering or removal of tariffs and/or import quotas imposed
by developed nations on manufactured products from Third
World countries 88 could help not only the balance of payments
position but also might assist in reducing unemployment in de-
186 See, e.g., GENNARD, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND BRITISH LABOUR:
A REVIEW OF ATTITUDES AND RESPONSES 48 (1972) - 53 percent of workers at
Chrysler of Canada surveyed were willing to go on strike in support of fellow
workers in the United States, but only 10 percent and 9 percent respectively of
Chrysler workers surveyed in England and Mexico would do so. For an analysis
of the obstacles to international union coordination, see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
OFFICE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 103 (1973); Weinberg,
The Multinational Corporation and Labor, in THE NEW SOVEREIGNS 93-95 (Said &
Simmons eds. 1975); Blake, Trade Unions and the Challenge of the Multinational Cor-
poration, 403 ANNALS 34, 44-45 (1973); Curtin, The Multinational Corporation and
Transnational Collective Bargaining, in AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION 203-15 (Kojawa ed. 1973); Comment, National Labor Unions vs.
Multinational Companies: The Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power, 11 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 124-26 (1972). For differences in types of bargaining, see Curtin,
The Multinational Corporation and Transnational Collective Bargaining, in AMERICAN
LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 203-15 (Kojawa ed. 1973); INTER-
NATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY
103 (1973).
187 Sturmthal, The Changing Role of the ILO, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, May
1970, at 51. On creation of a labor union, see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 148 (1973); U.N., THE IMPACT OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 76 (1974).
18 Speech by Henry A. Kissinger to the United Nations Sept. 1, 1975, in
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 1, indicated that the United States would
introduce a generalized tariff preference for the manufactured goods of develop-
ing nations. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1975, at 51, col. 3; but compare, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 1975, at 59, col. 2.
See also U.N. Summary of Development Text, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1975, at
10, col. 5; and U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 65 (1974).
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veloping countries. Developed nations taking such a step cor-
respondingly weaken their balance of payments position and
increase the competition faced by their domestic manufacturing
firms. An international agreement might allocate shares of the
world market for manufactured products. Developing nations
will seek to use their ability to permit access to raw materials on
favorable terms as the lever to gain tariff concessions.
Second, existing and new international financial institutions
could make available more funds through loans and grants to
Third World countries.189 For example, efforts by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank include making more
funds available to countries, mainly developing nations, to pay
higher oil and food costs, creating a subsidy account to make very
low interest loans to the poorest countries and lower than normal
interest rate loans to creditworthy nations.1t 0 Allocation of the
189 Secretary of State Kissinger called for the creation in the International
Monetary Fund of a development security fund to make loans of up to $2.5 billion
a year to meet export deficits experienced by developing countries. He also
advocated the establishment of an International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment to mobilize capital resources for an international program of research,
technical assistance and information exchange, and for the development of better
systems of control, transportation and long management. On the establishment
of a trust fund to benefit developing countries and an International Fund for
Agricultural Development, see U.N. Summary of Development Text, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1975, at 17, cols. 6 & 18. But primary reliance, Secretary Kissinger
indicated, should be placed on stimulating the flow of private capital to develop-
ing nations. Secretary Kissinger supported an increase in the capital of the
World Bank's International Finance Corporation from $100 to $400 million. To
support private enterprise in developing countries, he proposed the creation of an
International Investment Trust to mobilize private capital for investment in
local enterprises. The International Finance Corporation, it is proposed, would
manage the trust. Investments in the trust would be safeguarded by the $200
million loss-reserve fund jointly provided by the governments of developed,
developing and oil-producing nations. Speech by Henry A. Kissinger to the
United Nations, Sept. 1, 1975, in N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at 20, col. 1.
1io See Silk, OPEC Nations Flex Monetary Muscles, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1; and N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1975, at 35, col. 5; Dale, Jr.,
Monetary Bodies Facing Decisions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1975, at 27, col. 1;
Dale, Jr., Growing Debt of Poor Faces IMPI, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1975, at 35,
col. 5.
For various alternatives propounded by the Trilateral Commission, see TRI-
LATERAL COMMISSION, NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMic RELATIONS 9, 13 (1974). OPEC,
with a GNP of $150 billion, should put up one-half the funds, while the United
States, Western Europe and Japan, with an aggregate gross national product of
$2 trillion, should put up the other half. TRILATERAL COMMISSION, OPEC, THE
TRILATERAL WORLD, 11, 15, 19 (1974). OPEC should advance one-third of the funds
to service their loans to Fourth World countries; with the United States, in re-
turn for its lesser contribution, receiving up to $1 billion in additional U.S. ex-
ports. In advocating a third window at the World Bank to loan $3 billion per
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proportion of funds to be advanced by OPEC members and the
developed countries (United States, Western Europe, and Japan)
must be resolved before aid to the Fourth World can be under-
taken on a massive scale.
Developing countries, particularly OPEC member nations,
also want a greater voice in the running of world monetary or-
ganizations in return for increased financial contributions. The
United States has 23 percent and 21 percent of the voting rights,
respectively, in the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. The OPEC nations want to step up their voting rights to
15 percent in the World Bank and 10 percent in the International
Monetary Fund. 191  The United States and other industrialized
nations, however, are reluctant to lose control over international
financing agencies through their ability to veto significant ac-
tions. Meaningful participation for OPEC nations may rest on
gaining control of the Executive Board of the World Bank on which
the United States, Western Europe and Japan presently hold a
majority position.
Third, to achieve development objectives developing countries
continue to call for more direct public aid and investment from
developed nations, hopefully unencumbered with restrictive
strings such as tied aid.192  Sweden has emerged as the first
year at 3 percent interest for general development programs and specific projects,
the Trilateral Commission placed a greater burden on such a subsidy program on
highly liquid OPEC members rather than on industrialized nations who are not
currently very liquid. THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION, OPEC, THE TRILATERAL
WORLD, AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION,
1976-1980 19, 13, 15 (1975).
For an analysis of the World Bank, see MASON & ASHER, THE WORLD BANK
SINCE BRETTON WOODS (1973); LEWIS & KAPUR, THE WORLD BANK GROUP:
MULTILATERAL AID AND THE 1970's (1973); MCNAMARA, ONE HUNDRED COUN-
TRIES, Two BILLION PEOPLE (1973).
191 Silk, OPEC Nations Flex Monetary Muscles, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1975,
§ 3, at 1, col. 1; Gannon, IMF Gold Sales Pact Clears Way to Wider Accord, Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 2, 1975, at 3, col. 1. See also THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION,
OPEC, THE TRILATERAL WORLD AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEW ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR COOPERATION 1976-1980, 6, 18, 19 (1975); U.N. Summary of Development
Text, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1975, at 10, cols. 4-8; Report of Group of Experts on
the Structure of the United Nations System, A NEW UNITED NATIONS STRUCTURE
FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION, U.N. Doc. E/AC 6219 (1975).
192 The official U.N. goal is that development assistance from developed
countries will equal 0.7 percent of such respective nation's gross national product.
U.N. Summary of Development Text, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1975, at 17, col. 6.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger emphasized that the developing world
must depend on private loans and investments, not public aid, to meet its capital
needs. However, the Ford Administration has asked Congress to double U.S.
bilateral agricultural assistance in the 1977 fiscal year. Speech by Henry. A.
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industrial nation to spend seven-tenths of one percent of her gross
national product on foreign aid; the Netherlands and Norway are
also approaching the same percentage figure.193 As a corollary,
developing nations also seek a cancellation or reduction of the
rising level of indebtedness. 19  Rather than an abrogation, a re-
structuring of debt maturities may evolve.
VI. CONCLUSION
The widening gap in the standard of living between developed
and developing countries during the post-World War II period 95
and the desire to overcome the humiliation, inferiority and feeling
of being ignored (resulting from colonialism and the impact of
multinational corporations after independence) has led Third
World countries to engage in national and collective efforts (by
regional, transnational, and economic producing groups) to re-
distribute income and improve their status. Two different sce-
narios must be analyzed: The consequences of a successful effort
and the possible results of an unsuccessful endeavor by developing
countries.
Building on the experience of the oil cartel organized by
petroleum exporting countries, Third World nations possessing
vital raw materials, at least in the short run, possess considerable
negotiating leverage. Using such a bargaining position, develop-
ing countries may attempt to control and regulate multinational
corporations which in the past have transferred wealth and re-
Kissinger to the United Nations, Sept. 1, 1975, in N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1975, at
20, col. 1. For an analysis of foreign aid, see Frank, Jr. & Baird, Foreiqn Aid: Its
Speckled Past and Future Prospects, 29 INT'L ORGAN 133 (1975). See also MIKESELL,
THE ECONOMICS Or FOREIGN AID (1968); Griffin & Enos, Foreign Assistance: Ob-
jectives and Consequences, 18 ECON. DEV. &.CULTURAL CHANGE 313 (1970); Weisskopf,
The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings in Underdeveloped Countries,
2 J. INT'L EcON. 25 (1972); FRANK, BHAGWATI, SHAW & MALMGREN, ASSISTING
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PROBLEMS OF DEBTS: B3URDEN SHARING, JOBS AND TRADE
(1972); Papanek, Aid, Foreign Private Investment, and Growth in Less Developed
Countries, 81 J. POL. ECON. 120 (1973); NELSON, AID, INFLUENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY
(1968); HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM (1971); Frank, Optimal Terms of Foreign
Assistance, 78 J. POL. ECON. 1106 (1970).
193 Weinraub, Sweden Meets Third-World Aid Goal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1975, at 4, col. 4.
194 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 1, 1975, at 6, Col. 3.
i5 The income in the richest industrial countries is 13 times as high as in the
poorest developing nations. Francis, World Bankers Scan Economic Future,
Christian Science Monitor, June 19, 1975, at 13, col. 2. See generally PEARSON,
PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT (1969); MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POVERTY
(1970).
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sources from poorer to richer countries, and secure concessions
and reparations from developed nation-states. In a world of
growing resource scarcities, major industrial nations and multi-
national entities will compete for investment outlets and raw ma-
terial sources producing friction between such nations and per-
mitting a greater share of the world's wealth to gravitate to
developing countries. In short, economic power may supplant
military power as the decisive factor in transnational relations.
The transnational quest for increasing income and status stresses
a growing equality among nation-states, not individuals. In a
world of coercion by developing nation-states, little is said about
the individual within the new society and the paths of develop-
ment he may follow. The focus rests on governments reaching
compromises with corporate interests and other governments and
delineating spheres of exclusive and shared interests. Apparently,
most developing nations wish to continue to live in an inter-
dependent world with industrialized nations and global firms.
The model of economic interdependence coupled with advances in
communications and transportation envisages a weakening of
nation-states. Developing countries are attempting to counter the
impact of interdependence by seeking, through individual and col-
lective strength, to tap the benefits of multinational enterprise
(such as managerial skills and technical expertise) yet avoid the
costs. It remains uncertain whether industrial nations and multi-
national corporations will co-opt the movement for equality.
The example of concessions given to workers in the United States
during the 1930's, including the recognition of collective bar-
gaining, social security and higher minimum wages, does not
provide a hopeful precedent that meaningful reform will occur in
the transnational system during the last quarter of the 20th cen-
tury. Little redistribution of income has occurred on the national
level utilizing countervailing power, but labor has received more
because the pie has become larger. Developing countries may
only extract concessions (such as stabilization of commodity
prices, regulation of the most harmful practices of multinational
corporations, freer access for manufactured products in the mar-
kets of developed nations, and increased financial assistance)
which do not endanger the continued vitality of the world capital-
ist system. Countervailing measures may only squeeze con-
sumers, including many in developing countries. Continued
control of technological advances by industrial countries may doom
developing countries to perpetual dependency even if foreign
direct investment is controlled or restricted. The key to a new
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world system may be the control over the flow of information,
not capital.
This raises the question of the developmental paths to be
pursued by Third World nations. Many nations produce one or
two raw materials and engage, to a greater or lesser degree, in
manufacturing operations for local consumption and for exporta-
tion. A rational plan for development must rest on an assess-
ment of the value of what a nation produces, the means to increase
prices of such goods and services, and the likelihood of increasing
demand (such as opening new markets) or reducing costs (by
decreasing wages, an unpalatable alternative, or utilizing new
technology). In the short run, it is difficult for a country de-
pendent on the exportation of a single raw material to curtail such
operations and turn to another line of endeavor. During the
transition period, a country may remain part of the interdepen-
dent world capitalist system even if the ownership and production
of the resource comes under state control. However, a nation
should investigate unmet needs on a national, regional, and world-
wide basis, and direct its capital allocations to meet such needs.
The more difficult question is whether a nation should pursue
a road of economic autarchy based on participatory political and
work organization structures, with only a minimum amount of in-
ternational trade and investment. 196  Instead of pursuing the rain-
bow of a Western industrial society (which has generally resulted
in the depopulation of rural areas and brought unemployment and
underemployment to the urban multitude concentrated in metro-
politan centers), a developing nation might seek to build a labor-
intensive agrarian society based on the use of local resources and
on relatively primitive or intermediate technology in which the
population would be mobilized for large-scale projects. The mix
1 John Maynard Keynes based his position in opposition to world inter-
dependence through trade on three arguments: (1) Free trade in the nineteenth-
century did not ensure peace, but ended in World War I and the Great Depres-
sion; (2) the spread of modern technology facilitates the local production of basic
needs; and, (3) the world capitalist system would bar national experimentation
in alternate forms of social, political and economic organization. During the
Great Depression and World War 1I when contact was broken between the
industrialized west and the nations of Latin America, the region rapidly in-
dustrialized and urbanized. GRIFFIN, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SPANISH AMERICA 269-70
(1969). The leading example of a self-reliance approach is The People's Re-
public of China. The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is attempting to disperse
people to the country and build a strong agricultural base. Schanberg, Cambodia
Reds Are Uprooting Millions as They Impose a "Peasant Revolution", N.Y. Times,
May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 8; Kamm, Cambodian Refugees Tell of Revolutionary Up-
heaval, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
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between agricultural and industrial sectors, the latter more capital-
intensive, would require careful control and planning as well as
the ability to stop the exodus from the land and to uproot people
from the evergrowing shanty towns. Whether this path of de-
velopment can be accomplished on a voluntary basis remains doubt-
ful. However, a chance exists that a more humane, participatory
track may be implemented in the absence of a legacy of authori-
tarian industrial structures. 19 7
By turning from the industrial model and the system of inter-
dependence, a nation may also strive to avoid the growing burden
of inflation, spread through the medium of goods and services
exported from developed countries. The inflationary spiral may
intensify the inequalities inherent in the present transnational
structure. Regardless of the path of development selected, cur-
tailing surging population expansion should constitute a prime
goal for Third World nations.
As developing nations strive for equality or even global
hegemony to take revenge for past humiliation and dependency,
developed countries will perceive such endeavors as destroying
the present world capitalist system. Increasing prices for raw
materials, for which there may be an ever mounting demand, a
decline in the standard of living, the increase of unemployment in
the manufacturing sectors as multinational firms transfer manu-
facturing facilities to poorer lands, and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in Third World hands pose, for some, the specter of a
gloomy period for Western industrialized society. 198  Facing the
alleged need of authoritarian discipline to control industrialization,
to restrain individual consumption, and to provide for a fair sharing
of wealth, the demand may arise for increased resistance to the
aspirations of developing countries or at best for granting only
meaningless concessions which do not weaken the position of
industrialized nations or reduce their income or growth. Despite
the questions' 99 raised as to the ethical validity of the emerging
transnational welfare system, marked by redistribution of income
and status, significant benefits would accrue to industrialized
197 MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 47 (1964). For an example of the
developmental problems, see Northrup, Third-World Dilemma, Zambia, Hit by
Expensive Oil, Cheap Copper, Trying to Change One-Commodity Economy, Wall
Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1975, at 24, col. 1. But compare Riding, Mexico Heedless
of Peasant's Plight, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 5. See also Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 25, 1975, at 26, col. 3.
198 See generally HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT (1974).
199 Tucker, Egalitarianism and International Politics, 60 COMMENTARY 27 (1975).
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nations in meeting Third World nations; namely, a reduction of
worldwide tensions. The price, however, may be too great a
burden on the world capitalist system, and on the U.S. multi-
national corporations in particular.
Simply put, can the American society exist without the con-
tinued expansion and growth of foreign activities of multinational
enterprises?" There appears to be no reason why the United
For an analysis of the need for foreign direct investment and corporate
expansion to preserve the global ability to maintain the oligopoly advantage
enjoyed by American corporations, see Moran, Foreign Expansion as an 'Institu-
tional Necessity' jor U.S. Corporate Capitalism: The Search for a Radical Model, 25
WORLD POL. 369, 384 (1973).
Moran, Foreign Expansion as an 'Institutional Necessity' for U.S. Corporate Capi-
talism, 25 WORLD POL. 369, 386 (1973) concludes:
But there is something fundamental to American corporate capitalism -
the capitalism of tightly held technology, uncertain information, large
economies of scale, and unstable imperfect competition . . . that
creates strong pressures for foreign investment. As long as American
corporations exercise their virtues of inventiveness and aggressiveness,
their government will feel intense, even frantic pressures to create and
preserve an international system that facilitates foreign economic ex-
pansion.
See also Magdoff, The Logic of Imperialism, 1 SOCIAL POLICY 20 (1970).
For other views on whether the end to foreign direct investment in overseas
activities of American corporations will necessarily lead to a collapse of
capitalism in the United States, see Miller, Bennett & Alapatt, Does the U.S.
Economy Require Imperialism, 1 SOCIAL POLICY 13 (1970) who state, at 17-18:
Our conclusion - subject to closer study of the import question - is
that the [United States] economy as a whole does not have a heavy
dependence upon activities in low-income nations [italics omitted].
• . . [W]e are unconvinced that the U.S. economy so depends on
overseas activities that it must protect them, even by military actions.
Rather, our point is that this activity alone is not so dominating
within our economy that political groups could not develop and offset
the demands made by narrow, economically motivated interest groups.
We do not think that the economy would collapse if particular economic
interest groups were unable to control overseas U.S. political military
activities in certain areas.
See also Goldstein, U.S. Economic Penetration of Western Europe, in TESTING
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 214, 217 (Rosen & Kurth eds. 1974).
Weisskopf, Capitalism, Socialism, and the Sources of Imperialism, in TESTING
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALIsM 61-62 (Rosen & Kurth eds. 1974), states:
Should one of these economies suddenly be deprived of access to
its foreign investment assets, it is unlikely that macro-economic pros-
perity would be threatened.
The obligation to replace some foreign investments by new domestic
alternatives would no doubt inflict some losses on the economy as a
whole and substantial losses on particular firms, but there is every rea-
son to believe that an economy could remain buoyant with a somewhat
lower level of direct private investment abroad.
A Wharton School survey of 45 top U.S. corporations revealed that about
85 percent think that pulling out of foreign operations would be catastrophic or
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States must continue to build a system at the expense of individuals
located in other nation-states thereby widening the gap between
the affluent and impoverished areas. The present system, which
opens the United States to future blackmail attempts by raw
materials cartels, may adversely affect domestic employment and
income distribution. The coming new era may present a time of
promise as well as peril for Western civilization. Curtailment of
individual consumption may lay the basis for the creation of new
values and institutions. The disintegration of the old order may
be painful, especially for those possessing status and privilege, but
consideration should be directed to the period of rebirth of Western
society, particularly the rationale for vast political and economic
organizations. In the new environment, self-managed economic
institutions may flourish in the Western world as part of a move-
ment for a decentralized participatory society. Greater use of
labor-intensive techniques may alleviate growing concerns re-
garding unemployment, energy and capital shortage, and the
omnipresent danger of pollution. The new economic and political
institutions may also develop to meet the deep needs for personal
fulfillment and concern for others. In short, the emerging trans-
national order may lay the basis for the liberation of people every-
where and for an escape from old, lifeless institutions and values
cause permanent damage to their company. Perlmutter, Root & Plante, Re-
sponses of U.S.-Based MNC's to Alternative Public Policy Futures, 8 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus. 78 (1973).
In a capitalist economy characterized by limited expansion overseas, the
role of the military establishment and military spending remains uncharted.
Weisskopf, Capitalism, Socialism, and the Sources of Imperialism, in TESTING THEORIES
OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 69-77 (Rosen & Kurth eds. 1974), asserts that the best
way to stop "imperialism" is to build socialism. See also Weisskopf, Dependence
and Imperialism in India, 5 REV. OF RADICAL ECON. 53 (1972), who also urges a
revolutionary transformation of class structure, otherwise a developing country
faces a choice between economic stagnation or economic dependence. Weisskopf
argues that a centrally planned economy in a home country would not need
foreign markets to compensate for an inadequate demand at home or for foreign
investments to absorb surplus capital. Goods demanded by consumers in such a
society may require less imported raw materials. Such countries, therefore, are
less likely to engage in imperialistic activities. However, a centrally planned
economy operating at a continued high level of industrialization might still
need the same amount of raw materials. The exploitative behavior of the Soviet
Union, as a centrally planned economy with reference to its satellite nations,
does not offer much assurance that a change in economic institutions will solve
the attempt of one nation to dominate others. See Whitney, Russian Imperialism
Today, in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 262 (Boulding & Muker eds. 1972); STRACHEY,
THE END OF EMPIRE 292-306 (1964); HALLOWELL, SOVIET SATELLITE NATIONS: A
STUDY OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM (1958); See generally BARNET, ROOTS OF WAR Ch.
8 (1973).
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in the West. Thus, the new era may present, over the long term,
an unmatched opportunity to transform Western civilization.
In the short run, moreover, a multitude of challenges exist in
the United States to tap the expansionistic drives of multinational
corporations. Perhaps the most pressing is the need to develop
the technological and practical possibilities for a new energy
source such as solar energy or coal gasification. Attention should
be given to the development of synthetic substitutes for raw ma-
terials in short supply domestically. Joint public and private
efforts could undertake the necessary research and implement the
steps to insure a sufficiency of resources for the new society.
America's mounting urban needs such as housing, mass transpor-
tation and waste disposal also present new dimensions for busi-
ness development at home as well. What may be required is a
cessation of U.S. tax incentives for foreign direct investment and
the channeling of private investment through economic planning and
funding, to areas of public need.2i Support of technological
innovation in nonmilitary research and development areas is es-
pecially appropriate.
The danger of a unilateral inward turn by the United States
is that Western European and Japanese firms will fill the void.
The American public must chose either to pursue policies which
rebound to the advantage of United States multinational corpora-
tions or to meet domestic needs and build a more humane society,
albeit a less competitive one, vis-i-vis other industrialized nations.
Thus far it has been assumed that gains flowing to developing
countries will cause losses for industrialized nations. But the quest
for transnational equity, the redistribution of income and status,
the development of new institutional arrangements, the control of
foreign direct investment, and the regulation of multinational
enterprises may produce benefits for developing and developed
countries and global firms. One example is the role played by
the Industry Cooperative Program of the Food and Agriculture
Organization, an affiliate of the United Nations, to reduce conflict
between developing countries and transnational corporations in
the field of agribusinessA0 2  The Industry Cooperative Program
21 Solomon & Belzer, Looking Ahead: Capital Shortaes, Tax Policy and Eco-
nomric lPlaning, forthcoming, N.D. LAW. (1975).
32 See Turner, Muhinationals, The United Nations and Development. 7 COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus. 13 (1972); SECRETARIAT OF THE INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE PROGRAM,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, THE ROLE OF THE IN-
DUSTRY COOPERATIVE P3ROGRAMME (1973); J.AC. Hugill, Chairman, Industry Co-
operative Program, GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS 207 (1974); Vicker, New Partners
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acts as a catalyst and provides a supporting framework for a
dialogue to take place within the United Nations among govern-
ments of Third World nations and business entities. The Program
facilitates an exploration of the reasons for conflicts and attempts
to develop specific remedies which will produce benefits for de-
veloping countries and multinational corporations. Although
marked by many failures as well as successes, the Industry Co-
operative Program may serve as a model for cooperative govern-
ment-business endeavors under the auspices of the United Nations
in other areas.
The bedrock of the emerging transnational order will probably
require Western countries and multinational firms to negotiate
with, not dictate to, developing nations. Ideally each nation (or
more realistically those possessing an economic advantage in the
form of raw materials, a competitive manufacturing sector, a large
and rapidly growing market, or all three) should be free to assess
the degree of interdependence with the world capitalist system it
deems optimal and determine the price it is willing to pay for
the perceived benefits.203  Each nation should be able to control
its economy and development. The alternatives open to each na-
tion should be based on meaningful, accurate information which is
freely available. Charting how joint gains will be perceived and
shared remains to be developed as well as measuring the equitable
distribution and management of the world's wealth and the ac-
ceptable level of resource transfers that will meet the hopes of
poorer nations.
Another bleak possibility must be mentioned. Developing
Multinational Firms Help Poorer Nations to Boost Food Output, Wall Street Journal,
Mar. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 6. But compare, DeMarco & Sechler, Agribusiness Goes
Abroad: Corporate Myths in a Hungry World, in THE FIELDS HAVE TURNED BROWN,
FOUR ESSAYS ON WORLD HUNGER 67 (Marco & Sechler eds. 1975).
For an assessment that agribusiness multinational corporations have failed
to meet problems of hunger and malnutrition, see Berg, Industry's Struggle with
World Malnutrition, 50 HARV. Bus. REV. 130 (1972). Agriculture, in developing
countries, has become subordinated to the needs of developing countries or indus-
tries. The solution to the problem of world hunger may require a fundamental re-
structuring of agrarian institutions and an increase in food production by devel-
oping countries. See generally Schertz, World Food: Prices and the Poor, 52 FOR.
APP. 511 (1974); BROWN, By BREAD ALONE (1974).
203 Nye, Two Views of World Order, in GLOBAL COMPANIES 166 (Ball ed.
1975); UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 59 (1973) stated:
The key issue is not whether the home country should hamstring or
do away with the multinational corporations, but how their behavior
may be influenced so as to correspond more closely to a set of en-
lightened national and international objectives.
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nations, excluding OPEC, are drifting to economic stagnation
and possible bankruptcy and anarchy over the next 5 to 10 years.
Even if Western nations seek to meet the needs of developing
countries, their rising expectations may continue to render the
remaining inequities intolerable, thus leading to an ever spiraling
list of demands. The desperate position of Fourth World nations
and the possible future collapse of the oil cartel may propel de-
veloping countries to turn to ever more authoritarian political
regimes and to disruptive actions including defaulting on indebted-
ness, terrorism and nuclear blackmail. Short-term palliatives to
stabilize the international order may only postpone, but not
avoid, the day of reckoning. Frantz Fanon regarded violence as
part of the decolonization process.2 4 An individual participating
in violent action could, according to Fanon, rid himself of in-
feriority and submissiveness and could be transformed psycho-
logically so as to become capable of creating a new society. The
effort of Third World nations to change from being an object of
history to being its subject through liberating acts of violence may
destroy Western society and perhaps the entire world. As Nkrumah
bleakly concluded: "The danger is now not civil war within in-
dividual states provoked by intolerable conditions within those
States, but international war provoked ultimately by the misery
of the majority of mankind who daily grow poorer and poorer."205
2 See generally FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 35-103 (1968).
205 NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM, THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM 259
(1969).
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